Introduction

The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) is a statutory authority within the Australian Government portfolio of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy. ACMA was formed on 1 July 2005 following the merger of the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) and the Australian Communications Authority (ACA).

ACMA's regulatory functions are set out in the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act 2005 (ACMA Act) and include the regulation of broadcasting, radiocommunications, telecommunications and online content. Under this Act, responsibility for decisions about the agency's regulatory functions rests with ACMA as an Authority.¹ Under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, responsibility for the governance and management of ACMA rests with the ACMA chair in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer.

When it was established, ACMA assumed the ABA's functions in relation to broadcasting regulation. These include:

• regulating broadcasting services in accordance with the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (BSA);
• monitoring and investigating complaints relating to broadcasting services; and
• monitoring compliance with industry Codes of Practice and standards.

The BSA adopted a co regulatory approach to broadcasting services. This approach requires broadcasters to respond, in the first instance, to complaints relating to their adherence to their Codes of Practice (Code complaints). Where complainants are not satisfied with the broadcasters' response or do not receive a response, complaints can be escalated to ACMA. ACMA must investigate all complaints it receives that are within its jurisdiction unless it is satisfied that the complaints are frivolous, vexatious or not made in good faith. ACMA relies on television viewers, radio listeners and other industry stakeholders to inform it of alleged non compliance. In the absence of complaints or other evidence of alleged breaches, broadcasters are, by default, assumed to be complying with their broadcasting requirements.

The co regulatory approach ‘filters' the number of Code complaints received and investigated by ACMA. The 2575 Code complaints received by commercial broadcasters during 2005–06 and 2006–07 resulted in 165 investigations by ACMA. Non Code complaints (for example, those related to potential non compliance with the BSA or licence conditions) are made directly to ACMA. In addition to the co regulatory approach, broadcasters are required to provide compliance reports for: Australian, children's and local content quotas; and anti siphoning information.² They are also required to provide annual returns and change notifications under the media ownership and control rules.

Audit objective and scope

The audit objective was to examine if ACMA is, in respect of commercial broadcasting services, effectively discharging its regulatory responsibilities under the BSA. The audit examined ACMA's:

• monitoring of commercial broadcasters' compliance with the BSA;
• addressing non compliance with, and enforcement of, the BSA;
• collection of broadcast licence fees; and
• monitoring and reporting of its regulatory performance in respect of commercial broadcasting.

Overall conclusion

ACMA has regulatory responsibilities for media and communications across Australia. It administers a complex and disparate regulatory regime across its four areas of responsibility: broadcasting; radiocommunications; telecommunications; and online content. For commercial broadcasting, this means ensuring compliance with legislative requirements, industry standards and Codes of Practice. ACMA interacts with a wide range of stakeholders, including metropolitan and regional commercial broadcasters, peak representative bodies, and the viewing and listening public. Its regulatory role and responsibilities have continued to expand, putting pressure on its existing resource base.

As previously noted, the co regulatory approach relies on television viewers, radio listeners and other industry stakeholders to identify alleged non compliance with industry Codes of Practice. Their complaints are initially made to the broadcasters and ACMA is only required to investigate those Code complaints that have not been resolved. It is therefore important that ACMA and the broadcasters have effective systems, processes and procedures in place to handle complaints in a way that engenders stakeholder confidence and meets expectations. For the co-regulatory approach to operating effectively, the ANAO considers more attention needs to be given to the following areas:

• the considerable level of stakeholder dissatisfaction with the broadcasting complaints process reported in ACMA's Reality Television Review ³;
• the high number of complaints handling breaches identified by ACMA (and prima facie breaches identified by the ANAO that were not fully investigated); and
• monitoring whether broadcasters are publicising the Codes and their complaints procedures; and
• verifying the accuracy of the complaints data broadcasters report, on a risk assessment basis.

While ACMA has adequately addressed the majority of complaints it has received, the timeliness of its response to these complaints has deteriorated in the last couple of years. The time taken to complete commercial broadcasting investigations has also increased, with each taking, on average, 21 weeks in 2006–07. There is also the potential for investigations to take even longer, given ACMA's increased investigations workload in the first half of 2007–08. ACMA advised that it will continue to prioritise its investigations based on the risks they present and resourcing capability.

The ANAO has identified a number of areas were ACMA's management of its investigations could be improved. These include investigating all prima facie complaints handling breaches by broadcasters or recording the decision not to investigate, documenting consideration of past decisions and precedents, offering complainants the opportunity to comment (in terms of procedural fairness), and advising complainants the results of the investigations. Improving the quality and accuracy of the data in its complaints and investigations management system would increase its effectiveness as a management tool. ACMA has recently advised the ANAO that it is implementing a number of initiatives to improve its complaints and investigations processes. This includes producing an operations manual as business rules and procedures have not been documented to date.

ACMA has not taken (and does not propose to take) enforcement action to address identified non compliance with the change notifications under the old media ownership and control rules. In relation to the new rules introduced in February 2007, ACMA initially took an educative approach and, more recently, has issued formal warning notices for non-compliance with these rules. Broadcasters are generally not required to confirm that they have implemented compliance and enforcement actions arising from breaches found in broadcasting investigations and non-compliance with media ownership and control rules. Also, unless it is a requirement of the enforcement action, ACMA does not follow up with broadcasters to ensure these actions have been implemented as intended. However, some recent enforceable undertakings have required broadcasters to report regularly to ACMA on their progress towards compliance. The ANAO suggests that, where relevant, ACMA apply this approach more broadly to its broadcasting compliance and enforcement actions to reduce the risk of non-compliance recurring.

Most programming data reported by broadcasters to demonstrate their compliance with broadcasting content quotas and the anti-siphoning provisions, is not independently verified by ACMA. It considers that the potential costs of independent verification outweigh the assurance benefits. While appreciating that there is a balance to be struck, a risk based approach to monitoring would normally be applied in such circumstances to provide some assurance that broadcasters are meeting their regulatory requirements. This may involve ACMA gaining an appreciation of broadcasters' compliance processes and evaluating other industry intelligence.

ACMA has acknowledged that its governance arrangements in the 18 months following its establishment were not as effective as they could have been, particularly in terms of a coordinated framework. For this reason, ACMA has reviewed and is currently implementing revised corporate governance, performance management and risk management frameworks. The ongoing management of regulatory and operational risks needs to be incorporated into ACMA's risk management strategies. This will position ACMA to respond to changing risks and, where necessary, adjust compliance strategies, priorities and activities. In addition, expanded performance reporting would improve ACMA's management of, and accountability for, the regulation of commercial broadcasting.

The ANAO has made five recommendations to improve ACMA's regulation of commercial broadcasting services. These recommendations relate to investigations, broadcasters' complaints handling processes, monitoring compliance with industry Codes of Practice, compliance and enforcement action and ACMA's performance management and reporting.

ACMA response

The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), welcomes and supports the review undertaken by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) of the Regulation of Commercial Broadcasting. As a relatively new organisation, the ACMA is seeking to review its processes and approaches to ensure that they continue to meet the expectations of industry, government and the community.

ACMA acknowledges that the ANAO's findings in areas that can be improved upon, will further enhance ACMA's program of transformational change and continuous improvement. The audit has enabled ACMA to demonstrate the extent of the internal improvement and commitment in risk management, co-regulatory and investigation areas that has taken place within resource constraints and the benefits that this work delivers through the co-regulatory approach to industry and government participants.

Key findings by Chapter

Commercial broadcasting complaints (Chapter 2)

Under the co regulatory approach, the effective handling of commercial broadcasting complaints requires:

• broadcasters to publicise the industry Codes and complaint procedures; and
• broadcasters and ACMA to appropriately address complaints in a timely manner.

Publicising the Code and its complaint procedures

The TV and Radio Codes require licensees to provide regular on air information about the Code and complaints procedures. As ACMA has not received any complaints about this matter, it does not believe it is an issue of concern to the community. However, it would be difficult for members of the public to detect any non compliance by broadcasters with their requirement to publicise the Codes. ACMA would have greater confidence in broadcasters' compliance were they required to advise annually: that they have met their publicising requirement; and the dates and times of broadcasts, or announcements, publicising the Codes.

Code complaints received by commercial broadcasters

Broadcasters are required to report regularly to their peak industry associations, Free TV Australia and Commercial Radio Australia, on the number and substance of Code complaints they receive. This process is designed to keep the industry associations and ACMA informed of emerging or systemic issues in program content or complaints resolution. This information is not verified by ACMA prior to publishing in its ACMASphere magazine, or analysed to identify any trends in Code complaints to broadcasters.

ACMA's complaints management

ACMA relies on the Code and non Code complaints it receives to identify potential breaches of the BSA, regulations and standards, licence conditions and Codes. In 2006–07, ACMA received 487 commercial broadcasting complaints, an increase of 12 per cent on the previous year.

Complaints within and outside of ACMA's jurisdiction

ACMA usually classifies complaints as either being within jurisdiction or outside its jurisdiction, as they are received. Within jurisdiction complaints are either investigated, or complainants are directed to take their complaints to broadcasters. Out of jurisdiction complaints are referred to the broadcasters or other responsible bodies, such as the Advertising Standards Board. Over half the broadcasting complaints ACMA received in 2005–06 and 2006–07 were classified as being out of ACMA's jurisdiction or were not classified at all. The reasons for classifying complaints as out of jurisdiction were not documented in most cases.

Responding to out of jurisdiction complaints consumes ACMA's resources that could otherwise be directed towards addressing relevant complaints. To further reduce and streamline its handling of out of jurisdiction complaints, ACMA could better classify complaints as either within or out of jurisdiction, revise the jurisdiction reason codes to cover the most common categories, and periodically analyse the reasons for complaints being received and develop strategies to address them.

Complaint handling procedures

ACMA (and its predecessor, the ABA) have not documented internal procedures and business rules for handling complaints. ACMA advised that a procedures manual for handling broadcasting complaints will be developed during 2008.

Deciding whether to undertake a formal investigation

The majority of commercial broadcasting complaints received by ACMA do not result in a formal investigation. Of the 923 complaints made to ACMA during 2005–06 and 2006–07, only 193 (21 per cent) resulted in a formal investigation.⁴ Decisions on whether to investigate complaints, and their reasons, were generally adequately documented in ACMA's Information Management System (AIMS). However, the ANAO identified a number of instances (relating to broadcasters not meeting complaints handling requirements) where it was difficult to understand the reasons for ACMA's decision not to investigate the complaints. ACMA's management of complaints would be improved if it periodically examined whether broadcasters' responses met the complaints handling provisions of the industry Codes.

Timeliness and completeness of actioning complaints

The timeliness of ACMA's initial response to complainants has deteriorated in the last couple of years—from 92 per cent in 2005–06 being within ACMA's target of seven calendar days, to 63 per cent in 2006–07. Data in AIMS was often missing for some relevant fields (including classification of the complaint as either within or outside ACMA's jurisdiction and the type of broadcaster). At times, inaccurate data were also recorded in some date fields. The database was not routinely updated to indicate that complaints had been appropriately actioned and ‘closed'.

ACMA advised that a senior officer within the Investigations Section performs an undocumented monthly check to ensure that all complaints have been actioned. Documenting these checks in future would demonstrate that they have been performed. Given the delays in responding to complaints observed during the audit, more frequent checking for overdue responses also appears warranted.

Commercial broadcasting investigations (Chapter 3)

Under the BSA, ACMA must investigate all broadcasting complaints that are within its jurisdiction⁵, unless it is satisfied that the complaint is frivolous, vexatious, or was not made in good faith. ACMA can also self initiate investigations, and the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (the Minister) can direct ACMA to investigate matters.

About 20 per cent of commercial broadcasting complaints to ACMA in 2005-06 and 2006-07 generated an investigation. Over this period, ACMA completed 162 commercial broadcasting investigations (128 television and 34 radio), 78 per cent (126) of which did not result in breaches being found against broadcasters. Over three quarters of television breaches (31 in 24 investigations) involved complaints handling, news and current affairs, and the classification of television programs. Nearly three quarters of radio breaches (15 in 12 investigations) involved complaints handling and programs unsuitable for broadcast.

ACMA's management of broadcasting investigations

The ANAO identified deficiencies in the timeliness and management of commercial broadcasting investigations, including the absence of documented investigation policies and procedures. Nearly one quarter of investigations have exceeded ACMA's target of completing all investigations within 24 weeks. The average time for completing investigations in 2006–07 was 18 weeks. This timeframe increases to 21 weeks were ACMA to include all elapsed time between receiving a complaint and informing the complainant of the investigation result. The increase in ACMA's investigations workload during the first half of 2007–08 suggests that there is the potential for investigations to take even longer.

The co regulatory approach to commercial broadcasting relies on complaints to detect non-compliance. When commercial broadcasters breach the complaints handling provisions of the industry Codes of Practice the integrity of the approach is undermined. ACMA's investigations have identified a high number of complaints handling breaches (28) and the ANAO's analysis identified further prima facie complaints handling breaches that were not fully investigated (14). Other issues relating to ACMA's management of its investigations included ACMA:

• deciding not to investigate five dated cases, after obtaining legal advice to the contrary, without documenting the reasons for these decisions;
• not documenting, for most investigations, any consideration of past, relevant investigation decisions or precedents;
• not assessing whether complainants should be afforded the opportunity to comment on draft investigation findings and conclusions, for procedural fairness purposes;
• not informing all complainants of the result of the investigations, as required by the BSA; and
• applying inconsistent records management practices.

Compliance and enforcement action

When regulatory non compliance is found, ACMA should take action to address the risks posed by the non compliance that is commensurate with the seriousness of the breach. For most breaches of the TV and Radio Codes, ACMA considers that the use of its enforcement powers (licence conditions and enforceable undertakings) may not be appropriate to the breach. Rather, it uses negotiated agreements with broadcasters to address non compliance and generally accepts the compliance actions broadcasters have taken or proposed to prevent recurrences. These commonly include training for staff on the Code requirements and improvements to broadcasting procedures.

For most compliance and enforcement actions, ACMA does not require broadcasters to confirm that the actions have been implemented nor does ACMA follow up to ensure this has occurred. Compliance and enforcement actions are not recorded centrally. This inhibits ACMA's ability to follow them up, and bring past compliance and enforcement actions to bear on current enforcement considerations. Some form of broadcaster advice and checking by ACMA would provide greater assurance that compliance and enforcement actions have been implemented as ACMA intended.

Reporting on broadcasting investigations

The statistics ACMA publishes in its annual reports on broadcasting investigations are substantially less informative that that of its predecessor, the ABA. The information reported for each investigation, summarised in the annual reports, could be enhanced to better inform readers of compliance issues and ACMA's performance. Investigations that result in breaches being found against broadcasters are published on ACMA's website, while only summaries of those investigations where no breaches are found are published. The Authority decided in December 2006 to publish in full a number of non breach reports of ‘public interest' each year. ACMA advised in June 2008, that the release of such reports is being progressed.

Broadcasting content claims and disclosures (Chapter 4)

ACMA requires commercial broadcasters to provide programming information to assess their compliance with the BSA, standards and Codes of Practice covering: Australian, children's and local content quotas; and anti siphoning provisions.⁶ Commercial radio broadcasters are also required to make on air disclosures during current affairs programs of any commercial agreement between sponsors and presenters, and payment of production costs by advertisers and sponsors.

Australian, children's and local content

Commercial television and radio broadcasters are required to meet common minimum conditions and quotas in respect of the Australian and children's programming they broadcast. For example, commercial television broadcasters are to broadcast each year a minimum of 55 per cent Australian programming between 6:00 a.m. and midnight. Commercial television broadcasters in regional areas are also subject to additional local broadcasting requirements. From information provided by broadcasters, ACMA has determined that in the 2005 and 2006 calendar years, television broadcasters met all requirements for Australian, children's and local content; Australian advertising, and high definition television quotas. ACMA addressed the underperformance of two broadcasters who fell just short on meeting one quota each.

Under the Australian Music Code of Practice, all commercial radio broadcasters are required to broadcast minimum quotas of Australian music. The Australian Music Performance Committee (AMPCOM—a voluntary association comprising representatives from the Australian music industry) is required to monitor and report annually on radio broadcasters' compliance with the Code. As of May 2008, the 2006-07 AMPCOM Annual Report was not publicly available (although AMPCOM provided the ANAO with the data that will be reported). In reviewing these reports, the ANAO made the following observations:

• compliance was high for the period 2004-05 to 2006-07, but between six and 13 per cent of broadcasters did not fully comply or were omitted from the reports; and
• some licensees were reporting against incorrect quota requirements, which resulted in two to four percent of broadcasters not meeting their correct quota requirements between 2004–05 and 2006–07.

Under the BSA, ACMA has a broad oversight role to ensure that registered Codes of Practice are ‘operating to provide appropriate community safeguards'. Therefore, ACMA should identify and address any impediments to the timely production and publication of the annual reports on Australian music, and monitor broadcasters' reported compliance with the Code.

Anti siphoning provisions

The former Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts has determined that the television rights to 30 listed events covered in 12 sports are to be available to free to air television for viewing by the general public. This prevents subscription broadcasters from acquiring exclusive broadcasting rights to these events. From information broadcasters provide, ACMA determines the extent to which broadcasters ‘use' their rights by broadcasting the listed events, and provides regular reports to the Minister.

Notwithstanding the differences between listed events, there is great variability in the type of information reported and their methods of presentation—within and between reports. ACMA agrees that there is a need for greater consistency of reporting. A reporting model consistently applied, will assist stakeholders to compare more easily the extent to which events covered by the anti-siphoning provisions have been broadcast.

Verification of broadcasters' claims

Local content is the only area where ACMA independently verifies the broadcasters' claims of compliance. For the Australian Music Code and Australian advertising standard, intermediaries monitor Australian music on commercial radio, and determine the Australian content of advertising broadcast on commercial television.⁷ ACMA does not independently verify other claims from broadcasters. It advised that the scrutiny provided by third parties and the lack of other intelligence (such as upheld viewer complaints) indicate that the accuracy of broadcasters' claims is not an area of concern. ACMA also considers that the potential costs of independent verification outweigh the assurance benefits. While appreciating that there is a balance to be struck, a risk based approach to monitoring would normally be applied in such circumstances, to provide some assurance that broadcasters are meeting their regulatory requirements.

Commercial radio current affairs disclosure

Commercial radio broadcasters are required to provide ACMA with summaries of commercial agreements between sponsors and presenters of current affairs programs. ACMA publishes the summaries in a register on its website. ACMA advised that it has taken no action in response to receiving late notification of 15 commercial agreements and numerous other notifications with the dates of the agreements not specified.

ACMA advised that it relies on complaints to trigger any investigations into any potential breaches of the disclosure standard. However, without an up to date and complete register, listeners are inhibited from lodging complaints should they consider radio presenters are not making all relevant on air disclosures of commercial agreements. ACMA should communicate with the broadcasters to encourage them to disclose commercial agreements in a more timely manner.

Other regulatory activities (Chapter 5)

ACMA has responsibility for monitoring the media industry's adherence to the ownership and control rules established by the BSA. These rules changed during the period covered by the audit. Under both the old and new rules, the parties covered by them must notify ACMA when controlling interests change (within seven days and five days, respectively), and lodge annual returns with ACMA outlining the people in control of the licences.

Media ownership and control

For the period July 2005 to mid July 2007 (which covers both the old and new rules), there was major prima facie non compliance by broadcasters in lodging change of control notifications within the legislated timeframes. Many were lodged a month, and some over a year, after the relevant transaction. Although the broadcasters' submission of 2005–06 annual returns was satisfactory, some 2006–07 annual returns were either late or not lodged at all. Further, comparisons between change of control notifications and annual returns identified an additional eight cases where ACMA had not been informed of a change of control event at the time it occurred.

ACMA has not taken (and does not propose to take) enforcement action to address identified non compliance with the change notifications under the old media ownership and control rules. In relation to the new rules introduced in February 2007, ACMA initially took an educative approach and, more recently, has issued formal warning notices for non-compliance with the new rules. An absence of timely action creates a risk that non-compliance will continue unnecessarily or not be properly addressed. Early enforcement action sends a message to broadcasters that non compliance is not acceptable. ACMA committing to implementing a standard operating procedure will help to address broadcasters' non compliance in a more timely manner. Developing standard timeframes to impose compliance and enforcement action will also assist in this regard.

Broadcast licence fees

Collecting the fees payable in respect to commercial television and radio licences is a primary function of ACMA. In 2006–07, ACMA collected $275.9 million in licence fees. The ANAO found that ACMA's fee calculations, which are based on broadcasters' gross earnings, were generally correct. However, to calculate the correct amount of fees requires ACMA and broadcasters to have a common understanding of the nature of broadcasters' revenue sources and their applicability to licence fee calculations. Broadcasters have accessed new revenue sources since the licence fee guidelines were first developed by ACMA's predecessor, the ABA, nearly 16 years ago. A revision to the guidelines would aid both ACMA and the broadcasters.

The former ABA conducted an audit program of broadcast licence fees during 2001 to 2004. The audits found a generally high level of compliance, but raised questions about the treatment of various items of revenue. In October 2007, the Authority decided to recommence a targeted audit program for broadcast licence fees. The ANAO strongly supports this initiative as part of an integrated risk based strategy to maximise licensees' compliance.

Requirements of broadcasters' internal operations

Commercial broadcasters' compliance (or non compliance) with most provisions of the BSA, standards and Codes of Practice is demonstrable to the public and/or ACMA through their broadcasts and the information they provide to ACMA. However, two provisions—emergency broadcast procedures and commercial radio compliance programs—are related to broadcasters' internal operations and are not visible to ACMA or the public. Requiring broadcasters to publish their emergency broadcast procedures and compliance programs on their websites, as well as the results of their annual review/audit, would demonstrate broadcasters' compliance with these provisions.

Governance arrangements (Chapter 6)

ACMA's governance arrangements in the 18 months following its establishment lacked cohesion, as elements of corporate governance were considered in isolation rather than within a coordinated framework. ACMA is currently developing and implementing revised corporate governance and risk management frameworks to address identified shortcomings.

Corporate governance framework

In June 2007, ACMA's executive endorsed a new corporate governance framework and a process for its implementation. A preliminary assessment of its existing arrangements against desired governance practices identified shortcomings in business planning, risk management, procedural documentation, and performance measurement and reporting. ACMA advised that it expects to complete a more comprehensive assessment in May 2008 and to develop a workplan soon after to address the gaps in its governance arrangements. The ANAO supports ACMA's approach to implementing its revised corporate governance framework.

Risk management

Effective risk management will assist ACMA to appropriately manage the risks posed by its co regulatory approach to commercial broadcasting services. An important part of this approach is the handling of Code complaints by commercial broadcasters before investigation by ACMA, and the processes it has in place to gain assurance that broadcasters are meeting legislative requirements and industry Codes of Practice.

ACMA has identified the timeliness of investigations and the quality of programming data received from broadcasters to assess regulatory compliance as the risks facing its regulation of commercial broadcasting. These risks have been rated low. However, the ANAO considers that there are also potential risks to the overall integrity of the co-regulatory approach, given the following:

• ACMA does not monitor the requirement for broadcasters to publicise the Codes of Practice and their complaints handling procedures;
• broadcasters potentially restricting the number of complaints they receive by not accepting emailed complaints;
• the considerable level of stakeholder dissatisfaction with the broadcasting complaints process reported in ACMA's Reality Television Review;
• ACMA does not verify the accuracy of the complaints and compliance data reported by broadcasters; and
• the high number of complaints handling breaches by broadcasters identified by ACMA, coupled with prima facie breaches not fully investigated.

In re assessing the risks facing commercial broadcasting, ACMA should also consider the timeliness of addressing complaints, and the quality and completeness of complaints and investigations data. A further consideration is the risk of non-compliance not being properly addressed if enforcement action is not timely or followed-up by ACMA.

Performance management and reporting

Under the outcomes and outputs framework, agencies are expected to report annually against the performance indicators outlined in their Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS). ACMA plans its activities and monitors its performance against performance indicators in its divisional business plans. The relationship between performance indicators in the PBS and the relevant business plan was unclear. Without a reasonable degree of alignment between the two sets of performance indicators, and an explanation of the relationship between the two, it is difficult for ACMA to demonstrate that it has measured and reported against its regulatory outcomes and outputs.

Although ACMA has four distinct areas of regulatory responsibility—broadcasting, radiocommunications, telecommunications and online content, the PBS outcomes, outputs and (most of the) performance indicators are common to all. The context and relevance of each generic outcome and output differ for each area of regulation. Regulating telecommunications is very different to regulating broadcasting, and so some performance indicators are more relevant and important to some areas of regulatory responsibility and less so to others. ACMA's future annual reporting would be more effective if it included reporting separately on its performance for each key area of regulatory responsibility.

Footnotes

^{1 For the purposes of this audit, ‘the Authority' is used to describe members of ACMA appointed under the Australian Communications and Media Authority Act 2005 and ‘ACMA' is used to describe the staff and management of ACMA, which may include Authority members.}

^{2 The anti-siphoning provisions prevent subscription broadcasters acquiring the exclusive broadcasting rights to particular sporting events determined by the former Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts.}

^{3 ACMA 2007, Reality Television Review: Final Report, p.87.}

^{4 Similar complaints are often combined into the one investigation. During this period, 178 investigations were conducted.}

^{5 After Code complaints have first been responded to by broadcasters or no response is received within stipulated time limits.}

^{6 The anti-siphoning provisions prevent subscription broadcasters acquiring the exclusive broadcasting rights to particular sporting events determined by the Minister. Commercial broadcasters are required to report to ACMA on their broadcasting of these sporting events.}

^{7 The intermediaries are associated with the peak commercial broadcasting associations and broader industry associations.}