Introduction

1.1 The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) outlines how the Australian Government prepares for, responds to, and supports recovery from crises.⁵ Crises are characterised by three key conditions; a high degree of danger or threat against something that is desirable to protect, a lack of certainty regarding the specific nature of the threat and its consequence, and time pressure or urgency of counter measures.⁶ Crises may impact Australia’s economy, security, infrastructure and environment, and can have a significant impact on Australian’s health, wellbeing and livelihoods.⁷ Crises are often difficult to predict and have no standard response.

1.2 Australia’s threat and risk environment is evolving, resulting in new hazards with increased intensity and duration.⁸ This includes an increase in concurrent and consecutive hazard events, a changing climatic environment, increased digital connectivity and evolving national security environment.⁹

1.3 A number of reviews and inquiries into disaster events and crises have highlighted the impact of crises on vulnerable communities, including the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements¹⁰ and the Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 report.¹¹ Vulnerable communities may have a range of characteristics, such as impaired mobility or sensory awareness, chronic health conditions, or social and economic limitations, that may reduce their ability to prepare for and respond to crises. This can result in a greater risk of loss, injury, illness, and death during crises.¹²

The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework

1.4 The AGCMF describes an ‘all-hazards’ approach to crisis management that recognises the need for consistency across the Australian Government’s crisis management systems in preparation for the full spectrum of hazards that may affect life, property or the natural environment.¹³

1.5 In 2008, a Review of Homeland and Border Security¹⁴ highlighted the need for a more integrated approach to emergency management. The review highlighted the need for an overarching policy framework and strategic direction to better equip the Australian Government to plan and evaluate the national security activities of agencies and address fundamental gaps in emergency management. The AGCMF resulted from this review. Since its release, the AGCMF has been updated on 11 occasions.¹⁵

1.6 The AGCMF has been used to respond to a variety of crises between 2020 and 2023 including:

• the COVID-19 pandemic;
• natural disasters such as prolonged flood events across Australia and tropical cyclone events;
• cyber security incidents including data breaches involving Medibank and Latitude Financial, and the security breach affecting the email gateway system supporting some ACT Government systems; and
• the Turkiye and Syria earthquake for which the Australian Government committed humanitarian assistance.

Australian Government crisis management continuum

1.7 The Australian Government crisis management continuum comprises seven phases of crisis management and recovery.¹⁶ These phases are:

Table 1.1: Phases of the Australian Government crisis management continuum and their definitions

Source: Australian Government Crisis Management Framework.

1.8 The focus of the AGCMF is near-term crisis preparedness, response, relief and early recovery.¹⁷

Roles and responsibilities

1.9 The Australian Constitution establishes the legislative powers of the Parliament of Australia.¹⁸ States and territories retain legislative powers over matters not specifically listed in the Constitution. State and territory governments are the first responders to incidents that occur within their jurisdictions. The Australian Government contributes to crisis management during significant crises.

1.10 The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) is responsible for setting, and oversight of, whole-of-government crisis management policy, including coordinating updates to the AGCMF.¹⁹ The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is the custodian of Australian Government crisis capabilities that support some or all elements of crisis coordination. This includes administering the National Coordination Mechanism on behalf of Australian Government agencies, the Australian Government National Situation Room and providing guidance on crisis preparation and strategic planning, crisis communication and recovery.^{20 21}

2023 Australian Government Crisis Management Framework review

1.11 In March 2023, government decided to conduct a review of the AGCMF. PM&C conducted this review. The scope of this review was to consider the:

• objectives of the framework;
• triggers for escalation;
• accountabilities of agencies and ministers and mechanisms to resolve accountabilities where they are unclear or overlap during a crisis;
• arrangements for coordinating information, decision-making, reporting and transparency;
• arrangements for the receipt, coordination and deployment of international assistance; and
• gaps in the framework including providing confidence the framework can deal with crisis at scale, multiple crises and new and emerging vectors.

1.12 Following the 2023 AGCMF Review, a revised Australian Government Crisis Management Framework was released at the 2024–25 Higher Risk Weather Season National Preparedness Summit in Canberra on 18–19 September 2024.

Other scrutiny

1.13 The operations of the crisis management framework — including in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic response — have been subject to external scrutiny such as:

• Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements February 2020;
• Senate Select Committee on COVID-19; and
• Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) inquiry into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s crisis management arrangements.

1.14 The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements was established on 20 February 2020 to inquire into and report on national natural disaster arrangements at all phases of disaster management, including mitigation, adaptation, preparedness, response and recovery, and make recommendations about any policy, legislative, administrative or structural reforms the Commissioners deemed appropriate.²² The report was published on 28 October 2020.

1.15 The Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 was established on 9 April 2020 to inquire into and report on the Australian Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.²³ The Committee undertook public hearings and received submissions from a range of stakeholders. The Committee released its final report in April 2022.²⁴

1.16 The JCPAA undertook an inquiry into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s crisis management arrangements, based on the findings and recommendations made in Auditor-General Report No. 39 2021–22 Overseas Crisis Management and Response: The Effectiveness of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Management of the Return of Overseas Australians in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.²⁵

1.17 The Commonwealth Government COVID-19 Response Inquiry was announced on 21 September 2023. The inquiry will review the Commonwealth Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and make recommendations to improve response measures in the event of future pandemics.²⁶

Rationale for undertaking the audit

1.18 The AGCMF is the basis for the Australian Government’s response to crises including pandemics, natural disasters, terrorism, and cyber incidents. This audit provides assurance to the Parliament on whether Australian Government entities have identified and applied lessons from the crises between 2020 and 2023, including the COVID-19 pandemic, to the AGCMF in preparation for future severe to catastrophic crises.

1.19 In its report on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s crisis management approaches, the JCPAA recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a performance audit of the AGCMF, and include within the audit scope whether the updated framework adequately reflects lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁷ The JCPAA also identified an audit of the AGCMF as an audit priority of the Parliament in 2022–23.

Audit approach

Audit objective, criteria and scope

1.20 The audit objective was to assess whether the Australian Government has established an appropriate framework for responding to crises.

1.21 To form a conclusion against the objective, the following high-level criteria were adopted:

• Has the readiness of systems and processes to respond to crises been assessed?
• Is the AGCMF fit for purpose to respond to a changing threat environment?

1.22 The audit examined whole-of-government crisis coordination arrangements and the 2023 review of the AGCMF being undertaken by PM&C. The audit focussed on whole-of-government crisis coordination arrangements between 2020 and 2023 (i.e. excluding agency-specific crisis coordination arrangements) including the supporting mechanisms to convene key committees under the AGCMF.

1.23 The audit did not examine:

• the application of the framework to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or other crises;
• the adherence to individual national plans required under the AGCMF;
• agency specific crisis coordination arrangements; or
• operational responses to crises.

Audit methodology

1.24 The audit involved:

• reviewing records concerning the administration of the AGCMF, particularly relating to updates to the AGCMF between 2020 and 2023, and the 2023 review of the AGCMF; and
• meetings with key Australian Government officials involved in whole-of-government crisis coordination arrangements and the review of the AGCMF.

1.25 The audit was conducted in accordance with ANAO Auditing Standards at a cost to the ANAO of approximately $440,165.

1.26 The team members for this audit were Jacqueline Hedditch, Jade Ryan, Mary Potter, and Corinne Horton.

2.1 The nature of a crisis requires a quick response to minimise impacts and provide support for those affected.²⁸ Readiness of systems and processes includes establishing arrangements to ensure that the required resources, capabilities, and services can be efficiently mobilised and deployed.²⁹ Clear definitions of roles and responsibilities and regular reviews of arrangements, including processes to identify and learn lessons, are important to ensure that Australia is ready to respond to increasingly severe and complex crises often with events occurring concurrently.³⁰

2.2 This chapter relates to versions of the AGCMF in effect between 2020 and 2023 and the review processes related to these versions.

Were roles and responsibilities clearly defined in previous versions of the AGCMF?

2.3 The AGCMF was first released in 2010 following the 2008 Australian Government Review of Homeland and Border Security. The AGCMF has been updated on 11 occasions since the previous format³¹ was released in 2012. This includes five updates in the period 2020 to 2023.³² The updates were published in:

• October 2020;
• July 2021;
• December 2021;
• November 2022; and
• September 2023.

2.4 In 2023, PM&C commenced the first comprehensive whole-of-government review of the AGCMF since its establishment. A timeline of updates to the AGCMF is outlined in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Timeline of updates to the AGCMF

Source: ANAO.

Oversight roles

2.5 PM&C is responsible for whole-of-government national security and intelligence policy coordination. The Resilience and Crisis Management Division in PM&C has:

policy responsibility for Australian Government crisis management arrangements and continuity of executive government, coordinates across government to support continuous improvement and reform of Commonwealth disaster management policy and capability. This includes undertaking a comprehensive review of the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework and leading the National Preparedness Taskforce.

2.6 PM&C is responsible for setting, and oversight of, whole-of-government crisis management policy, in accordance with the AGCMF.³³

2.7 The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was established on 1 September 2022 to provide national leadership and strategic coordination for emergencies and disaster preparedness, response, relief, recovery, reconstruction, risk reduction and resilience.³⁴ NEMA was created by combining the National Recovery and Resilience Agency (NRRA) and the Emergency Management Australia (EMA) division of the Department of Home Affairs.³⁵

2.8 NEMA has defined one of its strategic objectives as ‘leading and coordinating national action and assistance across the emergency management continuum.’³⁶ References to NEMA were included throughout the AGCMF for specific activities, such as:

• developing and delivering the annual national exercise program (see paragraphs 3.81 to 3.111);
• maintenance of the Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning methodology (see paragraphs 3.25 to 3.35);
• operating the Australian Government National Situation Room (see paragraph 3.37);
• working with lead agencies to capture observations as part of the lessons management process (see paragraphs 2.64 to 2.68); and
• chairing or co-chairing relevant crisis committees (see paragraphs 2.20 to 2.33).

2.9 NEMA also has responsibility for specific national-level crisis plans (see paragraphs 3.68 to 3.80).

2.10 As outlined in paragraph 1.9, state and territory governments retain primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and the environment. The Australian Government provides support to states or territories where the nature of the crisis has or is expected to exceed the sovereign capacities of the state or territory to manage.

Lead ministers and agencies

2.11 Under the AGCMF, a lead minister is responsible for the coordination of the Australian Government’s near-term crisis preparation, immediate crisis response, and early recovery from a crisis arising from specific hazards. The lead minister is determined by the nature of the hazard or hazards. The lead minister is responsible for overseeing the coordination and delivery of the Australian Government response in conjunction with state and territory counterparts, exercise executive responsibilities in consultation with ministers with relevant portfolio interests and representing the Australian Government as the key spokesperson.

2.12 Under previous versions of the AGCMF, ministerial and lead agency responsibilities for specified hazards were outlined in Annex C.³⁷ The minister responsible for Home Affairs, supported by the minister responsible for Emergency Management, is the lead minister where there is no clear ministerial lead for a domestic crisis.

2.13 The lead agency is also determined by the nature of the hazard or hazards. Prior to September 2024, lead agencies were responsible for:

• coordinating, leading and implementing whole-of-government response actions and overseeing the strategic response to a crisis;
• providing support and advice to lead ministers, preparing and exercising plans to manage all-hazards³⁸;
• providing subject matter expertise;
• ensuring that ministerial directions and decisions are implemented;
• exercising relevant powers and decision-making responsibilities;
• working with jurisdictional partners to inform Australian Government situational awareness; and
• contributing to predictive analysis and decision support through effective information sharing.

2.14 In 2020, ten specific hazards were identified in the AGCMF.³⁹ Space weather events were added as a hazard in July 2021, and cyber incidents were added in September 2023. Space weather events were added as a specific hazard as they were identified as posing a risk to critical infrastructure.⁴⁰ Cyber incidents were added as a specific hazard following a review of significant cyber incidents which indicated that cyber incident response roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined.⁴¹

2.15 While new hazards have been identified and specific response plans have been developed, there has been no review of the appropriateness of the collective suite of existing plans (see paragraphs 3.72 to 3.78 for further detail). As outlined in paragraph 2.41, machinery of government changes have resulted in some conflict in relation to roles and responsibilities for specified hazards. Under the revised AGCMF released in September 2024, the Crisis Arrangements Committee has an expanded role in relation to crisis plans (see paragraphs 3.58 to 3.59).

Triggers and thresholds for activation

2.16 Triggers for activating a whole-of-government coordination response are identified in the AGCMF. These triggers remained the same between December 2017 and September 2023. Potential triggers for activating a whole-of-government coordination response included:

• the scale of the crisis and its potential or actual impact on Australia, Australians, or Australia’s national interests;
• formal ministerial consideration of the event;
• a crisis affecting multiple jurisdictions or industry sectors;
• a request from an affected nation, state and/or territory for Australian Government capabilities or assistance;
• a crisis with both domestic and international components;
• a crisis resulting in a large number of Australian casualties;
• community expectations of national leadership; or
• multiple crises occurring simultaneously which require coordination, resource prioritisation and de-confliction.

2.17 Previous versions of the AGCMF outlined that entities ‘may also choose to escalate issues where there is a novel event or crisis for which a specific Government plan does not exist.’ Previous versions of the AGCMF did not provide further guidance for entities to escalate such issues or detail on which supporting arrangements such as crisis committees may be utilised.

2.18 Triggers and thresholds for activation have been updated in the revised AGCMF released in September 2024 (see paragraph 3.55).

Crisis mechanisms

2.19 Crisis mechanisms such as crisis committees support crisis preparedness and response activities. The AGCMF identified some of these crisis mechanisms. Other mechanisms also operated in support of the AGCMF, however, were not defined in the AGCMF. These can be categorised as one of three types of mechanisms.

• Australian Government — these mechanisms and committees include representatives from Australian Government entities.
• National — these mechanisms and committees include representatives from Australian Government entities, states and territories, and where relevant may include other external stakeholders such as industry and non-government organisations.
• State and territory — these mechanisms and committees relate to states and territories.⁴²

Australian Government crisis mechanisms

Crisis Arrangements Committee

2.20 The Crisis Arrangements Committee (CAC) is intended to provide strategic direction in the development of coordinated Australian Government crisis management arrangements. The CAC was formed in 2015 to assist in developing coordinated, whole-of-government approaches to Australian Government crisis management matters. Membership includes Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 2 or 3 level officials from agencies with roles in crisis or emergency management matters.

2.21 PM&C advised the ANAO on 27 February 2024 that prior to its re-establishment in 2023, the CAC last met in December 2019. The CAC was re-established in June 2023 to provide whole-of-government oversight of the 2023 AGCMF Review. Prior to September 2024, the CAC was not defined in the AGCMF.

Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee

2.22 The Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee (AGCRC) was the ‘primary mechanism for bringing together relevant Australian Government Agency representatives, primarily in response to domestic crises’.⁴³ The AGCRC did not have a formalised terms of reference to guide its operations. The scope of the AGCRC was defined as ‘crisis with a predominantly domestic impact’ under the AGCMF. The AGCRC provided similar operational support to what is now the NCM (see paragraphs 2.22 to 2.23).

2.23 During the 2023 AGCMF Review, entity consultation identified that the existence and usage of multiple coordination groups, particularly at the senior officials’ level which includes the AGCRC, may cause confusion and duplication. The consultation feedback highlighted issues around the clarity of purpose and quantity of committees and mechanisms in place for crisis response and coordination. The AGCRC has since been replaced by an NCM function known as NCM-AUSGOV (see paragraphs 3.65 to 3.67).

Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force

2.24 An Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) ‘manages the whole-of-government response to overseas incidents or crises that impact or threaten to impact Australians or Australia’s interests overseas.’ An IDETF is chaired by the Deputy Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and may be co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary PM&C.

2.25 As part of the 2023 AGCMF Review (see paragraphs 2.48 to 2.63), DFAT provided feedback to PM&C that indicated further clarity around the triggers for and identification of participants in an IDETF may be beneficial. DFAT also queried whether both the AGCRC and the IDETF were necessary.

National crisis mechanisms

National Cabinet

2.26 The National Cabinet is a mechanism comprising the Prime Minister, state premiers and territory chief ministers. The National Cabinet held its first meeting on 15 March 2020.⁴⁴ On 29 May 2020, the Prime Minister announced that National Cabinet would replace the Council of Australian Government (COAG).⁴⁵ The role of COAG was not defined in the AGCMF.

2.27 In the October 2020 version of the AGCMF, the National Cabinet was referenced only in a note to a visual representation of the relationship between state and territory coordination arrangements, entity led coordination, and whole-of-government coordination, stating that ‘in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the National Cabinet was convened to support coordination between First Ministers.’

2.28 The July 2021 version of the AGCMF included the National Cabinet as an option to ‘ensure coordinated, timely action across Australian governments where cooperation across all states and territories is required.’ The wording remained through to the September 2023 version. There was no further guidance as to the scope or role of the National Cabinet in a crisis or its link to other committees within crisis coordination arrangements.

2.29 The National Security Committee (NSC) is a committee of Cabinet. The role of the NSC is to consider the highest-priority, highest-risk and most strategic national security matters of the day.⁴⁶ Prior to 2024, the NSC was not specifically identified in the AGCMF, however, has acted as one of the key decision-making committee’s during crises.⁴⁷

National Coordination Mechanism

2.30 The AGCMF stated that:

in some cases it may still be appropriate for the Prime Minister, or the Minister leading the response to a crisis, to establish special purpose / temporary response mechanisms in parallel with existing response mechanisms (AGCC, NCC or IDETF). Special purpose/temporary mechanisms may include, for example: the appointment of a special envoy; an ad hoc Secretaries’ coordination meeting; and/or a dedicated whole-of-government taskforce. Any special purpose/temporary mechanisms should be guided by existing arrangements, to ensure a consistent and effective whole-of-government response.⁴⁸

2.31 The NCM was established on 5 March 2020 as part of the COVID-19 pandemic response.⁴⁹ The intent of the NCM was to operationalise plans used during the COVID-19 pandemic and coordinate Commonwealth agencies’ planning and preparedness measures for non-health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The NCM was formally embedded in the October 2020 version of the AGCMF. NEMA administers the NCM on behalf of Australian Government entities. The relevant Deputy Coordinator-General NEMA convenes or chairs the NCM. The Deputy Secretary PM&C may elect to co-chair the NCM.

2.32 The Department of Home Affairs drafted Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the NCM in March 2020. The draft ToRs were returned to the NCM in May 2020 as ‘not endorsed’ with a note that they were ‘not required’.⁵⁰ On 18 July 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that the NCM does not fit within the typical construct for government committees and is not designed for stakeholders to have a ‘seat at the table’ and that ToRs for the NCM ‘would not be appropriate for its modality’. The NCM continues to operate under a national coordination and domain concept, which is a visual representation of the groups that may participate in the NCM.⁵¹

2.33 Prior to the establishment of the NCM, the National Crisis Committee (NCC) was the committee by which Australian Government and relevant state and territory government coordination in response to domestic crises would occur. As part of the 2020 administrative update of the AGCMF (see paragraph 2.36), entity feedback highlighted that there was a lack of clarity between the NCC and NCM which could create a ‘real risk’ during a crisis. The NCC was included in the AGCMF until July 2021.

Were updates to the AGCMF informed by evidence and analysis?

2.34 As the AGCMF has been utilised to support a range of crises between 2020 and 2023 (see paragraph 1.6), there is a base of actual experiences available to examine and analyse in order to identify examples of good practice and opportunities for improvement to be adopted in updates.

Updates to the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework

2.35 The December 2017 version of the AGCMF stated that the framework is ‘updated as necessary to maintain its relevance and currency and may be comprehensively reviewed every three years if required.’ ⁵²

2.36 In 2020, PM&C wrote to four entities to provide input to an administrative update led by PM&C. These entities were the Department of Home Affairs⁵³, Department of Health, Department of Defence, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

2.37 An agenda for a 3 September 2020 Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) meeting was prepared to discuss:

• entity comments and proposed amendments,
• changes to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) architecture and establishment of the National Federation Reform council, and
• interim decisions on disaster management.

2.38 There are no meeting minutes or outcomes arising from the IDC meeting.

2.39 A requirement to conduct an annual review of the AGCMF was introduced in 2021.⁵⁴ Prior to 2021, there was no time-based requirement to review and update the AGCMF.

2.40 The AGCMF was updated twice in 2021 — once in July 2021 which saw an update from version 2.3 to 3.0 (considered by PM&C to be a ‘more comprehensive review’) and again in December 2021 which saw an update from version 3.0 to 3.1 (considered by PM&C to be an administrative update).

2.41 In 2022, PM&C wrote to thirteen entities to comment on an updated draft of the AGCMF. As part of the PM&C clearance process, sensitivities relating to machinery of government (MoG) changes between Home Affairs and Attorney-General’s portfolios were identified as ‘difficult to reconcile within the scope’ of the 2022 administrative update. PM&C noted that ministerial and agency lead responsibilities remained unchanged and would require further consideration in a more extensive review proposed to commence in early 2023. At this time, the 2023 AGCMF Review had not been approved.

2.42 The 2023 annual administrative update was undertaken concurrent to the 2023 AGCMF Review (see paragraphs 2.48 to 2.63). Twenty-two Australian Government entities were provided with the opportunity to comment on an updated draft of the AGCMF. Some comments made by entities as part of this update were to be considered as part of the 2023 AGCMF Review.⁵⁵

2.43 PM&C does not have a documented process for undertaking administrative updates. The level of stakeholder engagement in each of the annual administrative updates varied. As there was no process documentation, it is not clear how and why stakeholders were identified for inclusion in each administrative update.

2.46 Machinery of government changes often result in changes to roles and responsibilities between ministers and their relevant departments. In previous versions of the AGCMF, PM&C had not established triggers to prompt an administrative update of the AGCMF, other than noting the requirement to conduct a review annually. The revised AGCMF released in September 2024, states that machinery of government changes may prompt an administrative update of the AGCMF.

2023 AGCMF Review

2.48 On 27 March 2023, the Australian Government agreed to a review of the AGCMF to be led by PM&C, with staff seconded from relevant agencies. The review was framed as a ‘comprehensive review’. The AGCMF Review team comprised of seconded officers from NEMA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Home Affairs.⁵⁶

Project management

2.49 PM&C developed a project plan for undertaking the review which defined five stages for delivery of the review. These stages, activities and timing are outlined in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Stages, planned activities and planned timings for the 2023 AGCMF Review

Source: PM&C documentation.

2.50 The AGCMF review team developed a ‘placemat’ which was updated on several occasions to reflect updates to work conducted and planned. The first of these was titled ‘initial draft’ and is dated 21 July 2023. The ‘placemat’ was updated on 25 July 2023 and four times in August 2023.⁵⁷ The ‘placemat’ was used to summarise emerging findings from the review based on the desktop research and consultation conducted by the review team. The emerging findings subsequently formed the basis of the 2023 AGCMF Review report.

2.51 While the placemats and report refer to lessons identified from the review of four prior crises (conducted as part of issues exploration and identification in the environmental scan phase as outlined in Table 2.1), it is unclear what analysis was conducted over these lessons to validate and contextualise them. Recurring themes identified during consultation with entities were reflected in the placemats and report. Comparison activities with international crisis management arrangements were also referenced, however, there were limitations with the documentation relating to this input.

2.52 PM&C considered the crisis management arrangements of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, Singapore, and the Republic of South Korea (environmental scan as outlined in Table 2.1). The 2023 AGCMF Review Report also refers to input from New Zealand and the United States, however, there was no evidence of input received from these countries.

Environmental scan phase

2.53 As part of the environmental scan phase, PM&C conducted consultation with Australian Government entities as well as states and territories, industry stakeholders and non-government organisations.

2.54 In July 2023, PM&C advised the CAC of emerging insights, which included ‘desire for increased clarity in the interface with State and Territory arrangements.’ This ‘desire’ was identified in consultation with Australian Government entities. Consultation with states and territories subsequently took place in September 2023.

Insights phase

2.55 Following the consultation undertaken as part of the environmental scan phase, PM&C developed an ‘observations report’ that provided a summary of observations from the consultation with Australian Government entities. This report was provided to the CAC in September 2023. A summary of observations is outlined in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Summary of observations from entity engagement as presented to the Crisis Arrangements Committee

Note a: This observation was included under both ‘Awareness and useability’ and ‘Gaps for future risks’.

Source: ANAO summary of PM&C documentation.

2.56 In September 2023, PM&C presented an update on the 2023 AGCMF Review to the CAC. The update stated that ‘a number of pieces of analysis are feeding into the AGCMF Review including workshops, international comparisons and engagement with non-Government stakeholders and industry partners.’ There was consultation with all Australian states and territories and input from Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. This input was provided in September 2023, after the need for clarity relating to the interface with states and territories was reported to the CAC. There is no evidence of input from the remaining states and territory.

Options phase

2.57 The project plan outlined that the options phase would include developing options that address key themes and insights; testing options with stakeholders using scenarios; and drafting a report.

2.58 PM&C developed a ‘preliminary model’ for testing with the Deputy Coordinator-General NEMA in September 2023.

2.59 PM&C developed a document titled ‘Next steps and suggested recommendations options’. This document builds on the thematic categories outlined in Table 2.2 and was presented to the CAC. This document was intended to inform discussions between PM&C and NEMA and to inform ‘co-design’ sessions with selected entities.⁵⁸ PM&C facilitated two co-design workshops — the first on 4 October 2023 and the second on 13 October 2023.

2.60 The first workshop involved a discussion on ‘key’ draft recommendations and potential options to improve the AGCMF. The draft recommendations and whether it was supported by participants is outlined in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Draft recommendations and support from workshop participants

Source: ANAO summary of PM&C documentation.

2.61 The second workshop was referred to as a ‘futures workshop’. This workshop was intended to explore future scenarios based on input from the national intelligence community. PM&C advised the ANAO on 19 February 2024 that as this workshop was based on a classified scenario, no documentation was developed as an input to the workshop.

2.62 Proposed recommendations were presented to and agreed by the CAC in November 2023.⁵⁹ A summary of the recommendations presented to the CAC are outlined in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Summary of recommendations presented to the CAC in November 2023

Source: ANAO summary of PM&C documentation.

Recommendations phase

2.63 PM&C presented the 2023 AGCMF Review Report to the Australian Government in February 2024. The report and its recommendations were noted.

Lessons management processes and capability

2.64 Lessons management is an overarching term that refers to collecting, analysing, disseminating, and applying learning experiences from events, exercises, programs and reviews.⁶⁰ A lesson is knowledge or understanding gained by experience. An experience may be positive or negative. The concept of lessons learned requires two components — the identification of a lesson and resulting change in behaviour.⁶¹

2.65 Version 3.0 of the AGCMF introduced a requirement for the lead minister’s entity to work with NEMA to capture lessons learned in the management of crisis as part of the government’s commitment to continuous improvement.⁶²

2.66 NEMA utilises the Observations – Insights – Lessons Identified – Lessons Learned (OILL) methodology as set out in the Australian Disaster Resilience Handbook for Lessons Management.⁶³ The OILL methodology is intended to provide a repeatable process NEMA can use throughout and following crises.

2.67 On 26 February 2024 NEMA advised the ANAO that a lessons process is applied to some but not all events or crises. NEMA further advised on 18 July 2024 that a general guiding principle was that a lessons process be conducted for activations of the Crisis Coordination Team and events of national significance. NEMA had not documented or defined what it considered to be events of national significance. NEMA is refining its lessons approach following the 2023 AGCMF Review, noting the recommendation for lessons to be conducted following Tier 4 events (see Table 3.3).

2.68 On 18 July 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that it also utilises adaptive and agile lessons processes to implement strategic and operational changes during or as close as possible to a crisis occurring. For example, in December 2022 NEMA provided support to New South Wales and Victoria in response to flooding on the Murray River. Following these requests for assistance, NEMA developed a new internal product to assess the likelihood of future assistance from South Australia as flood waters moved down the Murray River. This internal product allowed NEMA to identify potential types of requests for assistance and map against expected flood levels and timing based on inputs from the Australian Climate Service.

Implementation of recommendations from external scrutiny

2.69 As discussed in paragraphs 1.13 to 1.17, the Australian Government response to crises (including the COVID-19 pandemic) has been subject to scrutiny such as parliamentary inquiries and Royal Commission reviews, that have resulted in recommendations relating to crisis management.

2.70 In March 2023, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) presented Report 494: Inquiry into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s crisis management arrangements. The JCPAA recommended that PM&C, in the 2023 review of the AGCMF, incorporate human rights considerations in the framework, and outline measures to ensure that any crisis response limiting or restricting human rights is necessary, reasonable and proportionate.⁶⁴

2.71 The JCPAA also recommended that PM&C should require relevant entities to update their entity-level crisis management policies and plans to reflect this change. The government has not provided a response to this recommendation.⁶⁵

2.72 PM&C advised the ANAO on 5 April 2024 that:

the new principles for the revised framework endorsed by the Crisis Arrangements Committee in June 2023 stated that the Framework:

• Acknowledges community at the core of a response and considers the particular needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged Australians
• Recognises the importance of engaging with First Nations people and their communities before, during and after emergencies.

2.73 The principles outlined in the revised AGCMF include that the framework ‘acknowledges human rights considerations to ensure that measures enacted during crises are necessary, reasonable and proportionate’. There is no further information relating to the consideration of human rights.

2.74 The JCPAA recommendation was not identified in the ToRs or other planning documentation for the 2023 AGCMF Review. In September 2024 the CAC ToRs were updated to incorporate human rights considerations. The ToRs state that ‘the CAC has agreed to invite a representative from appropriate agencies to provide advice on human rights considerations relating to crisis arrangements’.

2.78 The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements (the Commission) report was published 28 October 2020. The Commission was established in response to the 2019–2020 bushfires, however, extended its scope to include natural disaster management. The role of the Australian Government was highlighted as necessary to ensure the coordination of whole-of-government cooperation and effort.

2.79 The Commission made 80 recommendations in total. Sixty-five were the responsibility of state and territory governments either independently or in partnership with the Australian Government. The Australian Government assumed primary responsibility for the remaining 15. The commission did not make any specific recommendations relating to the AGCMF. However, in recommendation 24.1, the Commission noted that the Australian Government should establish accountability and assurance mechanisms to promote continuous improvement and best practice in natural disaster arrangements. An interim report prepared by NEMA on 20 October 2023 that outlines the status of implementation of recommendations stated that the 2023 AGCMF Review would address this recommendation. The status of the recommendation was recorded as implemented.⁶⁶

Were lessons relevant to the AGCMF applied?

2.80 As noted in paragraph 2.64, the concept of lessons learned requires two components — the identification of a lesson and resulting change in behaviour.

2.81 Gaps in lessons management at the whole-of-government level were identified as part of the 2023 AGCMF Review. This included reporting to the CAC in September 2023 that ‘we aren’t very good at ‘learning our lessons’ from major crisis responses’. The 2023 AGCMF Review report included a recommendation for lessons identified to be recorded to inform updates to the Framework and Handbook.

2.82 Reviews of the AGCMF were administrative in nature between 2020 and 2023. There was an absence of process to capture lessons relating to the operations of the framework at the whole-of-government level. The application of lessons to the AGCMF were primarily driven by lessons identified by, or recommendations from, external scrutiny.

NEMA lessons implementation

2.83 As outlined in paragraph 2.67, a lessons process is applied to some but not all events or crises. Where a lessons process is conducted, NEMA develops insight reports as part of the lessons learned process.⁶⁷ One purpose of these reports is to validate and prioritise the insights among senior executive and subject matter experts, and that separate pieces of work will progress the actions and lessons identified that may result from these reports.

2.84 Although NEMA has captured a large volume of insights from prior crises, it is not clear that all insight reports progress to lessons identification and development of recommendations. On 26 February 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that it considers lessons management to be a maturing process.

2.85 An example of where NEMA has identified insights that have transitioned to lessons identification and some lessons have been learned is outlined in Case Study 1.

Capacity and capability related recommendations

2.86 The NEMA Corporate Plan 2023–24 to 2026–27 states that a robust, tested and collaborative national emergency management capability and capacity is critical for Australia to be ready to respond and recover from increasingly intense and severe disasters.⁶⁸ Emergency management capability and capacity includes people and assets to support coordination and response activities.

People

2.87 The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the operation of the Australian Public Service (APS), which needed to deploy staff on a large scale to support critical functions and quickly adapt to operating in a COVID-safe environment.⁶⁹

2.88 Auditor-General Report No. 20 2020–21 Management of the Australian Public Service’s Workforce Response to COVID-19 found that whole of government crisis management documents did not include information on managing the APS workforce in response to a pandemic, and there would be value in whole-of-government crisis management frameworks, plans and arrangements being updated to include consideration of APS-wide operational management matters, such as roles and responsibilities for identifying critical functions, mobilising the APS workforce and issuing-APS wide directions.⁷⁰

2.89 The 2023 AGCMF Review Report refers to feedback from agencies that ‘the current Australian Public Service Commission surge reserve, whilst used during the Covid-19 response, often did not provide officers that were appropriately trained or experienced in the specifics of crisis management’. While the APS surge reserve is intended to provide staff with ‘generalist’ skills, the 2023 AGCMF Review Report acknowledges the capability gap in relation to crisis management skills and includes a recommendation to improve cross-government crisis management capability, capacity and surge workforce.⁷¹ This includes the development of a standard crisis management training package to be developed by NEMA to support a surge crisis workforce across the APS.

Assets

Centres for national resilience

2.90 Centres for National Resilience are purpose-built quarantine facilities in Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth constructed as part of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Australian Government funded construction of the centres and state governments were responsible for the operation and management of the facilities for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Centres for National Resilience were expected to provide Australia with a new resilience capability following their use during the COVID-19 pandemic.⁷²

2.91 NEMA considers that the Centres for National Resilience may provide capacity to support COMDISPLAN⁷³ or AUSRECEPLAN.⁷⁴ For COMDISPLAN the Centres for National Resilience may provide temporary accommodation for people displaced due to natural disasters or emergency service personnel. For AUSRECEPLAN the Centres for National Resilience may provide temporary accommodation and quarantine for returning citizens and permanent residents.

2.92 The Department of Finance and NEMA commenced drafting a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in March 2024, to establish a framework that allows for the potential use of the centres for national resilience for emergency accommodation as well as general storage and emergency management stockpile. As at July 2024, this MOU has not been finalised.

National Emergency Management Stockpile

2.93 The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements made recommendations relating to enhanced preparedness through resource sharing arrangements and review of supply chain risks to ensure supply of essential goods during natural disasters. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review⁷⁵ highlighted a need to shift away from reliance on Australian Defence Force (ADF) resources in response to domestic disasters, and recommended that the Australian Government work with states and territories to develop national resilience and response measures without the need of ADF support. The development of a National Emergency Management Stockpile (the stockpile) goes towards addressing these recommendations.

2.94 Established in the 2023–24 financial year the stockpile consists of the following components.

• The NEMS Standing Offer Panel which provides a purchasing mechanism for government entities.
• Assets such as sandbags and self-sustaining emergency shelters. Assets include both re-deployable assets and single-use or seasonal consumables.
• Memoranda of Understanding and strategic partnerships with humanitarian and crisis response capabilities.

2.95 The physical stockpile is housed in ‘strategic’ locations intended to support asset deployment north, east and west.⁷⁶ The stockpile is intended to be used predominately by states and territories as a form of non-financial Australian Government assistance.

2.96 A National Emergency Management Stockpile Working Group (the working group) was established in October 2023 to ‘enable inter-jurisdictional representation on the deployment, delivery and operation of the National Emergency Management Stockpile’. The working group consists of a Commonwealth representative (NEMA) that acts as chair and representatives from all Australian states and territories. Members were appointed via nomination from the Australia and New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (ANZEMC).⁷⁷ The working group has met a total of five times since its establishment, this included twice in 2023 and three times in 2024.

2.97 NEMA is responsible for the development of the stockpile capability and creating draft materials for circulation across the working group. To date, state and territory members have largely been responsible for identifying subject matter experts to support panel evaluation and procurement activities and the socialisation, and coordination of feedback, within each jurisdiction, on draft materials for the stockpile.⁷⁸

3.1 The AGCMF adopts an ‘all-hazards’ crisis management approach. This approach recognises that crises are difficult to predict and that there is no standard response. Risk assessment and management activities should be designed to support delivery of government services by providing clarity around roles and responsibilities, identifying the required frequency for review of key plans and supporting improved preparedness for unexpected events.

3.2 This chapter considers version 4.0 of the AGCMF released in September 2024, following the 2023 AGCMF Review.

Has an appropriate risk-based approach to planning been established?

3.3 The Australian Disaster Preparedness Framework defines planning as the ability to systematically plan for and implement scalable strategic, operational, and tactical level approaches to dealing with catastrophic disasters.⁷⁹

3.4 Strategic planning involves the identification of objectives and resources and is often longer term and forward looking, however, may also relate to responding to an immediate objective where the ‘big picture’ and longer-term issues also require consideration. Operational planning translates the strategic intent into implementation. Tactical planning is where operational activities are planned and executed within short timeframes (often 24 to 48 hours). A risk-based approach to crisis planning incorporates consideration of risk across all levels.

Entity level risk planning

3.5 Section 16 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 requires accountable authorities of Commonwealth entities to establish and maintain appropriate systems and internal controls for the oversight and management of risk.⁸⁰

3.6 As discussed in paragraphs 3.40 to 3.42, PM&C is responsible for setting and oversight of whole-of-government crisis management policy, including coordinating updates to the AGCMF, and NEMA has responsibilities for domestic crisis management including convening key committees and maintaining a national all-hazard crisis exercising program.

PM&C risk planning activities

3.7 Divisional planning documents for the Resilience and Crisis Management Division (see paragraph 2.5) include references to the 2023 AGCMF Review and supporting departmental and whole of Australian Government preparedness via the Higher Risk Weather Season (HRWS) exercise (see paragraphs 3.109 to 3.111).⁸¹ Table 3.1 outlines the information included in divisional planning documents which identify risks, controls, risk ratings and activities intended to address these risks.

Table 3.1: Risks, controls and activities related to crisis management identified in the Resilience and Crisis Management Division business plan 2023–24

Note a: The risk ‘staff wellbeing’ is not replicated in the above as it does not have a direct relationship to the AGCMF.

Source: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

3.8 The divisional planning documents do not include an assessment of shared risks, such as those relating to capability and capacity within NEMA or other entities and the potential impact of those risks, as it relates to the effective operations of the AGCMF or delivery of the revised AGCMF.

NEMA risk planning activities

3.9 NEMA has identified a strategic risk — ‘the impact of all-hazards on Australian communities is not diminished by the Australian Government’s (facilitated by NEMA) involvement, due to an inability to provide effective coordination and national leadership in emergency management’. The AGCMF is listed as one of the controls for this risk.

3.10 NEMA documentation does not include an assessment of shared risks, such as those relating to capability and capacity within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) or other entities and the potential impact of those risks, as it relates to the effective operations of the AGCMF or delivery of the revised AGCMF.

Key management personnel risk

3.11 There is a potential risk relating to key management personnel for both NEMA and PM&C.⁸² Neither PM&C nor NEMA have documented key management personnel risks in their internal risk management documentation.⁸³

3.12 In relation to PM&C, this risk relates to the ad-hoc nature of engagement in some areas (see paragraphs 2.35 to 2.43 which discuss informal engagement during the administrative update processes and paragraph 2.14 which discuss the identification and inclusion of annexes etc.) There is a risk that the operations of the framework become reliant on relationships resulting in decisions being made without appropriate documentation being kept or other stakeholders not being appropriately engaged.

3.13 In relation to NEMA, there is a risk that consecutive, concurrent or compounding crises of national significance may overwhelm existing Australian Government capabilities and may require surge support for sustained events, including at the Senior Executive level. In particular, the Deputy Coordinator-General Emergency Management Response Group plays a significant role in both strategic and operational activities.

3.14 Certain crisis scenarios may result in key personnel becoming unavailable and may necessitate contingency arrangements to ensure continuity.⁸⁴ Planning for these potential scenarios may reduce the risk that key staff become unavailable or that other personnel required to fulfil these roles are unaware of their roles and responsibilities.

Future scenario planning

3.17 The main focus of the AGCMF is near-term crisis preparedness, immediate crisis response and crisis recovery arrangements.⁸⁵ Effective near-term crisis preparedness, immediate crisis response and recovery arrangements are informed by future planning activities such as horizon scanning and risk assessments.⁸⁶

3.18 The AGCMF states that the Australian Government undertakes threat and security risk assessments and provides national security capabilities to prepare for and respond to events determined to be of national significance. There is no evidence that these assessments are considered within the context of the whole-of-government AGCMF. The 2023 AGCMF Review identified an absence of a centralised process to ensure critical hazards and risks are being systematically addressed in planning and preparedness activities.

3.19 As part of the 2023 AGCMF Review, advice relating to future risks framed around mega trends was provided by the national intelligence community.⁸⁷ Two ‘futures workshops’ were conducted with senior officials from approximately 20 Australian Government agencies (see paragraphs 2.59 to 2.61).

3.20 The first workshop was intended to explore a response to concurrent, cross-sectoral and catastrophic crisis. Documentation for workshop one is limited and there is no evidence of how participant input from the workshop was analysed for input into the report. The second workshop was intended to explore a specific future risk identified in the intelligence briefing.

3.21 High level insights were captured from the second workshop. Insights are grouped into discussion themes that are aligned to proposed revisions to the framework. There is no analysis document that documents how the insights were considered and addressed. The AGCMF Review Team observed the workshop.

3.22 Since 2020, discussions such as ‘futures workshops’ have not occurred. On 9 April 2024, PM&C advised the ANAO that longer term strategic horizon scanning takes place under the Crisis Arrangements Committee (CAC). As discussed in paragraph 2.21, the CAC did not meet between December 2019 and June 2023 and was re-established for the purposes of providing oversight to the 2023 AGCMF Review. As such, there has been limited opportunity for the CAC to perform this function.

Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning methodology

3.25 The CASP methodology is a tool for planning for responding to hazards and ensuring preparedness. The methodology provides processes and products to support decision-makers to evaluate and categorise risk and ensure appropriate priority is assigned to risk areas. The CASP methodology also creates a record of decisions and documents how key decisions were made. References to the CASP methodology were introduced into the AGCMF in version 3.1 which was released in December 2021.

3.26 Although the CASP guidebook is publicly available via the NEMA website, efforts to embed usage have been predominantly internally focussed. NEMA has identified a desired end state for the emergency management sector — which includes Australian Government, states and territories, and industry — to use the CASP methodology as a common tool to plan for crises. To reach this end state, NEMA is undertaking capability development activities internally and externally. NEMA advised the ANAO on 2 July 2024 that for the period 2021 to 30 June 2024, 304 people were trained in the use of CASP.

Key elements of the CASP

3.27 CASP comprises four steps:

• define the environment;
• mission analysis;
• developing courses of action; and
• executing the plan.

Define the environment

3.28 The CASP guidebook states that defining the environment involves laying the foundation of the common operating picture⁸⁸ by outlining the who, what, where and when of the incident environment. Data from situation reports, media and other sources are inputs to the common operating picture. The CASP guidebook states that the length of time required to establish the initial common operating picture varies and may be in the order of 15–20 minutes for ‘no-notice’ incidents, 30–45 minutes for emerging incidents and more than 60 minutes for long-range incidents.⁸⁹

Mission analysis

3.29 The CASP guidebook states that analysing the mission involves four interrelated processes:

• developing priorities;
• conducting gap analysis;
• developing desired end state; and
• defining lines of effort and success conditions.

Developing courses of action

3.30 The CASP guidebook notes that with the strategic intent formulated, planning commences to inform the operational level of incident management.

Executing the plan

3.31 The CASP guidebook acknowledges that the process of providing mission tasks varies and that the end format is determined by what is necessary to meet agency-specific policies and requirements.

Application of the CASP

3.32 An example of where the CASP methodology has been used as a planning document is outlined in Case Study 2.

Note a: Tropical Cyclone Ellie crossed the Northern Territory coast on 22 December 2022. It then weakened below tropical cyclone intensity on the morning of 23 December, however, continued to impact the Northern Territory and Western Australia as a tropical low until 8 January 2023.
Bureau of Meteorology, Past Tropical Cyclones — Tropical Cyclone Ellie [Internet], available from http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/history/Ellie-2022.shtml [accessed 30 April 2024].

3.33 The CASP guidebook states that contemporary risk management practices in the preparedness phase involve risk assessment through horizon scanning, risk radars and forward-looking analysis to detect emerging threats.⁹⁰ The current use of the CASP methodology is focussed on responding to crises and early recovery planning and does not maximise value in planning for potential crises.

3.34 Noting that the process to embed the CASP methodology remains ongoing, CASP has the potential to support conformity and interoperability between different entities and stakeholders. Finalising the suite of documentation including templates and continuing to develop capability has the potential to provide consistency and speed in planning and responding to crises. On 23 September 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that since May 2024 it has undertaken the following activities to support the CASP methodology.

• Fourteen CASP courses have been delivered across Australian Government, jurisdictions and NEMA staff.
• Five CASP training modules have been delivered.
• A pool of subject matter experts has been established in NEMA to support states and territories in strategic planning during times of crisis.
• The CASP doctrine including the Guidebook and supporting templates have been updated.

Situational awareness

3.36 Intelligence⁹¹ and situational awareness⁹² are key capability requirements identified in the Australian Disaster Preparedness Framework.⁹³ Under the AGCMF, the Australian Government facilitates near-real time national situational awareness to support state and territory governments to deliver on their responsibilities for the protection of life, property, and the environment in their jurisdictions.

3.37 The Australian Government National Situation Room (the National Situation Room) within NEMA provides 24/7 all-hazard situational awareness, impact analysis and decision support to Government. The National Situation Room was officially opened in November 2022.⁹⁴ It was formerly known as the Crisis Coordination Centre. The National Situation Room incorporates the National Joint Common Operating Picture (NJCOP).⁹⁵ The establishment of the NJCOP is one component of efforts to address recommendations 3.6 and 4.2 from the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.⁹⁶

Have clear roles and responsibilities been established?

3.38 As discussed in paragraphs 2.48 to 2.63, PM&C completed a review of the AGCMF in 2023. As a result of this review, a revised AGCMF was released in September 2024 during the 2024–25 HRWS National Preparedness Summit (see paragraphs 3.109 to 3.111).

3.39 The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the 2023 AGCMF Review acknowledged a need for better national coordination and integration in the context of increasingly complex, cascading, compounding, and concurrent national and international crises.

Oversight roles

3.40 Under the revised AGCMF, PM&C retains responsibility for whole-of-government crisis management policy. The revised AGCMF specifies additional responsibilities and states that, if required, PM&C can:

• initiate an Australian Government response;
• determine the initial tier of coordination and adjust the tier over time;
• determine the initial Australian Government Coordinating Agency;
• co-chair the peak senior officials’ crisis coordination committee, including the National Coordination Mechanism or Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF);
• change the Australian Government Coordinating Agency and Lead Coordinating Senior Official following consultation with relevant senior officials; and
• initiate escalation to a NEMA-led Tier 4⁹⁷ coordination.

3.41 Under the revised AGCMF, NEMA is responsible for:

• administering the NCM on behalf of Australian Government agencies;
• supporting whole-of-Australian Government situational awareness through the National Joint Common Operating Picture and National Situation Room briefing products (see paragraph 3.37); and
• supporting Australian Government crisis management capabilities by providing best practice guidance, including preparatory and strategic planning, crisis communication and recovery.

3.42 NEMA continues to hold responsibility for delivering an annual national crisis exercising program and maintaining a national crisis exercising register (see paragraphs 3.84 to 3.105 for further detail).

Lead ministers and agencies

3.43 The revised AGCMF consolidates definitions and guidance for defined roles and responsibilities. These roles and responsibilities, the intersection between the different roles and the arrangements for them to change are outlined in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Comparison of roles and responsibilities

Source: ANAO analysis of versions of the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework.

Hazard identification

3.44 The revised AGCMF identifies 14 specific hazards — an increase from 12 hazards under the September 2023 version of the AGCMF. The two additional hazards added are ‘radiological / nuclear incidents’ and ‘novel or ambiguous hazard’. Radiological or nuclear incidents were identified as emerging hazards requiring further guidance and documentation as part of the consultation process for the 2023 AGCMF Review.

3.45 For each hazard, the roles of Lead Minister, Australian Government Coordinating Agency, Lead Coordinating Senior Official are defined (see Appendix 3). The applicable coordination mechanism and relevant national plan are also specified.

3.46 As part of the 2023 AGCMF Review consultation process, PM&C identified that economic crisis events such as the global financial crisis are not captured under the AGCMF and there is a need for certainty over how this should be treated. PM&C advised the Crisis Arrangements Committee of this observation in September 2023, noting a need for certainty on how to treat such an event.

3.47 The CAC agreed that the AGCMF is not intended to consider economic crises, noting that it should be used to address economic consequences of crises and that the framework should be able to deal with nationally significant consequences of all crises. While the revised AGCMF considers the potential for compounding economic impacts as a result of other crises it does not identify or incorporate any guidance on an economic crisis event.

Capability considerations

3.48 As outlined in Table 2.2, the findings of the 2023 AGCMF Review were aggregated into five overarching themes. One theme related to improving national crisis capability to ensure responsibilities articulated in the Framework can be fulfilled.

3.49 The Review also states that regardless of the cause or hazard, if the required response extends beyond one single entity’s capability and capacity to undertake its role as the lead coordinating agency, NEMA should provide coordination and assistance to lead the response. In the revised AGCMF, it notes that if NEMA becomes the Australian Government Coordinating Agency, the agency that had primacy as lead, becomes a sector lead agency, as defined in Table 3.2, and continues to lead the consequence management activities within that sector. The introduction of a tiered crisis coordination model in the revised AGCMF further clarifies these arrangements.

3.50 Personnel that have key roles under the Framework should be supported through activities such as briefings and opportunities to exercise the arrangements outside a crisis. PM&C has identified the need for ‘deliver’ and ‘educate’ phases to support the implementation of the revised AGCMF. PM&C has developed an ‘Awareness Raising Campaign’ (the campaign) outlining seven initiatives to increase understanding of the revised AGCMF.⁹⁸ The campaign was to begin rolling out in September 2024 and finish early 2025.

Revised Australian Government Crisis Management Framework and new Handbook

3.51 The 2023 AGCMF Review noted that entities requested more crisis management guidance to support systematic response and decision-making during a crisis. This led to the development of the Australian Government Crisis Management Handbook (the Handbook) to provide high-level principles-based guidance to support senior officials in coordinating strategic responses and articulate the national crisis mechanisms that can be used. PM&C advised the ANAO on 22 July 2024 that the Handbook will not be publicly available.

3.52 The revised AGCMF has undergone a significant change to its presentation since the last publicly available AGCMF released in 2023. The revised AGCMF has structured content under five main headings, ‘Introduction’, ‘Preparedness’, ‘Crisis coordination spanning near-term preparedness, response, relief and early recovery’, ‘Recovery’ and ‘Key Legislation’.

3.53 In comparison to the previous versions of the AGCMF, the revised version has reduced in length following the introduction of a figure outlining the hierarchy of documents that underpins the Australian Government’s crisis management arrangements. The revised AGCMF also brings together key information that was previously presented in different sections of the AGCMF to improve readability. The addition of the Handbook, which supports the Framework, has meant that more specific and detailed guidance can be outlined separate to the Framework.

3.54 The Handbook is intended to be an operational document designed to ‘support senior officials to fulfil their responsibilities under the Framework’. As outlined in paragraph 2.16 and 2.17, guidance on escalation triggers previously lacked detail and clarity for entities. The Handbook includes more detailed guidance for senior officials including principles-based thresholds for activation, escalation and deactivation of responses to significant crises, how to coordinate whole-of-government crisis communications and specific questions to guide lead coordinating senior officials in coordinating a crisis response.⁹⁹

Tiered crisis coordination model

3.55 One of the recommendations of the 2023 AGCMF Review related to a gap in the existing Framework about ‘cross-sectoral, concurrent, consecutive, compounding and catastrophic crises’. In responding to this gap, the revised AGCMF introduces a tiered crisis coordination model. The tiered model is intended to ‘provide guidance on the appropriate level of Commonwealth decision-making and coordination. The model also allows flexibility to adjust the lead coordination agency and minister where required, to reflect changes in likely impact and consequences’. Table 3.3 below outlines the tiered crisis coordination model.

Table 3.3: Tiered crisis coordination model

Source: Australian Government Crisis Management Framework September 2024.

3.56 The Handbook provides further defines the process of transitioning between tiers and who can authorise these decisions.

Crisis mechanisms

3.57 During the 2023 AGCMF Review, entity consultation identified that multiple coordination groups could cause confusion and duplication (see paragraph 2.23). The consultation feedback highlighted issues around the clarity of purpose and quantity of committees and mechanisms in place for crisis response and coordination.

Australian Government crisis mechanisms

Crisis Arrangements Committee

3.58 The 2023 AGCMF Review recommended that the CAC be formalised as the peak whole-of-government senior officials’ body for crisis management planning and preparedness. The revised AGCMF outlines the roles and responsibilities of the CAC as:

• annually review and update the list of identified hazards in the Framework;
• oversee the development and maintenance of new national hazard plans when required;
• annually review and report on the status of cross-government crisis management capability, capacity and surge workforce, and provide advice if required to address vulnerabilities
• audit existing national plans and arrangements for ongoing relevance and currency;
• review the full suite of national plans at least once every three years; and
• oversee Australian Government and relevant multinational crisis exercises and advise on gaps and priorities for whole-of-government exercising.

3.59 In September 2024, the CAC ToR were updated. The ToRs largely reflect these roles and responsibilities, except for clearly aligning with the following roles:

• reviewing and reporting on the status of cross-government crisis management capability, capacity and surge workforce; and
• oversight of Australian Government and relevant multinational crisis exercises and advising on gaps and priorities for whole-of-government exercising.¹⁰⁰

Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force

3.60 The revised AGCMF does not change the operations or usage of the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) for coordination during Australian Government response to international crises other than specifying that the IDETF would apply for crises between tier one and three.

3.61 As outlined in paragraph 2.25, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provided feedback to PM&C as part of the 2023 AGCMF Review that indicated a need for further clarity around the triggers for and identification of participants for an IDETF. No additional information has been provided in the revised AGCMF to address this feedback.

National crisis mechanisms

National Cabinet

3.62 The revised AGCMF includes a statement outlining the role of National Cabinet, stating that:

The Prime Minister may convene the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and the National Cabinet at short notice to ensure coordinated action across the Australian, state and territory governments.

3.63 The revised AGCMF identifies the National Cabinet as a mechanism for crisis coordination. National Cabinet is identified in the national coordination and domain concept diagram that describes the NCM.¹⁰¹ However, this diagram does not define a role for National Cabinet.

National Security Committee

3.64 As part of the consultation process, the AGCMF Review received feedback from three entities¹⁰² on clarifying the role of the National Security Committee (NSC), including feedback on clarifying the role of the NSC during a crisis. The role of the NSC has been clarified.

National Coordination Mechanism

3.65 A CAC meeting held on May 2024 discussed the need to streamline coordination arrangements for domestic crises, with particular focus on the similarity of roles between the Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee (AGCRC) and the NCM. PM&C proposed the ‘streamlined’ approach which focussed on a specialised NCM combining the functions previously performed by the AGCRC, known as the Australian Government NCM (NCM-AUSGOV). This decision was agreed by members of the CAC.

3.66 Under the revised AGCMF, the NCM-AUSGOV is to be chaired by the relevant Deputy-Coordinator General NEMA, with the option for the relevant Deputy Secretary PM&C to elect to chair or co-chair.

3.67 On 1 July 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that NCM-AUSGOV serves the same purpose as the AGCRC, however, instead of three mechanisms that perform similar functions (NCM, AGCRC and the IDETF) there are now two (NCM and IDETF). NEMA’s website states that the NCM ‘brings together Australian Government, states, territories, industry and community organisations to ensure effective and efficient consequence management of events across the emergency management continuum’. The NCM is already intended to be a flexible mechanism that can be held with relevant stakeholders as necessary. It is not clear that the establishment of NCM-AUSGOV reduces confusion identified in the 2023 AGCMF Review (see paragraph 2.23). This risk may require further testing by NEMA and PM&C.

Are there oversight arrangements to ensure plans are reviewed and updated to respond to future events?

3.68 The AGCMF is implemented through a series of national-level crisis plans that detail the preparation, response and recovery phases of the Australian Government crisis management continuum (see paragraph 1.7). These plans consider natural, human-induced, and multi-faceted hazards and are maintained by relevant Australian Government agencies identified as hazard lead under the AGCMF.

3.69 Under the AGCMF, the Minister for Emergency Management is responsible for response and recovery of a number of hazards. NEMA’s website states that it undertakes a rolling review of national-level plans to ensure they remain fit-for-purpose.¹⁰³ NEMA developed a forward work program which outlines proposed review timeframes for plans for which NEMA has responsibility. These timeframes are outlined in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Proposed review of national-level plans led by NEMA

Source: ANAO analysis of NEMA documentation.

3.70 On 18 July 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that it intends to review and implement all national level plans that it leads during 2024, 2025 and 2026 subject to priorities of each HRWS

3.71 As at August 2024, NEMA has developed interim arrangements for the following plans:

• Australian Government Arrangements for the Reception of International Assistance (AUSARIA) — a new plan under development.
• Australian Government Space Weather Event Plan (AUSSWEPLAN) — a new plan under development.
• Australian Government Catastrophic Plan (AUSCATPLAN) — a new plan under development.

Review arrangements and currency of national plans

3.72 Prior scrutiny of planning arrangements for crises identified deficiencies in planning such as plans that were outdated, not fit for purpose or not used.¹⁰⁴ The version of the AGCMF current until September 2024 did not stipulate a timeframe for review of plans.

3.73 Sixty plans¹⁰⁵ and documents relating to national arrangements¹⁰⁶ were identified by PM&C in the September 2023 version of the AGCMF. Thirty of these are national plans of which 22 are publicly available. Of the publicly available plans, 59 per cent have been updated within the last five years. Less than half (32 per cent or seven of 22) have been updated within the last three years.

3.74 In September 2020, PM&C requested that NEMA (then EMA) undertake a stocktake of plans as part of the administrative update process. The request noted a need to remind plan owners of the need to review. In April 2021, June 2022 and April 2024, NEMA requested national plan owners review the Australian Government Crisis and Response Plans Matrix.¹⁰⁷

3.75 The September 2024 version of the establishes a requirement for the full suite of national plans to be reviewed at least once every three years with oversight by the CAC. The AGCMF does not specify which national plans make up ‘the full suite of national plans’. In September 2024, the CAC ToRs were updated to reflect this additional responsibility.

3.76 As at August 2024, NEMA has commenced drafting Australian Government National Plans Guidelines, which are intended to promote a consistent approach to developing and reviewing national plans.

3.77 The revised AGCMF outlines nineteen existing, in progress and proposed national plans for twenty identified hazards. Of the 15 plans that have been completed 10 are publicly available. The remaining 10 plans either do not exist or have not been finalised. As of July 2024, the revised AGCMF includes 11 less national plans as version 3.3 of the AGCMF.

3.78 Where plans are not made publicly available, this limits stakeholders’ visibility of crisis arrangements including limiting their ability to plan for their role in supporting crisis response activities.

Have arrangements been established to review and test preparedness?

3.81 Preparedness is defined as developing arrangements to ensure that, should a crisis occur, the required resources, capabilities and services can be efficiently mobilised and deployed.

3.82 NEMA, under the AGCMF, is expected to develop and deliver an annual national exercise program and report on observations and insights to inform future preparedness, policy and capability requirements.¹⁰⁸ This includes maintaining a register that consolidates and creates a single picture of Australian Government national-level all-hazard crisis exercises.¹⁰⁹

3.83 Additionally, NEMA has preparedness responsibilities ahead of the HRWS which runs from October to April each year. While all Commonwealth, state and territory governments and agencies have responsibilities to reduce disaster risk and ensure preparedness for the HRWS, NEMA acts as the lead entity in ensuring preparedness, through the HRWS program.

Annual national exercise program

3.84 The requirement for an annual national exercise program has been in place since at least 2017.¹¹⁰ The AGCMF states that ‘NEMA delivers an annual national crisis exercising program’.

3.85 NEMA’s 2022–23 to 2025–26 Corporate Plan Performance Measure 2.1¹¹¹ outlines the delivery of ‘at least two national-level exercises and the HRWS National Preparedness Program, which includes the HRWS National Preparedness Summit. NEMA has established an annual national exercise program that comprises two multi-jurisdictional exercises. Internal NEMA business planning documentation for 2023–24 identifies ‘two annual multi-jurisdictional, multi-entity exercises from severe to catastrophic hazards to support preparedness and continuous improvement’ as a deliverable. NEMA advised the ANAO on 18 July 2024 that the exercise conducted as part of the annual HRWS National Preparedness Program is considered one of the two national-level exercises delivered..

3.86 NEMA has delivered nine national-level exercises since 2021 (see Table 3.5).¹¹²

Table 3.5: NEMA-led exercises between 2021 and 2024

Note a: The National Emergency Declaration Act was passed in 2020 in response to Recommendation 5.1 of the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.

Note b: ANZEMC is the senior officials committee responsible for emergency management. It includes members from each Australian state and territory government plus a member from New Zealand and the Australian Local Government Association.

Note c: As at July 2024, the report for this exercise has not been finalised.

Source: ANAO summary/analysis of departmental documentation.

3.87 As outlined in Table 3.5, NEMA has largely focussed on exercising severe to catastrophic natural disasters. Since 2022, NEMA has introduced broader consequences from all-hazard scenarios into exercises. This included mass power and telecommunication outages and supply chain issues which were explored within the context of several exercises¹¹³ including the space weather event exercise held in May 2024.

Exercise development process

3.88 NEMA has developed documentation to support entities to design, deliver and evaluate crisis exercises and build Australia’s exercising capability. This documentation is not intended to include all materials required for an exercise and is intended to be read in conjunction with the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience Managing Exercises Handbook.¹¹⁴

3.89 The current suite of documentation includes 28 templates, documents and checklists categorised under six sections to assist in the development of an exercise. These six categories and stages of an exercise are outlined below.

• Planning (concept documentation, risk register and planning group materials)
• Event management (floor plan, participant registration form and event run sheet)
• Media and communications (checklist and branding)
• Delivery (exercise program, master schedule, scenario)
• Evaluation (feedback survey and observation collection form and evaluation plan)
• Post-exercises (exercise report and dashboards).

3.90 Of the six categories, planning, delivery, evaluation and post-exercises contain the majority of the resources available. An example of the use of these resources is the development, delivery and post exercise activities of the 2023 APERE, in which NEMA used 18 of the 28 documents and templates. There are additional resources listed under the six categories¹¹⁵, however, in the context of the APERE, this is an example of the level of documentation and planning that is required throughout the development and delivery of a national-level exercise.

Identification and selection of exercise topics

3.91 NEMA established the National Crisis Exercise and Lessons Capability (NCEC) team in 2021 in response to Recommendation 6.5 from the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements (the Commission). The Commission recommended that Australian, state and territory governments should conduct multi-agency, national level exercises, not limited to cross-border jurisdictions.

3.92 The purpose of the NCEC is to design and implement the national crisis exercise program for multi-jurisdictional and multi-entity events that require national coordination and consequence management. The NCEC also supports the uplift of lessons management, exercise management and continuous improvement.¹¹⁶

3.93 The NCEC strategy (the strategy) was first approved in October 2022 and was designed as a one-year strategy. The strategy states that the NCEC will establish a program of national crisis exercises ‘to support, examine and evaluate current national capabilities for crisis response and early recovery’. One of the objectives was to ‘develop a three-year strategy to provide a long-term vision and ability to plan the NCEC program of work’.¹¹⁷

3.94 The strategy outlines how exercises can be identified, which includes a consultation process with the Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (ANZEMC) on exercising priorities, feedback on draft exercise programs and providing recommendations from national crisis exercises. On 13 March 2024 NEMA advised the ANAO that although consultation with the ANZEMC is part of the strategy it has not been formally adopted or utilised in this context.

3.95 NEMA has identified potential exercises beyond natural disasters to be conducted at a national, whole-of-government level. A 2024 exercise work program was drafted which outlined four ‘National Crisis Response Exercises’. In addition to the standing HRWS Preparedness Program exercise, the three other exercises that were included related to El Niño, space weather and a cyber event. On 25 March 2024 NEMA advised the ANAO that the work program was developed as part of an internal NCEC planning session. Cyber and El Niño events were not incorporated into NEMA’s 2024 annual exercise program. However, cyber consequences were integrated into one of the 2024 Catastrophic Space Weather Exercise. On 18 July 2024, NEMA advised the ANAO that design of the HRWS Summit exercise scenarios is supported by the Bureau of Meteorology¹¹⁸ and that these relate directly to El Niño (and La Nina) events.

3.96 On 13 March 2024 NEMA advised the ANAO that exercises consider events that are considered to have a low likelihood and high consequence. There was no risk assessment process to support the identification of these types of events and to inform the establishment of the annual exercise program. As the annual exercise program has historically focussed on natural disaster events and as a risk assessment process has not been established to identify and assess broader consequences, there is a risk that the exercise program does not provide sufficient coverage of priority natural and all-hazard scenarios.

Exercise governance

Australian Government Exercise and Lesson Managers Forum

3.99 The Australian Government Exercise and Lesson Managers Forum (the Forum) was re-established¹¹⁹ in November 2022 following the establishment of NEMA and approval of the NCEC strategy. The NCEC strategy states that it will ‘build and share a register of nationally significant exercises, supported by advice from forum members’.

3.100 The forum is intended to share exercise reports and lessons identified to inform the development of Australian Government policy, plans, capability and recommend priorities for the national exercise program to the National Crisis Exercise and Lessons Steering Committee (the Steering Committee) (see paragraphs 3.102 to 3.104). The forum is open to officer-level representatives from the Australian Government, State and Territory Government departments and agencies with responsibility for crisis management exercising.

3.101 As outlined in the Strategy the forum is required to meet twice annually. Since its re-establishment the Forum met in November 2022, March 2023, November 2023 and June 2024. A review of the meeting minutes indicate that the forum discussed planned and completed exercises, and exercise capability, however, there is no evidence that the forum identified priorities to recommend to the National Crisis Exercise and Lessons Steering Committee.

National Crisis Exercise and Lessons Steering Committee

3.102 The Steering Committee is chaired by NEMA’s Deputy Coordinator-General of Emergency Management and Response. It includes representatives from the Australian Government, states, and territories.

3.103 The Steering Committee is to prioritise and agree on the national crisis exercise program. Its ToRs state that the Steering Committee will meet twice annually. The Steering committee met in February¹²⁰ and December 2023.

3.104 The Steering Committee discussed the draft exercise program in February 2023, as well as matters relating to capability, strategy and specific exercises in both the February and December 2023 meeting. While the timing of exercises, specifically to avoid peak response periods, was discussed, there is no evidence that prioritisation of exercises or specific scenarios was discussed.

National Crisis Exercise Register

3.105 Under previous versions of the AGCMF, NEMA was required to maintain a register that created a single picture of Australian Government national-level all-hazard crisis exercises. Under the revised AGCMF, this remit is no longer outlined. The National Crisis Exercise Register (the Register) was intended to provide the National Crisis Exercise and Lesson Forum members with visibility of exercising and contacts across the Australian Government, states and territories and allow for opportunities to increase efficiencies and identify gaps in national preparedness to inform the national crisis exercising program. The Register was intended to be distributed quarterly or as requested from the NCEC team.

3.106 The Register recorded exercise events since October 2021 and provided an overview and objective of exercises facilitated by Australian Government agencies (including NEMA), state and territories and international agencies. There were gaps in the Register as information for some exercises was incomplete. On 13 March 2024 NEMA advised the ANAO that limitations with the completeness of the register were due to reliance on stakeholders to provide complete input. This limited the ability to report on all-hazards preparedness.

3.107 Increased visibility of exercises and lessons identified and learned reflecting the all-hazards nature of the AGCMF would increase transparency relating to preparedness. The 2023 AGCMF Review recommended that the CAC should oversee Australian Government and relevant multi-national crises exercises and advise on gaps and priorities for whole-of-government exercising.

Higher Risk Weather Season National Preparedness Program

3.109 A HRWS National Preparedness Program (the Preparedness Program) has been delivered since 2014.¹²¹ NEMA is responsible for the design and delivery of the preparedness program. The Preparedness Program has evolved in recent years with the addition of ministerial exercise activities and the establishment of the HRWS National Preparedness Summit. As part of the Preparedness Program, NEMA delivered a ministerial exercise in October 2022 (see Table 3.8).

3.110 In September 2023 NEMA held the first ‘inaugural HRWS National Preparedness Summit’¹²² over a two-day period at Australian Parliament House. Representatives from the Australian Government, state and territory governments, industry, non-government organisations and other stakeholders were involved. NEMA’s reported on its website that ‘the Summit is the first time all key stakeholders … have come together to prepare for the coming Higher Risk weather Season.’

3.111 Maintaining an annual HRWS National Preparedness Summit and an exercise component can ensure stakeholder engagement remains consistent and ongoing. The annual HRWS National Preparedness Summit and associated exercise component provide opportunities for consistent and ongoing stakeholder engagement.

Appendix 1 Entity responses

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

National Emergency Management Agency

Appendix 2 Improvements observed by the ANAO

1. The existence of independent external audit, and the accompanying potential for scrutiny improves performance. Improvements in administrative and management practices usually occur: in anticipation of ANAO audit activity; during an audit engagement; as interim findings are made; and/or after the audit has been completed and formal findings are communicated.

2. The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) has encouraged the ANAO to consider ways in which the ANAO could capture and describe some of these impacts. The ANAO’s corporate plan states that the ANAO’s annual performance statements will provide a narrative that will consider, amongst other matters, analysis of key improvements made by entities during a performance audit process based on information included in tabled performance audit reports.

3. Performance audits involve close engagement between the ANAO and the audited entity as well as other stakeholders involved in the program or activity being audited. Throughout the audit engagement, the ANAO outlines to the entity the preliminary audit findings, conclusions and potential audit recommendations. This ensures that final recommendations are appropriately targeted and encourages entities to take early remedial action on identified matters during the course of an audit. Remedial actions entities may take during the audit include:

• strengthening governance arrangements;
• introducing or revising policies, strategies, guidelines or administrative processes; and
• initiating reviews or investigations.

4. The 2023 Review of the AGCMF and resulting development of the revised AGCMF was underway during the course of the audit, which resulted in a period of significant change for both entities in relation to crisis management arrangements. As such, it is not clear whether changes or actions undertaken by the entities were in response to proposed or actual audit activity.

Appendix 3 Ministerial and lead agency responsibilities under the September 2024 AGCMF

Source: ANAO summary of ministerial and lead agency responsibilities under the AGCMF.