1.1 When a natural disaster or other domestic emergency occurs within Australia, state and territory governments (state governments) have primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and the environment within their respective jurisdictions. State governments draw on a range of emergency services, volunteer organisations and commercial resources when responding to these emergencies, and in certain circumstances, may also request Australian Government non-financial assistance to provide additional resources for response and recovery activities.

1.2 The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) outlines the Australian Government’s approach to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from crises, and provides ministers and senior officials with guidance on their respective roles and responsibilities.⁴

1.3 The Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) outlines the coordination arrangements for the provision of Australian Government non-financial assistance in the event of a disaster or emergency within Australia or its offshore territories.⁵ The COMDISPLAN derives its authority from the AGCMF and is managed by the Australian Government’s Department of Home Affairs, through the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).⁶

1.4 For a state government to make a request under the COMDISPLAN, one of the following criteria must be met:

• all government, community and commercial resources are exhausted or are likely to be exhausted;
• the jurisdiction is unable to mobilise its own resources (or community and commercial resources) in time; or
• the Australian Government has a capability that the state or territory does not have.

Defence assistance to the civil community

1.5 Department of Defence (Defence) assistance during emergencies is provided under Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) arrangements and is governed by Defence policy and procedures.⁷ Defence has stated that:

DACC provides the means through which Defence can assist State and Territory Governments, non-Defence organisations or agencies to deliver emergency or non-emergency support at a time when their own resources are not sufficient, have been overwhelmed, no alternative for gaining this support is available or there is a mutually beneficial outcome for Defence in providing assistance. Whether assisting emergency service agencies to respond to natural disasters or other emergencies, or supporting government/non-government agencies, the DACC arrangements exist to guide the requirements of providing Defence support outside the core business of military operations to defend Australia.⁸

1.6 Defence’s mission and purpose is to defend Australia and its national interests in order to advance Australia’s security and prosperity. Defence is resourced to deliver against this through the following two outcomes, documented in its Portfolio Budget Statements. DACC activities fall under Outcome 1.

• Outcome 1: Defend Australia and its national interests through the conduct of operations and provision of support for the Australian community and civilian authorities in accordance with Government direction.
• Outcome 2: Protect and advance Australia’s strategic interests through the provision of strategic policy, the development, delivery and sustainment of military, intelligence and enabling capabilities, and the promotion of regional and global security and stability as directed by Government.

DACC Policy

1.7 Defence’s policies and procedures for DACC have been periodically reviewed and updated. The current iteration of the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Policy (DACC Policy) was approved in August 2020 and last reviewed in August 2021 (see paragraphs 2.2–2.13 of this audit). It ‘describes the agreed approach to providing Defence assistance to the civil community’ and outlines ten key principles that are to be applied by Defence personnel when making decisions about the provision of DACC support.⁹ It also sets out that:

Through the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Government has directed Defence to enhance its support to civil authorities in response to national and regional crises and natural disasters such as pandemics, bushfires, floods or cyclones. Defence is committed to assisting the civil community in both emergency and non-emergency situations. DACC is a mechanism by which Defence achieves this effect. DACC support is not to involve the use, or potential use, of force (including intrusive or coercive acts) by Defence members.¹⁰

1.8 The DACC Policy also states, in the ‘rationale’ section, that:

DACC provides a highly responsive and agile policy framework through which Defence can assist other organisations or agencies. This assistance delivers an outcome or effect at a time when the recipient’s own resources are unlikely to be sufficient and/or have been overwhelmed. It can also include an activity of significance where there is a mutually beneficial outcome for Defence in providing assistance. Although states and territories have primary responsibility for domestic disaster response within their jurisdiction, Defence support to civilian agencies in times of major disasters and emergencies has been a consistent policy of Australian Government physical assistance. The DACC arrangements exist to guide decision makers in the application of Defence resources to provide support outside the core business of military operations to defend Australia and its national interests to advance Australia’s security and prosperity.¹¹

1.9 In the DACC Policy, DACC support is classed as either ‘emergency assistance’ (DACC categories 1–3) or ‘non-emergency assistance’ (DACC categories 4–6), as set out in Box 1 below. This audit focuses on emergency assistance provided through DACC categories 1, 2 and 3. As discussed in paragraph 1.41, DACC categories 4, 5 and 6 were not examined as part of this audit.

Source: DACC Policy

DACC 1 — localised, short-term emergency responses

1.10 Requests for support under DACC 1 arrangements are made at the local level directly to a Senior Australian Defence Force (ADF) Officer¹², Base Manager or Unit Commander and are not required to be made in writing. Requests are considered by the ‘approving authority’ which, in the case of DACC 1 support, is the Senior ADF Officer, Base Manager or Unit Commander. The approving authority may approve DACC 1 support if satisfied that the following conditions are met:

• deliberate and decisive action is necessary to protect human life, prevent and/or alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life or prevent widespread loss and damage to property;
• civilian resources are inadequate, unavailable or cannot be mobilised in time;
• the requested support is consistent with the principles of DACC (see footnote 9); and
• assistance can be provided from within the approving officer’s resources.

1.11 Once approved, the provision of DACC 1 support is coordinated by the approving authority in consultation with the regional Defence Joint Operations Support Staff (JOSS)¹³ and civilian authorities at the incident site.

1.12 The approving authority is required to re-assess the continued provision of DACC 1 support 48 hours after it was initially activated. If further support is required, it must be provided in consultation with Defence’s Military Strategic Commitments Domestic Branch (MSC).¹⁴ MSC and the regional JOSS may consider transitioning the DACC 1 task to another DACC category if the continuation of support is likely to exceed the approving authority’s resources.¹⁵

1.13 Support under DACC 1 arrangements concludes when the approving authority is satisfied that the emergency circumstances have been resolved, or when the support task has transitioned into another DACC category. The approving authority is required to notify JOSS, MSC and Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)¹⁶ of any commitment to DACC 1 support as soon as possible by the most expedient means, and the JOSS are to register the request in the DACC database. These actions can be completed following the conclusion of support.

DACC 2 and DACC 3 — significant crisis response, relief and recovery assistance

1.14 Once an affected jurisdiction determines that due to the nature, magnitude or duration of an event, it cannot reasonably cope with the needs of the situation, it may advise NEMA of its intention to seek Australian Government non-financial assistance under COMDISPLAN.¹⁷ NEMA is responsible for activating COMDISPLAN¹⁸ and obtaining the required approvals from the Minister for Emergency Management after that activation.

1.15 Once ministerial approval has been provided, NEMA may request support from appropriate agencies. The process for obtaining support from Defence involves NEMA submitting a task request through MSC for approval by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) or an appropriately delegated official.

1.16 Based on the complexity, duration or geographical spread of the support requested, CDF may issue a direction to activate a Joint Task Force (JTF). JTF arrangements are discussed at paragraphs 3.3–3.6.

1.17 Following approval of DACC 2 or 3 support, the JOSS are to register the request in the DACC database. A DACC 2 or 3 support task is to conclude when any of the following occur:

• the requesting agency withdraws its request for continued support;
• NEMA de-activates COMDISPLAN; or
• the approving authority determines, in consultation with civil authorities, that the DACC support is no longer required.

1.18 A post-activity report is to be provided to HQJOC, MSC and JOSS within 28 days of the conclusion of support and the JOSS are to ensure that all details of the task are recorded on the DACC database.

1.19 The process for requesting and providing DACC support is summarised in Figure 1.1.

Recent significant DACC events

Operation Bushfire Assist

1.20 Defence stood up Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 on 31 December 2019 in response to the 2019–20 bushfire season. At its peak more than 6500 ADF personnel, including 3000 reservists, worked with more than 450 international military personnel to provide emergency relief and response and recovery operations, making this operation the largest mobilisation of the ADF for domestic disaster relief in Australian history. Defence support included: use of Defence assets to facilitate the transportation of emergency supplies and evacuation of civilians; road and fence clearance; the provision of water, fuel, meals and accommodation to emergency services personnel and impacted communities; and the maintenance of fire breaks. The operation concluded on 26 March 2020.

Operation COVID-19 Assist

1.21 Announced on 1 April 2020, Operation COVID-19 Assist saw more than 18,000 ADF personnel providing support across every state and territory during the pandemic, with a peak of 3500 personnel providing support on 1 September 2020. The operation provided support for various initiatives including: hotel quarantine program assistance for returning Australians and international travellers; emergency response planning assistance; police border controls logistics support; frontline COVID-19 swab testing support; contact tracing teams; and logistical support for civilian authorities. The operation concluded on 7 October 2022.

Flood assistance

1.22 Defence has also provided support to flood-affected regions through the following operations.

• Operation NSW Flood Assist 21-1, which commenced on 24 March 2021 as part of the Australian Government’s response to flooding in New South Wales (NSW) and concluded on 15 April 2021.
• Operation Flood Assist 22-1, which commenced on 28 February 2022 in response to flooding in Queensland and NSW and concluded on 26 April 2022.
• Operation Flood Assist 22-2, which commenced on 17 October 2022 in response to flooding in NSW and Victoria, before being extended to flood-affected regions of South Australia on 14 December 2022 and concluding on 5 February 2023.
• Operation Flood Assist 23-1, which commenced on 6 January 2023 after heavy rainfall in Western Australia’s Kimberley region and concluded on 28 February 2023.

1.23 Defence assistance across these operations included: sandbagging; use of Defence assets to support search and rescue efforts; doorknocking; aerial surveillance and imagery of flood-affected regions; and clearance of flood-damaged waste.

Figure 1.1: DACC request for support process

Note a: NEMA may activate COMDISPLAN prior to receiving a request for assistance.

Source: ANAO analysis of DACC Manual.

1.24 For the period 27 May 2013 to 30 June 2022, Defence recorded 4051 individual emergency and non-emergency DACC tasks in the DACC database. The majority of these have been recorded as DACC 1 activities, with a notable increase in DACC 2 and DACC 3 tasks from 2018–19. This increase largely relates to support provided as part of Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20, Operation COVID-19 Assist, and the flood assistance operations discussed in paragraph 1.22.

1.25 Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 illustrate the distribution of DACC support for each year for the period 27 May 2013 to 30 June 2022, as recorded in Defence’s DACC database.¹⁹

Figure 1.2: Number of emergency DACC tasks recorded by Defence, per annum and by DACC category

Source: ANAO analysis of Defence data.

Figure 1.3: Days of emergency DACC support recorded by Defence, per annum and by DACC category

Source: ANAO analysis of Defence data.

DACC related expenditure

1.26 The DACC Policy states that the costs incurred for all DACC support are to be funded from Defence Service and Group budgets. However, the Australian Government may agree to provide supplementary funding where it directs the ADF to undertake major operations. Where supplementation is agreed, Defence receives funding for the net additional cost of major operations on a ‘no-win/no-loss basis’.²⁰ The net additional cost is the cost of a Defence operation, above the cost of Defence business-as-usual activities.

1.27 Table 1.1 sets out the net additional cost component recorded by Defence for 2019–20, 2020–21, 2021–22 and 2022–23.

Table 1.1: Net additional costs recorded by Defence for DACC support

Note a: Defence reports costs by DACC category unless the task becomes a declared operation. Once declared, a specific charge code is established for the operation and the associated costs from that point onwards are recorded against that code. Operations may include costs associated with multiple DACC categories. Defence is unable to disaggregate the costs recorded for declared operations by DACC category.

Note b: Tasks under Operation COVID-19 Assist were managed as non-emergency DACC arrangements. The ANAO identified 43 tasks associated with the COVID-19 response in the DACC database that were recorded as emergency DACC (categories 1–3). Defence provided documentation to the ANAO in July 2023 showing that 42 of these tasks had been re-categorised as non-emergency tasks.

Note c: Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with cost figures for Operation Flood Assist 2021–1.

Note d: Figures for 2022–23 are based on Defence advice to the ANAO provided in September 2023.

Source: Defence data.

Reviews and inquiries into DACC arrangements

Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements

1.28 On 20 February 2020, the Prime Minister announced the establishment of a Royal Commission to examine the national natural disaster coordination arrangements in the aftermath of the 2019–20 bushfires. The Royal Commission’s final report was tabled in Parliament on 30 October 2020. It found that:

• there was confusion at the state and territory level over the thresholds for requesting Commonwealth support, and the role of Defence in providing support in response to domestic disasters; and
• Defence personnel providing DACC support were not afforded the same immunity provisions from civil or criminal liability that state and territory emergency services personnel possessed.²¹
• The Royal Commission made 80 recommendations. Three related to DACC support, as follows.
• State and territory governments should take steps to ensure that there is better interaction, planning and ongoing understanding of ADF capabilities and processes by state and territory fire and emergency service agencies and local governments.
• The Australian Government should review the content of the DACC Manual to ensure consistency of language and application with a revised COMDISPLAN.
• The Australian Government should afford appropriate legal protections from civil and criminal liability to ADF members when conducting activities under an authorisation to prepare for, respond to and recover from natural disasters.²²

1.29 The Australian Government supported the three recommendations. Defence’s progress in implementing these recommendations is discussed at paragraph 4.41.

Senate Select Committee on Australia’s Disaster Resilience

1.30 The Senate Select Committee on Australia’s Disaster Resilience was established on 30 November 2022 to inquire into Australia’s preparedness, response and recovery workforce models, as well as alternative models to disaster recovery. The Committee’s terms of reference outlined, among other things, that it would examine:

• the role of the ADF in responding to domestic natural disasters;
• the impact of more frequent and more intense natural disasters, due to climate change, on the ongoing capacity and capability of the ADF; and
• the impact on the ADF in responding to domestic natural disasters.

1.31 As at September 2023, the Committee’s final report was scheduled for tabling in April 2024.²³

State and territory inquiries

1.32 The 2019–20 bushfire season resulted in multiple state and territory reviews of response efforts, including those outlined in Table 1.2. DACC arrangements have been considered in the context of many inquiries.

Table 1.2: State and territory inquiries – findings relating to DACC

Note a: NSW Bushfire Inquiry, Final Report of the NSW Bushfire Inquiry [Internet], 31 July 2020, pp. 349–353, available from https://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/assets/dpc-nsw-gov-au/publications/NSW-Bushfire-Inquiry-1630/Final-Report-of-the-NSW-Bushfire-Inquiry.pdf [accessed 27 March 2023].

Note b: Inspector-General for Emergency Management, Inquiry into the 2019–20 Victorian Fire Season – Phase 1 Community and sector preparedness for and response to the 2019–20 fire season [Internet], 31 July 2020, pp. 321–324, available from https://files.igem.vic.gov.au/2021-03/Inquiry%20into%20the%202019%2020%20Victorian%20Fire%20Season.pdf [accessed 27 March 2023].

Note c: Government of South Australia, Independent Review into South Australia’s 2019–20 Bushfire Season [Internet], June 2020, pp. 69–70, and 119, available from https://www.safecom.sa.gov.au/public/download.jsp?id=159868 [accessed 27 March 2023].

Note d: ACT Government, ACT Emergency Services Agency Operational Review of the Bushfire Season 2019/20, [Internet], 20 August 2020, pp. 44–45, available from https://esa.act.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-08/ACT%20Emergency%20Services%20Agency%20Operational%20Review%20of%20the%20Bushfire%20Season%202019-20.PDF [accessed 27 March 2023].

Source: ANAO analysis.

Defence Strategic Review

1.33 The Australian Government released a public version of the Defence Strategic Review on 24 April 2023. The review stated that:

• Defence is not structured or appropriately equipped to act as a domestic disaster recovery agency concurrently with its core function, in any sustainable way.
• Defence must be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community. This is critical given the urgent geostrategic risks that the nation faces and the need for the ADF to be in a position to respond to regional contingencies.²⁴

1.34 The review recommended that: ‘Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances.’²⁵ The Australian Government agreed in principle to this recommendation, and made the following observations.

• It acknowledged that the ADF’s role in providing assistance to the civil community following natural disasters came at a cost to force preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness.
• It would work in partnership with states and territories to further develop national resilience response mechanisms.
• It would further develop and consider the recommendations it had agreed to in-principle as part of a National Defence Strategy to be delivered in 2024.²⁶

Previous audits and reports

1.35 Previous ANAO performance audits relating to Defence’s arrangements for responding to domestic emergencies include:

• Auditor-General Report No. 46 2021–22 Administration of the National Bushfire Recovery Agency;
• Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community²⁷;
• Auditor-General Report No. 1 2011–12 The Australian Defence Force’s Mechanisms for Learning from Operational Activities; and
• Auditor-General Report No. 41 1999–2000 Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements.

Rationale for undertaking the audit

1.36 DACC provides the means through which Defence can assist other organisations or agencies. This assistance delivers an outcome or effect at a time when the recipient’s own resources are unlikely to be sufficient and/or have been overwhelmed. The Australian Government has observed, in the context of the recent Defence Strategic Review, that the ADF’s role in providing assistance to the civil community following natural disasters comes at a cost to force preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness.

1.37 This audit has been undertaken to provide independent assurance to the Parliament on the effectiveness of Defence’s administrative arrangements to support the provision of emergency assistance to the civil community.

Audit approach

Audit objective, criteria and scope

1.38 The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of Defence’s planning and administrative arrangements to support the provision of emergency DACC.

1.39 To form a conclusion against the objective, the following high-level criteria were adopted.

• Does Defence prepare effectively to respond to DACC requests?
• Has Defence established fit-for-purpose arrangements to manage DACC delivery?
• Has Defence established arrangements to assess and learn from DACC activity and reviews?

1.40 The ANAO examined Defence’s framework of policies, plans, processes and guidance that apply to its preparations for, and provision of ‘emergency assistance’ (DACC categories 1, 2 and 3). The ANAO did not examine:

• ‘non-emergency assistance’ provided through the DACC framework (DACC categories 4, 5 and 6);
• the results of support delivered under DACC by Defence; or
• the activities of other entities, or the effectiveness of emergency management frameworks managed by other entities, such as the COMDISPLAN and the AGCMF.

Audit methodology

1.41 The audit methodology included discussions with relevant Defence officials and an examination and analysis of Defence records.

1.42 The audit was open to contributions from the public. The ANAO did not receive any submissions.

1.43 The audit was conducted in accordance with ANAO Auditing Standards at a cost to the ANAO of approximately $549,961.

1.44 The team members for this audit were Jarrad Hamilton, Hugh Balgarnie, Shane Madden, Ethan Carey, Burak Yuksel, Sally Ramsey and Amy Willmott.

2.1 Effective planning and administrative arrangements for DACC activity will include clear guidance on Defence’s roles and responsibilities, effective stakeholder engagement, the preparation of Defence personnel to deliver DACC, focused information gathering and planning, and advice to decision-makers on risks associated with the activity.

Has Defence provided clear guidance on its DACC role and responsibilities?

Defence’s DACC policy framework

2.2 Internal policies and procedures to govern Defence’s delivery of assistance to the civil community comprise the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Policy (DACC Policy) and the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual (DACC Manual).²⁸ The DACC Manual has been in place since 2012. The DACC Policy was first established in August 2020.²⁹

2.3 The DACC Policy provides high‐level guidance in the form of a policy statement, concepts, and a set of principles for Defence personnel considering whether to approve requests for DACC. Those concepts and principles include that:

• the provision of DACC support requires a continuous evaluation of the readiness of the Defence resources necessary to achieve the Australian Government’s expected Defence outcomes;
• the provision of DACC is based on a number of factors and deliberate consideration is required to ensure Defence resources are used to deliver the core business of Defence; and
• DACC support is not to involve the use, or potential use, of force by Defence members.

2.4 This high-level guidance is supported by the DACC Manual, which sets out comprehensive working level processes and procedures. The first edition of the DACC Manual was issued by the Secretary of Defence and Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) in December 2012.³⁰ In addition to minor editorial amendments, the DACC Manual has undergone four reviews that resulted in new editions issued between 2017 and 2022, with the most significant amendments made in August 2020.³¹

2.5 The 2017 review involved changes as a result of learnings from Cyclone Debbie, a severe tropical cyclone that impacted Queensland in March 2017. These changes included aligning DACC categories with the terminology and process of the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) and the Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN); and clarifying the ability of Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders to approve and complete DACC 1 tasks.³²

2.6 Work for the next and most substantial review commenced in February 2020, in the context of the Australian Government’s review of learnings from the response to the 2019–20 Australian bushfires and early work on reform options to strengthen the Commonwealth’s ability to prepare for, and respond to, natural disasters and emergencies of national scale (see paragraph 2.53). As part of this work, Defence was responsible for:

• considering options to enable the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to take a more proactive stance in responding to significant natural disasters, including reforms to DACC, Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority (DFACA) and Part III AAA arrangements under the Defence Act 1903³³; and
• examining ADF force structure and posture for domestic crisis response.

2.7 On the issue of potential changes to DACC arrangements, Defence’s advice to government recommended against the establishment of a legislative framework for the use of the ADF for disaster relief, and for the continuation of the existing DACC policy framework, as: ‘This allows flexibility for the use of the ADF by the Government as it sees fits [sic] without a prescriptive legal framework’. Defence also recommended that the DACC Manual be ‘further enhanced and streamlined to facilitate more proactive ADF response to disaster relief’. Government consideration of this advice is discussed further in paragraphs 2.53 to 2.56.

2.8 In response to a CDF direction in March 2020, Defence’s Military Strategic Commitments Division (MSC) had sought input from Emergency Management Australia (EMA)³⁴ and from across Defence and the ADF to inform the 2020 review of the DACC Manual. The Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) provided approval in June 2020 for a ‘stand-alone’ DACC Policy document to be developed. This was to occur ahead of revisions to the DACC Manual, which was to remain in place as a separate document focused on working level processes and procedures.

2.9 While authority to approve the DACC Policy was to remain with VCDF, approval of the DACC Manual was devolved to the Head of MSC. This was to streamline approvals for any amendments to the procedures resulting from annual High Risk Weather Season (HRWS) stakeholder reviews.³⁵ This was the second time the approval authority for the DACC Manual has been reassigned since the first edition of the DACC Manual was approved in 2012.³⁶

2.10 The content of the new DACC Policy comprised largely of extracted and rearranged policy elements that had been previously included in the DACC Manual.

2.11 On 2 October 2020, the Defence Minister wrote to the Prime Minister confirming that the review of DACC arrangements was complete and that a new, principles-based DACC Policy and a streamlined DACC Manual had been approved. The Defence Minister summarised the key changes as follows.

• The DACC policy documents had been published on Defence’s public access website to provide civilian authorities with access to information on how DACC is requested and approved.³⁷
• The DACC approval and ‘approval not to charge’ delegations had been amended to improve responsiveness of Defence support³⁸ (DACC cost recovery arrangements are discussed at paragraphs 3.34–3.44 of this audit).
• A HRWS section had been included to improve integration with Commonwealth, state and territory management authorities (Defence’s HRWS arrangements are covered in paragraphs 2.22–2.26 of this audit).
• JTF and Joint Task Group (JTG) roles and responsibilities had been defined, including the establishment of an ADF representative to facilitate communication with states and territories ahead of the HRWS (JTF and JTG arrangements are covered in paragraphs 3.3–3.6 of this audit).
• Updated command and control, roles and responsibilities, public events of significance, legal, finance, WHS, administration and reporting.

2.12 The August 2020 DACC Policy and Manual were published on the Royal Commission website on 9 October 2020.

2.13 The most recent review of the DACC Manual was completed in December 2022 to reflect the establishment of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in September 2022 and to align with Defence’s February 2022 Accountable Authority Instructions.³⁹ Defence did not seek input from external stakeholders as part of the review.⁴⁰

DACC roles and responsibilities

2.14 Table 2.1 below outlines the roles and responsibilities of key internal Defence stakeholders. These are clearly set out in the DACC Manual.

Table 2.1: Emergency DACC roles and responsibilities

Note a: Command and control is the process for the exercise of authority over, and lawful direction of, assigned forces and the means by which military forces are organised towards the strategic goals set by government. Defence’s implementation of these arrangements in the context of DACC is discussed at paragraphs 3.22–3.25 of this audit.

Source: ANAO summary of details within the 2022 DACC Manual and 2021 DACC Policy.

Emergency DACC categories

2.15 The DACC Manual provides guidance on the categorisation of DACC activities and includes examples of support tasks that may be provided under each category.

2.16 Table 2.2 below sets out the descriptions of emergency DACC categories 1–3 provided in the December 2022 DACC Manual.

Table 2.2: Emergency DACC categories

Note a: There were no DACC requests recorded on the DACC database where it is evident that Defence has undertaken cost recovery for DACC 1 tasks.

Note b: The DACC database contains records for two DACC 2 tasks where cost recovery was recorded.

Note c: Cost recovery and waivers for DACC 3 support are discussed at paragraphs 3.34–3.44 of this audit.

Source: Summary of details within the 2022 DACC Manual.

Supporting guidance for Defence personnel

2.17 In addition to the DACC Manual, Defence has developed a Domestic Operations Doctrine for ADF use.⁴¹ It was issued by CDF on 12 October 2021.⁴² It provides guidance for planning and conducting Defence contributions to domestic operations that are broader than, but may involve, DACC support. These include domestic security operations, major event operations, and civilian search and rescue.

2.18 Defence has also detailed the operational framework and arrangements for the provision of DACC 2 and DACC 3 support by the ADF through its ‘Concept Plan Coalesce’, which is to be reviewed annually or ‘as directed’. The current version of the plan, as at June 2023, was issued by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) on 15 November 2022.⁴³ It references the DACC Manual and DACC Policy and outlines: limitations in relation to the provision of support; assumptions and facts about the operating environment; and operational requirements for Defence Services and Groups.⁴⁴

2.19 Defence has also developed eight regional JOSS support plans which reference the Concept Plan as a guiding document. The ANAO’s review of the regional JOSS support plans indicated the following.

• The Australian Capital Territory/Southern New South Wales support plan, the Northern New South Wales support plan, the Queensland support plan, and the Tasmania JOSS support plan were overdue for review.⁴⁵
• Only one of the plans referenced Concept Plan Coalesce.⁴⁶
• None of the plans referenced the current version of the DACC Manual.⁴⁷

2.20 These findings are consistent with observations made by the ANAO in Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community, which found that regional support plans contained references to out-of-date material. The ANAO suggested in that audit that Defence centrally review the content of the regional plans on an annual basis.⁴⁸

2.21 The Queensland, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory/Southern New South Wales, and Western Australia regional JOSS offices have also developed their own Standard Operating Procedures for the provision of DACC support.⁴⁹ These procedures align with the processes in the DACC Manual and provide guidance at a more granular or region-specific level, such as outlining naming conventions for documents and key emergency contacts in the JOSS region.

Has Defence engaged with DACC stakeholders?

2.22 Defence undertakes planning each year in preparation for the High Risk Weather Season (HRWS). This is a six-month period between 1 October and 30 April, which includes the Australian cyclone season (November to April) and the southern Australia bushfire season (based on the NSW statutory bushfire danger period of 1 October to 31 March).

National Emergency Management Agency Preparedness Program

2.23 Prior to the August 2020 review and update of the DACC Manual (discussed in paragraphs 2.8–2.11), it was standard Defence procedure for the CJOPS to issue a HRWS Warning Order in September of each year. The orders summarised the upcoming expected weather conditions and directed Defence personnel to undertake communication with civil authorities, particularly Emergency Management Australia (EMA),⁵⁰ ‘during the evolution of an event’. Defence would then, in October each year, provide the Defence Minister with a HRWS brief summarising the weather risks identified and the Defence service capabilities available to provide DACC support.

2.24 This process was expanded and documented within the DACC Manual in August 2020, in a dedicated HRWS preparedness chapter that describes, among other things, Defence’s roles and responsibilities in engaging with stakeholders as part of the National Emergency Management Agency’s (NEMA) HRWS Preparedness Program. The manual defines the preparedness program as ‘a series of activities conducted around Australia with federal, state and territory emergency management authorities’, and outlines that these activities are to:

• ensure an ongoing understanding of the civil operating environment, state/territory responsibilities, authorities, interdependencies, interoperability as well as their potential operational hazards, risks and challenges; and
• enable an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various Defence entities, as well as allow for an understanding of Defence capabilities which will likely be available during the HRWS.

2.25 These requirements were added to the DACC Manual as part of the August 2020 review. They were intended to address a recommendation of Defence’s internal review into Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 (discussed further in paragraphs 4.24–4.28).⁵¹

2.26 To support NEMA’s preparedness program in 2022–23, Defence developed a briefing for each state and territory outlining the process for requesting DACC support, as well as Defence’s capabilities, HRWS posture, and resource limitations.⁵² The briefings also outlined the factors considered by Defence when assessing whether it is able to provide DACC support, including: the impact on other Defence operations, activities and preparedness; and that the provision of support does not replace the primary responsibility of states and territories for emergency response. Defence developed similar briefings for the 2021–22 HRWS Preparedness Program.

Committee representation

2.27 The HRWS preparedness chapter of the August 2020 DACC Manual also outlined the areas and/or Defence personnel responsible for Defence’s representation at national, state and territory, and local standing emergency management committees.

2.28 Defence records do not support regular attendance at these committees and forums, as required by the DACC Manual since August 2020.⁵³ Defence provided the ANAO with some evidence and advice regarding its representation at relevant emergency management committees and forums, as follows.

• Defence informed the ANAO that at the national level, it attends the Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee and the National Coordination Mechanism.⁵⁴ Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with records to substantiate its attendance.
• Defence documentation indicates that Defence attended the National Crisis Exercising and Lessons Forum on one occasion in November 2022.⁵⁵ The National Crisis Exercising and Lessons Forum is scheduled to meet at least twice per year.
• For the period 1 January 2020 to 30 June 2023, Defence provided the ANAO with evidence of its attendance at the following.
  • One meeting of the ACT Joint Operations Coordination Group – in December 2022.⁵⁶
  • One meeting of the ACT Health Sector Emergency Management Committee – in July 2022.⁵⁷
  • Three meetings of the Victorian State Emergency Management Team – in October 2022, November 2022 and April 2023.⁵⁸
  • One meeting of the NSW State Emergency Management Committee – in December 2021.⁵⁹
  • Three meetings of the Territory Emergency Management Council – in March 2023.⁶⁰
  • Nineteen meetings of the Zone Emergency Management Committees – between 2 February 2023 and 6 June 2023.⁶¹
  • One meeting of the Southern Regional Emergency Management Committee and one meeting of the Northern Regional Emergency Management Committee – in February 2023.⁶²
  • One meeting of the Response Capability Subcommittee – in May 2023.⁶³
  • One meeting of the Brisbane District Disaster Management Group.⁶⁴

Communications plan

2.29 Defence has a HRWS Communication Plan, approved by the Head of Military Strategic Commitments Division (MSC) in August 2022. The plan identifies target audiences, key stakeholders, and the sensitivities and risks relating to its communication around DACC, which include:

• public perceptions of the role of the ADF in support of the whole-of-government response;
• unrealistic expectations of Defence capacity; and
• misalignment of messaging with other Australian Government agencies.

2.30 The Communication Plan notes that ‘Defence communication should focus on the role of Defence support as part of the co-ordinated national response’ and identifies key themes and messages for communication, which include the following.

• Defence is not the first responder to domestic natural disasters, and works proactively with state and territory governments to provide optimised and timely support when requested.
• Defence’s support to domestic natural disasters is most effective during the initial relief phase.
• The prolonged support from Defence in responding to domestic crises is at the expense of its core duties and often at the expense of employment of Australian civilians.

Has Defence prepared its personnel to deliver DACC responsibilities?

2.31 The DACC Manual requires Defence to ensure a range of DACC training and awareness products are available and delivered across Defence Groups and Services. Defence advised the ANAO in February 2023 that:

The DACC Manual and Policy themselves are the primary awareness product for how DACC is conducted and managed.

2.32 Defence has also developed a DACC Fact Sheet and presentation to support awareness raising for ADF personnel regarding the conduct and management of DACC support, including: Defence’s role in the overarching crisis management framework; roles and responsibilities within Defence; DACC categories; approval and coordination authorities; DACC cost recovery policy; decision-making considerations for providing DACC support; and the requirement to provide post-activity reporting.

Training for Defence personnel

2.33 Defence advised the ANAO in February 2023 that:

DACC tasks are not a specified requirement on the ADF with a training suite associated. DACC skills, knowledge, attributes and behaviour requirements will vary from event to event, and role to role. Defence is only assigned to an emergency DACC task upon request from responsible authorities. This means that DACC is not a singular task, nor creates a standalone training continuum. Specific task training (military skills, licences or qualifications) are likely to be leveraged from other requiresments [sic] or training, not delivered for DACC specifically.

2.34 This approach is broadly consistent with the DACC Policy, which states that:

DACC support should be limited to that which can be accomplished within the standing core qualifications, skills and resources available to ADF elements at the time, which are then augmented by what reasonable additional mission training and resources can be provided within the available period.

2.35 Defence advised the ANAO in December 2022 that training is provided for ADF personnel force assigned⁶⁵ to DACC 2 and DACC 3 tasks under JTF629.⁶⁶ This training consists of three components.

• Force Preparation Training – 39OSB Domestic Response Operations Force Preparation Course 2022-23⁶⁷, accessed through the Australian Defence Education Learning Environment (ADELE).⁶⁸ The training is comprised of three modules covering: situational awareness (cultural and legal considerations), survivability (first aid, environmental hazards and safety training), and administration and wellbeing (conditions of service and psychological preparation for deployment).⁶⁹
• Deployed Environment General Awareness Briefings. These cover: expected values and behaviours to be demonstrated by ADF personnel while providing support; guidance on dealing with members of the public and the media; legal considerations (such as the use of force and entering private property); and medical guidance, including identifying and managing key health risks while providing DACC support.
• Mission-specific training. Defence advised the ANAO that such training will vary depending on the contingency being responded to and may include instruction in sandbag construction, basic chainsaw operation, or manual handling techniques (for example, the handling of rubbish or damaged household items). This training will typically be delivered on site by state emergency services, police personnel or qualified ADF personnel.

2.36 Defence does not undertake centralised assurance activity to monitor the extent to which mandatory training is completed.

Has Defence gathered relevant information and planned effectively for DACC?

2.37 Defence’s planning for the provision of DACC support is aligned with the HRWS. The DACC Manual requires that prior to 1 October each year, Defence is to ensure an appropriate level of HRWS preparation including a review of lessons from the previous HRWS and analysis of the HRWS meteorological forecast. These requirements are included in the HRWS preparedness chapter of the DACC Manual, which was added in August 2020.

HRWS forecast and Defence force posture

2.38 Each quarter, the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) provides its Global Seasonal Outlook to Defence, to provide decision-makers with early awareness of emerging weather and climate risks around the globe. These arrangements are established in the HRWS chapter of the DACC Manual, which notes that the forecasts will inform planning considerations including posturing, resource allocations and personnel and equipment readiness. Prior to 2020, the DACC Manual did not include any requirements regarding BoM Forecasts. The December 2022 to February 2023 Global Seasonal Outlook observed that:

Australia is being exposed to the risk of more frequent and extreme natural hazards. As the frequency of major events like bushfires, flood and drought increases, so too does the likelihood of multiple events coinciding, or occurring before communities have time to recover from the previous hazard – putting increasing strain on emergency responders and local services, increased reliance on ADF for assistance, as well as short and long-term impacts on livelihoods of Australians. Reliance on the ADF has the potential to impact preparedness for security crisis.

2.39 Defence’s ‘force posture’ is established through CDF Preparedness Directives.⁷⁰ These directives specify Defence’s preparedness priorities and response times against key strategic tasks.⁷¹ In accordance with the preparedness directives, CDF ‘warning orders’ were issued ahead of the HRWS in 2020–21, 2021–22 and 2022–23 and outlined Defence’s force posture to deal with the weather threats reported in the BoM’s seasonal outlook. This included outlining the nature of DACC support likely to be requested and the types of Defence assets that may be required in the context of the seasonal outlook. The CDF warning orders were supported by CJOPS task orders which provided further detail on Defence’s posture, including requiring Service Chiefs to prepare specific quantities of Defence assets and personnel and stipulating the required readiness of those assets and personnel in order to respond to anticipated task requests.

High Risk Weather Season table-top exercise

2.40 As part of preparations for the 2022–23 HRWS, Defence participated in a table-top exercise run by NEMA in October 2022, which simulated natural disaster scenarios relating to flooding, bushfires and cyclones. The table-top exercise scenarios aligned with the BoM’s September 2022 to January 2023 Seasonal Outlook, which was included as part of the scenario documentation. The exercise aimed to address a recommendation made by the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements that:

Australian, state and territory governments should conduct multi-agency, national-level exercises, not limited to cross-border jurisdictions. These exercises should, at a minimum:

(1) assess national capacity, inform capability development and coordination in response to, and recovery from, natural disasters, and

(2) use scenarios that stress current capabilities.

Use of reserves for DACC

2.41 On 4 January 2020, the Governor-General ordered the compulsory call-out of over 2500 ADF reservists under section 28 of the Defence Act 1903⁷², to support Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20.⁷³ This was the first time such a call-out had been ordered. The call-out was revoked by the Governor-General on 7 February 2020.

2.42 Following the conclusion of Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20, Defence conducted an internal review which observed that, in relation to reservists’ civilian skillsets⁷⁴:

A detailed review of Reserves policies (as currently being undertaken by DPG [Defence People Group]) should consider greater flexibility around recognition of skills. Examples of skills that would have been useful include arborist, veterinarian, doctor, health worker, psychologist and engineer.

…

To enable Reserves to properly use civilian skills on deployment, an overall framework will need to be developed. This will have some challenges, as it has been pointed out that there is not even uniformity of skills recognition between different states. Considerations around work cover will need to be investigated and thus Comcare will need to be involved. Ultimately a database documenting all these accredited skills will need to be created, which will be a large undertaking.

2.43 In response to these observations, Defence advised the Defence Minister in June 2020 that it would ‘examine options to capture, track and utilise the high pay off qualifications and skills of Defence personnel for natural disaster and emergency responses.’

2.44 In September 2021, Defence conducted a table-top activity to refine the procedures for a reserve call-out and inform associated policy and procedures ahead of the 2021–22 HRWS. Army Headquarters provided a summary of observations from the activity to MSC in September 2021 and noted that:

Army does not maintain good awareness of Army Reserve civilian qualifications. Those qualifications that are registered rely on the Reserve workforce volunteering the information. There is also no Defence policy requiring Reserve personnel to provide this information.

2.45 Defence advised the ANAO in March 2023 that work to capture and track relevant civilian skillsets held by reservists had been paused. Defence further advised in mid-July 2023 that the work would not proceed as it ‘would require significant resourcing and reserve personnel do not provide services in relation to civilian roles and skills when rendering Defence DACC support’.⁷⁵ As noted at paragraph 2.42, Defence’s internal review of Operation Bushfire Assist 2019– 20 identified a range of civilian skills that would have been useful in providing DACC support.

Lessons boards

2.46 The DACC Manual requires that, at the end of the HRWS, there is to be a Defence-level lessons board, involving HQJOC and the Defence Services and Groups, to review observations, insights and lessons identified during DACC activities and inform reviews of policy, process, training and preparation for the next HRWS. The DACC Manual also stipulates that: lessons boards are to be conducted at headquarters and unit levels; formal lesson reviews are to occur when a DACC operation ceases; and that Defence may be required to provide input into whole-of-government lessons boards.⁷⁶ Prior to 2020, the DACC Manual only required the conduct of a HQJOC lessons board.⁷⁷ According to the DACC Manual:

Lessons boards should consider key themes arising from PARs [post-activity reports] and associated DACC documentation. Lessons reviews and boards could also consider key themes and trends for further analysis such as root cause analysis.

2.47 In accordance with the DACC Manual, at least 12 lessons boards should have been convened since 2020, including three Defence-level lessons boards, and three lessons boards for Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters. Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with documentation for any Defence-level or Air Force lessons boards.

2.48 Defence advised the ANAO in July 2023 that an Army Lessons Board was not conducted in 2020 due to Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 and Operation COVID-19 Assist. The ANAO reviewed the documentation prepared for the two Army Lessons Boards in 2021 and 2022. The documentation identified ten and 12 lessons respectively, which included:

• the need to improve integrated communications with other government organisations;
• the need for Army to be prepared to support increasingly complex DACC operations;
• mitigation of potential hazards when responding to natural disasters; and
• ensuring that Defence responses to natural disasters are sustainable and fit-for-purpose.

2.49 Defence further advised the ANAO in July 2023 that arrangements for a Navy Lessons Board were established in October 2022. Prior to the establishment of the Navy Lessons Board, Navy lessons were managed through a biannual Fleet Lessons Board. Defence did not provide the ANAO with documentation for the Fleet Lessons Boards, instead advising the ANAO that a Fleet Lessons Board was not conducted in 2020 due to COVID-19, and that Fleet Lessons Boards conducted in 2021 and 2022 did not include any content related to DACC.⁷⁸

2.50 The ANAO also reviewed post-operation documentation for Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 and Operation Flood Assist 22–1, and observed that Defence had identified observations, lessons and recommendations across these operations. These observations and lessons ranged from those impacting specific business areas or Services and Groups, to those with enterprise-wide implications.⁷⁹ As discussed at paragraphs 4.12–4.23, Defence’s recording and monitoring of lessons with enterprise-wide implications on its centralised lessons database, the Defence Lessons Repository, has been limited.

Has Defence informed decision-makers of risks associated with the provision of DACC assistance?

2.51 As discussed in paragraph 2.23, Defence provides the Defence Minister with operational advice, such as an October HRWS brief summarising the weather risks identified and the Defence service capabilities available to provide DACC support. As discussed in paragraph 3.94, Defence also provides the Defence Minister with briefings on the nature, extent and timing of support provided under DACC operations.

2.52 As discussed at paragraphs 2.53–2.61, Defence has also provided the Australian Government with advice on policy and legal issues relating to DACC. Further, since 2020, Defence has provided the Australian Government, the Parliament and reviewers with information and advice regarding its assessment of the impact of DACC on Defence capability.

2020 review activity

2.53 In February 2020 the Prime Minister requested that the Defence Minister consider potential legislative and non-legislative options to strengthen the Commonwealth’s ability to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and emergencies of a national scale.⁸⁰

2.54 In that context, in February 2020 Defence advised the Defence Minister that:

A change in relative priority regarding natural disaster and emergency response and an increased Defence involvement in emergency events has significant implications for Defence. It would require a shift towards a 12 month constant activity cycle which impacting [sic] the management of Defence capability and introducing longer term institutional costs, particularly for ADF personnel. Deeper analysis is required to understand the implications and is underway. Defence will return to you once the analysis is complete.

2.55 On the issue of potential changes to DACC arrangements, Defence’s advice to government recommended: against the establishment of a legislative framework for the use of the ADF for disaster relief; and for the continuation of the existing DACC policy framework, to allow ‘flexibility for the use of the ADF by the Government as it sees fits [sic] without a prescriptive legal framework’. Defence also recommended that the DACC Manual be ‘further enhanced and streamlined to facilitate more proactive ADF response to disaster relief’. In March 2020, the Defence Minister recommended this approach to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister agreed to this approach in May 2020.

2.56 In July 2020, Defence provided further advice to the Defence Minister ahead of government consideration of options in August 2020 to strengthen the Commonwealth’s ability to prepare for, and respond to, natural disasters and emergencies of national significance. Among other things, Defence provided advice relating to: amendments to the Defence Act 1903 to make the process for the call-out of reserve members more flexible; and providing ADF members, Defence personnel and foreign forces commensurate immunities to emergency services personnel when performing disaster preparedness, response and recovery duties.⁸¹ In its advice, Defence again noted that there remained a risk of over-reliance on Defence following the support provided in response to the 2019–20 bushfires and COVID-19.

2022 incoming government brief

2.57 In its 2022 incoming government brief, prepared in the context of the May 2022 federal election, Defence advised the incoming Minister for Defence that:

sustaining capability, adapting investment, and designing a force structure to meet our strategic challenges will require clear-eyed prioritisation to balance competing pressures, in particular, weighing the potential role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in responding to regional contingencies against government expectations of it in providing for homeland defence and assistance to the civil community.

COVID-19 transition planning

2.58 In October 2022, the Australian Government was provided with an update on the development of a ‘Strategic Framework for Transitioning COVID-19 Responses’.⁸² Defence provided input to the update, noting challenges with the sustainability of Defence’s role in providing support for domestic crises, and in particular, that the prolonged nature of recent support activities had impacts on Defence’s capacity to achieve broader operations and retain staff.⁸³ Defence also noted that the response to COVID-19 had highlighted a need to strengthen the Commonwealth’s approach to national resilience and crisis management.

Senate Select Committee on Australia’s Disaster Resilience

2.59 As noted at paragraph 1.31, the Senate Select Committee on Australia’s Disaster Resilience was established on 30 November 2022 to inquire into Australia’s preparedness, response and recovery workforce models, as well as alternative models for disaster recovery.

2.60 In its February 2023 submission to the inquiry, Defence stated that:

The employment of ADF resources to conduct domestic disaster relief is increasingly in tension with the requirement to resource operations and activities to defend Australia and its national interests. The use of both full-time and part-time Defence personnel to support the Australian community since 2019 has been at an unprecedented scale, duration and frequency. … While the ADF is proactively postured to support the response to domestic disaster relief, the unprecedented scale, duration and frequency of support is unsustainable without accepting significant impacts to ADF preparedness for its primary defence of Australia role.

…

The enduring requirement for Defence in responding to more frequent and intense natural disasters impacts its capacity to conduct specific training, exercises or deployments. … The opportunity cost on training, exercises or deployments has a resultant impact on capability to effectively respond to defence of Australia contingencies.

2.61 Defence also stated that it continued to work with the Department of Home Affairs, NEMA and other government agencies ‘to explore alternate models and options for national civil contingency capabilities and capacities’. In its submission, Defence included some suggestions for reducing the impacts on capability it had outlined, including:

• the establishment of a scalable and deployable civil contingency workforce as an alternative to using the ADF to respond to national crises; and
• increasing the threshold required for the approval of DACC requests to reduce the operational tempo and disruptions to ADF training.

2023 Defence Strategic Review

2.62 The Australian Government released a public version of the Defence Strategic Review on 24 April 2023. The review stated that:

5.3. Defence is frequently required to make large contributions to domestic disaster relief efforts as well as support to the community, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Defence is not structured or appropriately equipped to act as a domestic disaster recovery agency concurrently with its core function, in any sustainable way.

5.4. State and local governments, in partnership with the Commonwealth, must have in place the necessary plans, resources and capabilities to deal with all but the most extreme domestic disaster operations.

5.5. Defence must be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community. This is critical given the urgent geostrategic risks that the nation faces and the need for the ADF to be in a position to respond to regional contingencies.⁸⁴

2.63 The review recommended that: ‘Defence should be the force of last resort for domestic aid to the civil community, except in extreme circumstances.’⁸⁵

2.64 The Australian Government agreed in-principle to the recommendation, stating that:

The Government acknowledges that the ADF’s role in providing assistance to the civil community following natural disasters comes at a cost to force preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness. The Government will work in partnership with states and territories to further develop national resilience response mechanisms.

The Government will further develop and consider those recommendations that it has agreed to in-principle as part of the National Defence Strategy to be delivered in 2024.⁸⁶

3.1 DACC is not conducted under any specific Commonwealth legislation. Policies and procedures are set out in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Policy (DACC Policy) and Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual (DACC Manual) issued by Defence. These policies and procedures operate in the context of relevant legislation, such as the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) which governs the use and management of resources by Commonwealth entities, including Defence, and the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act).

3.2 Effective planning and administrative arrangements for DACC activity will include fit-for-purpose arrangements for coordination and delivery, the consideration and application of relevant policy and legislative requirements, and appropriate monitoring and reporting on risks, cost, workforce and community impacts.

Has Defence established clear arrangements to coordinate and provide emergency DACC?

Joint Task Forces

3.3 The DACC Manual provides that when the scale or expected duration of emergency DACC support is anticipated to be extensive, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) or relevant approving authority can decide to form a Joint Task Force (JTF). A JTF is an organisational structure established for the purpose of carrying out a specific task or mission. Defence establishes JTFs by reassigning personnel from Defence Services and Groups to the command of a ‘theatre commander’ or a JTF Commander. A JTF consists of a JTF headquarters and assigned forces, which are usually organised as Joint Task Groups (JTGs). When providing DACC support across multiple jurisdictions, JTFs may be structured with JTGs in each state or territory.

3.4 Following the commencement of Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 in December 2019, Defence established three JTFs: in Victoria (JTF646); New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) (JTF1110); and South Australia (SA) and Tasmania (JTF1111). In January 2020, the CDF approved overarching DACC 2 support, and delegated approval authority for specific DACC requests to JTF commanders. In April 2020, Defence advised the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements that:

With the establishment of the JTF in New South Wales Victoria and South Australia state authorities submitted requests for support to Defence directly through their supporting JTF headquarters. This streamlined process suited the dynamic situation and was authorised through EMA⁸⁷ and by the delegated authority that the CDF had given to the JTF Commanders and the Emergency ADF National Support Coordinator. The JTFs were therefore enabled to quickly respond to requests for assistance at the local level.⁸⁸

3.5 On 27 March 2020, Defence established JTF629 under Operation COVID-19 Assist to support the ADF’s contribution to the whole-of-government response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The JTF was supported by JTGs in each state and territory, which coordinated with civilian agencies to provide regional command and coordination of Defence contributions in support of relevant state and territory authorities.

3.6 JTF629 has been retained by CDF as a contingency capability for commanding domestic operations, including responses to natural disasters. In May 2022, Defence’s Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) issued a Directive to the Commander of JTF629 outlining ongoing responsibilities for responding to natural disasters.

Emergency Support Force

3.7 As part of the standing JTF arrangements (JTF629), each year from 1 October to 30 April, Defence establishes an Emergency Support Force of approximately 130 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel in each state and territory in anticipation of requests for assistance during the High Risk Weather Season (HRWS).

3.8 The Emergency Support Forces include capabilities aligned with the requirements of the jurisdiction, such as high clearance transport vehicles or engineering equipment.

Liaison officers

3.9 The DACC Manual states that ADF Liaison Officers are to assist in the coordination of DACC support. An ADF Liaison Officer is a member of the Joint Operations Support Staff (JOSS). When activated by CDF or through the Director of Operations and Training Area Management (DOTAM), the ADF Liaison Officer role is situated within a state or territory emergency management agency or organisation to facilitate DACC support. They also provide advice to Defence’s Military Strategic Commitments Division (MSC) and CJOPS on potential emergency requests for assistance and act as the working-level Defence representative within the state or territory emergency management agency.

3.10 In April 2020, Defence advised the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements that:

To assure that communication between the ADF and the relevant state and territory authorities is efficient and effective Defence has standing liaison teams in each state and territory. These teams titled Joint Operations Support Staff (JOSS) conduct regular liaison between Defence and civil agencies on a variety of convergent issues and represent Defence on all civilian state and territory level emergency management committees.

During civil emergencies civil emergency management authorities may request ADF liaison officers to establish initial liaison capability with Defence and to provide advice on DACC support.

Holistically regional JOSS teams ensure that the demands for information and the subsequent monitoring and reporting of activities are provided to key decision maker planners and commanders of government and non government agencies.

3.11 The extent to which ADF Liaison Officers arrangements have been applied to DACC tasks is discussed at paragraphs 3.22–3.25.

Has Defence considered and applied relevant legislative and policy requirements in the provision of emergency assistance?

3.12 The DACC Policy and DACC Manual set out Defence’s policy and procedural requirements for the provision of DACC support, including: request initiation and approval; command, control and coordination arrangements; cost recording and recovery; and monitoring and reporting. The DACC Manual also outlines procedures in accordance with the WHS Act.

3.13 To examine Defence’s application of relevant requirements, the ANAO selected the last DACC 1, DACC 2 and DACC 3 tasks in each state and territory recorded in the DACC database for 2021–22 as at 30 November 2022. In instances where there was no applicable DACC 1, DACC 2 or DACC 3 task that met this criterion, the ANAO did not select any further tasks for examination. The resulting eight DACC tasks examined by the ANAO are set out in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: DACC tasks reviewed by ANAO — summary

Note a: This task was recorded as a DACC 2 task in the DACC database. ANAO analysis of the CDF Task Order for this task indicated that it was provided under DACC 5 arrangements.This task was therefore not examined any further.

Source: ANAO analysis of Defence records and the DACC database.

3.14 For the eight DACC tasks summarised in Table 3.1, the ANAO reviewed the following activities against requirements in the DACC Manual:

• request initiation and approval;
• command, control and coordination arrangements;
• recording of costs and cost recovery; and
• WHS and risk management.

Request initiation and approval

3.15 The DACC Manual sets out the process for requesting DACC support and the approvals required for each category of support. This process is summarised in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2: DACC request and approval process – DACC Manual

Note a: These requirements are taken from the 2021 version of the DACC Manual, as that is the version of the DACC Manual that was applicable at the time of the selected DACC tasks examined by the ANAO and listed in Table 3.1.

Note b: Requests for DACC 1 support are recorded by Defence on an ‘AE830 webform’.

Source: Summary of 2021 DACC Manual content.

3.16 For the four DACC 1 tasks reviewed by the ANAO (listed in Table 3.1), an AE830 webform was completed for each request as required, and approved by the Senior ADF Officer, Base Manager or Unit Commander of the relevant unit providing the support. The webforms provided details of the request including the emergency circumstances that the approving authority was required to be satisfied of in order to approve the support.

3.17 As outlined in Table 3.2, where time permits for DACC 1 tasks, the approving authority is required to seek advice from the regional JOSS when deciding whether to approve a request for support. For the NSW DACC 1 task examined by the ANAO, Defence was unable to provide evidence of such advice being sought within the three day period between the receipt of the request and the date on which the support was approved.

3.18 For the two DACC 2 tasks reviewed by the ANAO, requests were raised by EMA (now NEMA) through MSC and, in accordance with the DACC Manual, were subsequently approved by CDF after the Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) had been activated.

3.19 The DACC 3 task reviewed by the ANAO is discussed in Case study 1 (see below). The ANAO identified issues of compliance with Defence’s Accountable Authority Instruction 6 (AAI6), which states that: ‘You must ensure that a request to not charge, where full cost exceeds $500,000 is submitted to the Minister for Defence.’ Defence sought to avoid triggering the requirement to obtain the Defence Minister’s approval to waive the recovery of Defence costs, estimated at over a million dollars, from the Queensland Government. As discussed in Case study 1, on 1 April 2022 Defence personnel seconded to the Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA) were advised as follows by Defence (MSC):

Please work with [name removed by ANAO] to get the projected costs under $500k so it doesn’t need to go to the Minister for approval.

Options for this are:

• Fewer staff
• Shorter duration for some or all of these staff.

Please ensure these changes are reflected in the RFA once sorted and before submission.

3.20 On 6 April 2022, following receipt of an estimated costing of over one million dollars from Defence personnel seconded to the QRA, Defence (MSC) advised as follows:

If you proceed with the costing as it stands, this will need to go to MINDEF [Minister for Defence] for approval. As we are about to enter a caretaker period, we may not get an answer until June. We would like to avoid this.

The fastest way of gaining approval is if the support requested by QRA and reflected in the RFA [request for assistance] comes in under $500k. Alternatively, Defence will amend the period of support so that it can be authorised by CDF, but this is not ideal.⁸⁹

3.21 The approach adopted by Defence raises both compliance and ethical issues. The approach was not consistent with AAI6, which provides that Defence personnel must ensure that a request to not charge for DACC, where the full cost exceeds $500,000, is submitted to the Minister for Defence. The Secretary’s Accountable Authority Instructions are issued pursuant to section 20A of the PGPA Act and deliberate non-compliance with their requirements is inconsistent with the general duties of officials, set out in section 26 of the PGPA Act, to exercise powers, perform functions and discharge duties honestly, in good faith and for a proper purpose.⁹⁰ Further, section 8 of the PGPA Act provides that the proper use or management of public resources means efficient, effective, economical and ethical use and management. Deliberate non-compliance raises the issue of whether public resources have been managed in an ethical manner.

Note a: The required frequency of consultation with the JTF Commander was not specified in the CDF directive.

Note b: Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with documentation of this weekly reporting.

Note c: The QRA supports the State Recovery Coordinator and is the lead agency responsible for disaster recovery and resilience policy in QLD.

Note d: In June 2022, Defence recommended that the Defence Minister approve an extension of support to QRA and waive the cumulative total cost of $599,436 for the DACC 3 support. The Minister agreed to this advice in July 2022. See paragraph 3.39 of this audit.

Note e: The CDF Execute Order for Operation Flood Assist 22–1 established command and control and reporting arrangements for DACC tasks conducted under the operation. The CDF Task Order for the DACC 3 task states that ADF personnel seconded to QRA were not supporting Operation Flood Assist 22–1. Defence confirmed to the ANAO in July 2023 that the DACC 3 task was not conducted under Operation Flood Assist 22–1.

Note f: In response to an ANAO request for this post-activity reporting, Defence advised in July 2023 that ‘Status updates and reporting were passed through daily synchronisation meetings, and overall issues were reported to CDF at a Strategic Command Group [SCG] meeting.’ Defence provided the ANAO with an example of an undated ‘SCG report’. While drawing on some experiences from the South-East QLD event, the ANAO’s review of the report found that it did not relate specifically to the DACC task or the operation in QLD. Rather, it gave a general overview on how Defence responds to emergencies. The DACC Manual requires task-level reporting against specific post-activity reporting fields, as discussed in paragraph 3.82.

Command, control and coordination arrangements

3.22 The DACC Manual sets out the respective command, control and coordination arrangements to be established for each category of DACC once a request for support has been approved. These arrangements are summarised in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Command, control and coordination arrangements by DACC category

Note a: The AE830 webform is the mechanism by which requests for DACC 1 support are documented and approved by Defence.

Note b: As discussed at footnote 46, Concept Plan Charlemagne was the predecessor to Concept Plan Coalesce.

Note: These requirements are taken from the 2021 version of the DACC Manual, as that was the applicable version at the time of the selected DACC tasks examined by the ANAO and listed in Table 3.1.

Source: Summary of 2021 DACC Manual content.

3.23 For all four of the DACC 1 tasks reviewed by the ANAO, the approving authority notified MSC of the commitment to DACC 1 support within 24 hours of support commencing. For the NSW and Western Australia (WA) DACC 1 tasks, Defence records did not reflect that ongoing consultation with HQJOC occurred throughout the provision of support. Defence was unable to provide evidence of JOSS liaison with relevant local, state or territory authorities for any of the four DACC 1 tasks. Defence’s engagement with HQJOC and JOSS for the WA DACC 1 task is discussed in Case study 2.

3.24 For the two DACC 2 tasks reviewed by the ANAO, Defence initiated command, control and coordination arrangements through CDF Task Orders and supporting CJOPS Task Orders. JOSS liaison with state authorities was undertaken for both DACC 2 tasks. Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with evidence that Concept Plan Charlemagne⁹¹ was activated for either of these tasks.⁹² JTF arrangements were not established for the SA DACC 2 task, but were established for the QLD DACC 2 task discussed further in Case study 3.

3.25 Command, control and coordination arrangements were established for the DACC 3 task reviewed by the ANAO, as discussed in Case Study 1 (see above).

Recording of costs

3.26 The DACC Manual requires that all DACC support is to have a cost recovery calculator completed. The manual provides a template for Defence to calculate the costs associated with the use of its resources including personnel, travel, vehicles, and Defence facilities.

3.27 ANAO analysis of the DACC database indicates that only 103 (14 per cent) of the 748 DACC 1–3 tasks recorded as completed as at 30 June 2022, had cost estimates recorded. Of these 103 tasks, 62 tasks had the total cost recorded as nil.⁹³

3.28 For five of the seven DACC tasks reviewed by the ANAO (listed in Table 3.1 above), Defence was unable to provide evidence of completed cost recovery calculators. For the two tasks with completed calculators, the calculators had not been signed.⁹⁴

3.29 The Director Operations and Training Area Management (DOTAM) advised the ANAO in January 2023 that:

The prescribed finance system in Defence is the Resource and Output Management and Accounting Network (ROMAN). As such it is not mandatory for costs to be entered in to the DACC database.

JOSS would be able to provide the estimated cost of a DACC task based off the completion of the Cost Recovery Estimate, however the tracking of the actual expenditure of funds is reliant upon the unit providing the support recording their expenditures and submitting a PAR with accurate records. Given the vast majority of units are failing to submit a PAR (let alone accurately record costs associated with the support / as most DACC tasks are cost-waived) it becomes near impossible for JOSS to record the Total DACC task cost unless it is based off the Cost Recovery Estimate (which will vary compared to the actual cost expended).

3.30 The Defence Finance Group advised the ANAO in March 2023 that:

There is no linkage between DACC activities and the finance system. A DACC activity may not, depending upon the circumstances, be recorded in the finance system as a DACC activity. To illustrate with an example, consider the RAAF flying helicopters from Qld to WA to provide support to flooded townships and flying them back again. The flying hours may be recorded against training budget, fuel against RAAF fuel budget etc. with the activity not being recognised in the finance system as DACC but the costs will be recorded against RAAF cost centres.

3.31 This advice is at odds with the Defence policy requirement that:

Costs incurred to provide DACC, regardless whether a cost recovery was sought or not, must be recorded in the financial system.

3.32 The ANAO has previously observed issues with Defence’s recording of costs associated with DACC support, in the following audit reports.

• In Auditor-General Report No. 41 1999–2000 Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements the ANAO observed the following.
  • Defence did not collect and quantify the cost of all DACC assistance as operational commanders did not always provide the required reports to HQAST [Headquarters Australian Theatre]⁹⁵ on task completion.
  • The inadequacies of the DACC information base had implications for the management of this function, including support for effective policy generation, Defence’s ability to charge for services provided, and Defence’s ability to plan and manage the allocation of resources to DACC tasks.
  • Defence should enforce the provision of required DACC reports and monitor the costs associated with the provision of DACC. Enhanced management information would facilitate decision-making relating to DACC, in particular in relation to the cost effectiveness of DACC provision and in determining the impact of DACC activities on operations and training.⁹⁶
• In Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community, the ANAO observed that Defence did not have an understanding of the overall costs of its DACC activities because it had not recorded costs for many DACC tasks.⁹⁷

3.33 Notwithstanding these previous ANAO audits, Defence’s recording of DACC costs, and its understanding of the total costs associated with providing DACC support, remains limited. Defence has continued to place a low priority on tracking the costs associated with DACC tasks.

Cost recovery

3.34 The Australian Government’s overarching cost recovery policy is that, where appropriate, non-government recipients of specific government activities should be charged some or all of the costs of those activities. The cost recovery policy promotes consistent, transparent and accountable charging for government activities and supports the proper use of public resources. Cost recovery can:

• promote equity, whereby the recipients of a government activity, rather than the general public, bear its costs;
• influence demand for government activities;
• improve the efficiency, productivity and responsiveness of government activities and accountability for those activities; and
• increase cost consciousness for all stakeholders by raising awareness of how much a government activity costs.⁹⁸

3.35 Defence’s Cost Recovery Policy and its Accountable Authority Instruction 6 (AAI6) are generally consistent with the Australian Government cost recovery policy.

• Defence’s Cost Recovery Policy states that Defence does not have a catalogue of activities that it charges for, however, in accordance with the Commonwealth Charging Framework, Defence is to cost recover for all activities where possible; and where a delegate agrees that it is not appropriate to recover costs, this decision needs to be considered in line with this policy.
• Defence’s AAI6 states that approval from the Defence Minister is required when there is a request to not charge for Defence support and the full cost of that support exceeds $500,000. A request for approval from the Minister must include resource implication comments or advice provided by the Chief Finance Officer (CFO), or an official authorised by the CFO.

3.36 These policies and the DACC Manual are not fully aligned. The DACC Manual indicates the following.

• Cost recovery is not undertaken for DACC Categories 1 and 2, unless the requester agrees to pay costs prior to the provision of Defence support.
• While ‘DACC 3 activities are normally provided on basis of full recovery of direct costs’ — with the requesting organisation to agree in advance to pay these costs — Defence may waive the requirement for cost recovery where the delegate agrees that there are justifiable circumstances to do so.

3.37 Twelve DACC 3 events were recorded as complete in the DACC database since 2013–14. Two of these events have an associated cost recovery amount of ‘nil’ recorded and two have a total cost recorded. For seven events, Defence provided cost recovery waivers approved by the Defence Minister.⁹⁹ For one event, Defence provided only a completed cost recovery calculator. Appendix 3 provides further detail of Defence’s management of the 12 events.

3.38 One of the cost waivers covered support provided under Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20, which incorporates five separate DACC 3 tasks in the DACC database. This waiver did not outline the actual cost to be waived.¹⁰⁰ Defence advised the Defence Minister in March 2020 that:

If Defence accepts long term recovery and rebuilding work, there is a possibility this will preclude local business and contractors from bidding for the work. The ADF will work to minimise the risk of continued ADF recovery operations taking business from local contractors and other commercial entities through close engagement with state authorities during the vetting of tasking requests.

Applying cost recovery to DACC 3 support requests for bushfire recovery could lead to questions as to why contractors were not paid for the work.

3.39 In relation to the waiver for support to the QRA – which had requested a cost of $599,436 be waived — Defence advised the Defence Minister that it ‘typically waives the cost of DACC support unless there is a need to promote equitable access to Commonwealth resources’. This advice was at odds with the policy set out in both the DACC Manual and Defence’s Cost Recovery Policy.¹⁰¹

3.40 Under the PGPA Act, Commonwealth entities have an obligation to meet high standards of governance, performance and accountability in the use of public resources. While it is a decision for government to waive cost recovery, it is important that the departmental advice around such decisions is complete and based on considerations regarding the efficient, effective, economical and ethical use of Commonwealth resources. Further, noting the impacts of DACC support on Defence’s primary purpose (discussed at paragraph 2.60), appropriate cost recovery arrangements can act as a mechanism to manage the demand for Australian Government support.

WHS and risk management

3.45 As discussed at paragraph 2.34, the DACC Policy states that DACC support should be limited to that which can be accomplished within the standing core qualifications, skills and resources available to ADF elements at the time. This serves to restrict Defence personnel to tasks for which they are appropriately trained, reducing the risk of injury.

3.46 The DACC Manual requires that before DACC support is approved, the approving authority must be satisfied that all reasonably foreseeable risks have been identified and appropriately addressed including mission, reputational, financial, legal and safety risks. The DACC Manual also states that:

Where there is sufficient time before approval, a formal risk assessment must be undertaken in accordance with AS ISO 31000:2018 ‘Risk Management—Guidelines’. This will assist the decision maker in assessing the risks associated with approval of DACC support and determining additional controls to either eliminate the risk, or where this is not possible, to reduce risk as far as is reasonably practicable. If there is not sufficient time prior to approval, a formal risk assessment must be completed as soon as practicable after approval is given and before the commencement of support.

3.47 Defence has developed a HRWS Quick Risk Assessment Card template to allow for the conduct of risk assessments at the DACC task-level for tasks under JTG 629.3.¹⁰² For three of the seven DACC tasks examined by the ANAO as part of this audit, Defence provided evidence of high-level risk assessments conducted at the JTF, JTG, and unit-level. While these risk assessments identified risks broadly relevant to the nature of DACC tasks¹⁰³, Defence was unable to provide evidence of risk assessments being conducted in response to specific DACC tasks as required by the DACC Manual.¹⁰⁴

3.48 This is consistent with the findings in Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community:

The ANAO sought to obtain examples of formal risk assessments and evidence that the assessment results and controls had been registered for specific emergency DACC tasks, as required by the DACC Manual. Defence did not provide any evidence that met the DACC Manual requirements, and informed the ANAO that ‘risk management is inherent to the military planning process’ and that ‘unit commanders will conduct hazard and risk identification, and register at unit‐level. While the ANAO acknowledges broader military planning processes, Defence did not provide evidence of unit‐level registration of hazards and risks for any of the emergency DACC tasks specified by the ANAO.¹⁰⁵

3.49 In that audit report the ANAO observed that there would be benefit in Defence reviewing the need for formal risk assessments for all DACC tasks and clearly documenting in the DACC Manual the measures necessary to meet its obligations under the WHS Act when providing DACC support. The DACC Manual requirements and Defence’s approach to conducting risk assessments have remained largely unchanged.

Indemnity and insurance

3.50 Defence does not require state and territory DACC recipients to indemnify the Australian Government or hold insurance for the provision of DACC 1 and DACC 2 support. However, the DACC Manual states that a risk assessment should be conducted and a record of decisions retained.

3.51 For DACC 3 support, the DACC Manual states that:

the DACC recipient shall be solely responsible for personal injury, public risk and property loss or damage and that non-Commonwealth DACC recipients shall indemnify the Commonwealth against all liability arising out of the assistance, except for liability caused by, or arising out of, any act or omission by the Commonwealth, its officers, employees or agents in providing assistance.

3.52 The DACC Manual also states that ‘DACC 3 recipients must provide Defence with a written undertaking that they will enter into the indemnity and provide evidence of appropriate insurance cover prior to the event.’

3.53 The DACC Manual provides templates for memorandum of understanding (MoU) and deed arrangements, and states that the deed template is to be used for all support to state and territory governments.¹⁰⁶ However, the DACC Manual also states that: the MoU is the applicable document for DACC 3 arrangements, despite the recipients of DACC 3 support likely being state and territory governments due to the nature and scope of DACC 3 support; and that neither the MoU or the deed is required for DACC 1 support.

3.54 The deed template includes a clause requiring that the:

Recipient must release and indemnify the Commonwealth … from and against all claims … arising from or relating to the death of or injury to any person … or loss of or damage to property … in connection with the provision of the Assistance.

3.55 On 28 April 2022 an MoU was formalised between Defence and the QRA in relation to the support provided under the DACC 3 arrangements discussed in ANAO Case study 1 (see above). The MoU did not include any clauses indemnifying the Commonwealth for liabilities resulting from the assistance, and instead stated that:

The parties acknowledge the principle that where responsibility for managing and settling any third party claims or costs arising out of or in connection with performance of this MOU and the provision of the Assistance by Defence, should be borne by the party that is best placed to manage that claim.

3.56 The DACC Manual states that a risk assessment should be conducted and a record of decisions retained, if the insurance and indemnity requirements for DACC 3 support are not pursued.

3.57 For the seven DACC tasks reviewed by the ANAO, Defence was unable to provide evidence of risk assessments conducted at the DACC task-level. ANAO review of JTF, JTG and unit-level risk documentation indicates that insurance and indemnity requirements were also not considered as part of the risk assessments.

3.58 Defence’s approach to the conduct of risk assessments at the DACC task-level is not consistent with the requirements of the DACC Manual, discussed at paragraph 3.46.

Has Defence appropriately monitored and reported on risks, cost, workforce and community impacts during DACC delivery?

3.60 The DACC Manual outlines the high-level monitoring and reporting requirements for each DACC category, which includes situation reports during the course of the operation, post-task reporting following the conclusion of operations, and maintenance of the DACC database.

DACC database

3.61 Specific information and details for individual DACC tasks are required to be recorded in Defence’s national DACC database. The database is managed and maintained by the Director Operations and Training Area Management (DOTAM) within the Defence Security and Estate Group (SEG). The DACC Manual states that the database ‘is the Defence tool for registering and recording all DACC activities.’ In contrast, the DACC Manual also states, in a separate section, that: ‘All DACC tasks, with the exception of civil explosive ordnance disposal and civilian search and rescue are to be reported to the relevant JOSS office for registration and inclusion in the DACC database.’ There is scope for Defence to clarify its requirements.

3.63 The DACC Manual sets out that the regional JOSS offices are responsible for entering information related to DACC activities into the database. The DACC Manual also states the following.

• The JOSS will register the request and issue a registration number. This number will be used in all future correspondence.
• The Authorising Authority of the DACC support is responsible for ensuring that the relevant JOSS has received notification of the approval (for DACC 1) or a copy of the request (for other DACC categories).
• Other DACC documentation required includes: cost estimates, situation reports (SITREPs), PARs and legal documents, including MoUs and deeds.

3.64 The database includes fields to record key details for DACC tasks including: the date the request was received; task start and end dates; the name of the requesting organisation; DACC category¹⁰⁷ and class¹⁰⁸; task description; approving authority; and cost details.

3.65 The database contained 2828 individual DACC tasks that had been recorded as either ‘completed’, ‘approved’ or ‘conducted’ for the period 27 May 2013 to 30 June 2022.¹⁰⁹ Of these, 748 were categorised as emergency support tasks (DACC categories 1-3) and 1905 were categorised as non-emergency support tasks (DACC categories 4-6).¹¹⁰

Data quality issues

3.66 The ANAO’s analysis of the DACC database identified data quality issues, which indicates that there are weaknesses in the processes established to ensure that appropriate (complete and accurate) data is recorded by Defence personnel.

3.67 A key issue was that not all data fields have been consistently populated. Table 3.4 outlines key fields in the DACC database and the extent to which data has been recorded against those fields for the 748 DACC emergency support tasks.

Table 3.4: Completeness of DACC database for emergency support tasks

Note a: Of these tasks, 103 had request dates after the start date. The form used to report the provision of DACC 1 support includes a field for recording the date a DACC 1 request was received, which can precede the date the task was reported.

Note b: Of these tasks, 184 had a ‘DACC Class/Activity Type’ recorded as ‘non-emergency’ despite having a ‘DACC Category’ recorded as either DACC 1, DACC 2 or DACC 3.

Note c: The ANAO identified instances where the task description in the database did not fit the definitions of emergency DACC support, including the use of Defence assets for displays at sporting events, and the provision of training to the Australian Border Force. In response to the issues identified in Note b and Note c, Defence advised the ANAO in March 2023 that ‘Due to the high number of entries with the exact, same error, it seems likely that the errors were largely caused by a problem with the migration of the National DACC Register to a new SharePoint platform in Dec 22. Since then DOTAM HQ has received reports of similar issues with other entries, which they insist were correct before the migration but wrong after it.’

Note d: Of these tasks, 13 had recorded start dates as occurring after end dates. Defence advised the ANAO that this was likely due to user input errors.

Note e: PARs are required to be submitted following the conclusion of DACC tasks. Defence’s post-activity reporting is discussed at paragraphs 3.81–3.89 of this audit.

Note f: Defence’s cost recording and cost recovery arrangements are discussed at paragraphs 3.26–3.44 of this audit.

Source: ANAO analysis of Defence data.

Elapsed time between receipt of request and task start date

3.68 ANAO analysis of the ‘date request received’ and ‘task start date’ fields indicated that the average length of time between the request received and start date is 60 days. However, the task descriptions for requests categorised as DACC 1–3 often did not accord with the associated DACC category.

3.69 The DACC tasks with the longest duration between the request receipt date and start date were:

• support for the Commemoration of the ANZAC Centenary in April 2014 (646 days); and
• four tasks to provide security support for the QLD April 2018 Commonwealth Games (585 days).

3.70 These five tasks were recorded as DACC 1 events, which involve emergency assistance being provided at a local level and are to be short term in nature (no more than 48 hours). These task descriptions and the long duration between the request and approval dates suggest that these events were not emergencies and were therefore recorded incorrectly.

Duration of DACC tasks

3.71 ANAO analysis of the ‘task start date’ and ‘task end date’ fields indicates that the average duration of DACC 1–3 tasks was 15 days. The three DACC tasks with the longest duration were as follows.

• South Australian Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure’s use of Defence estate at Woomera from 20 February 2014 to 20 February 2017 (1096 days).
• Use of Defence estate by the Catholic Diocese of Port Pirie from 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2017 (1095 days).¹¹¹
• Use of Defence estate to provide postal services for Woomera 1 from July 2014 to 1 July 2016 (731 days).

3.72 These three tasks were recorded in the DACC database as DACC 1 tasks. However their descriptions did not accord with the emergency characteristics of DACC categories 1–3.¹¹² The DACC Manual states that:

where the assistance provided is simply access to Defence ranges, training areas or other use of Defence facilities, the support is to be provided in accordance with the Defence Estate Civil Use Policy. For other Defence assistance outside of Civil Use Policy, such as support to training requirements on and off base, DACC 5 is to be considered.

Operation Bushfire Assist and Operation Flood Assist tasks

3.73 ANAO analysis of tasks recorded as taking place under Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20, or the iterations of Operation Flood Assist, indicated the following.

• Average duration between the receipt of requests and commencement of support was one day.
• Average task duration was 16 days.
• The three tasks with the longest durations under these operations were:
  • DACC 3 flood recovery support for the QRA from 8 March 2022 to 30 June 2022 (114 days)¹¹³;
  • DACC 2 non-aviation support for the NSW bushfires from 3 January 2020 to 1 March 2020 (58 days); and
  • a DACC 2 task entry delegating approval of new DACC requests to JTF Commanders from 3 January 2020 to 1 March 2020 (58 days).¹¹⁴

Quality assurance

3.74 The ANAO sought Defence advice on quality assurance processes and training for personnel responsible for entering data into the DACC database. Defence advised the ANAO in January 2023 that these processes are largely supported by the DACC Policy and DACC Manual.

3.75 In respect to education and training for personnel, Defence advised the ANAO in January 2023 that:

• a session on the DACC database is included in the annual JOSS Induction and Professional Development Courses (JIPDC – delivered by DOTAM HQ); and
• [t]he DACC database is also frequently discussed at Manager Joint Operations Support Staff (MJOSS) conferences conducted at least annually.¹¹⁵

3.76 In respect to quality assurance, Defence advised the ANAO that the accuracy of the data entered into the DACC database is the responsibility of the entering officer and that ‘in many cases, there is no secondary oversight (or cross-referencing) conducted by another person to ensure that data inputted reflects the correct data.’¹¹⁶ Defence further advised the ANAO in January 2023 that the ‘DOTAM HQ Domestic Support will be in position during 2023 to undertake regular checks of the DACC Database to ensure that entries are accurate and correct’ and that it ‘will also issue a national SOP on the management of DACC requests for all JOSS to use and follow.’

3.77 The DACC database was first activated on 16 December 2013, during the ANAO’s 2013–14 audit of DACC arrangements.¹¹⁷ That audit report included a recommendation that Defence review the minimum information necessary to be reported for each emergency DACC task and take steps to strengthen the priority afforded by Defence personnel to meeting those reporting requirements. The ANAO noted that without doing so, there would continue to be shortcomings in Defence records relating to emergency DACC. This most recent audit indicates that there remains scope for improvement in Defence’s record-keeping practices and its management of the DACC database.

Situation reporting

3.78 The DACC Manual states that situation reports are required to be provided to HQJOC, MSC, the relevant chain of command, and the relevant JOSS manager during all DACC tasks, including those undertaken by JTFs. For DACC 1 tasks, these reports are to be provided every 24 hours. For DACC 2 and DACC 3 support, the submission time for reports is stipulated through orders and directives to the relevant JTF or DACC Commander. The DACC Manual states that timely and accurate reporting to MSC enables ongoing advice to CDF, the Defence Minister and NEMA as necessary.

3.79 Defence provided evidence of situation reports for five of the seven emergency DACC tasks reviewed by the ANAO (listed in Table 3.1). While situation reporting had been completed for the four DACC 1 tasks, Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with evidence that the reports had been provided to MSC or HQJOC for the QLD DACC 1 and WA DACC 1 tasks. For the NSW DACC 1 task, the situation report was provided to MSC and JOSS, but was not sent within the 24 hour timeframe and was not provided to HQJOC.

3.80 Defence provided evidence that situation reporting had been conducted in line with the requirements of the CJOPS Task Order for the SA DACC 2 task. Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with any situation reporting for the QLD DACC 2 task (which was discussed in ANAO Case study 3). Defence was also unable to provide the ANAO with evidence of task-level situation reporting taking place for the QLD DACC 3 task (which was discussed in ANAO Case study 1).

Post-Activity Reporting (PARs)

3.81 The DACC Manual states that to ensure appropriate record-keeping, PARs are to be completed for all DACC activities and submitted to the relevant regional JOSS office within 28 days of the cessation of the DACC support.¹¹⁸

3.82 Some potential ambiguity exists within the DACC Manual in respect of the required format of PARs. While it states that the specific format of PARs will be as determined by the approving officer or their delegate, it also sets out that PARs need to confirm particular information, including the:

• supported organisation;
• nature of the support provided;
• location(s) and timeframe(s) in which support was provided;
• DACC category applied;
• number of observations, insights and lessons (OILs) submitted on the Defence Lessons Repository;
• Defence resources employed; and
• financial factors, including cost estimate, cost recovery and any cost waivers.

3.83 The DACC Manual states that due to the nature of DACC 1 tasks, there is potential for Defence support to be completed before notification of the event is submitted. The DACC 1 Task Notification (webform AE830) is the appropriate mechanism through which relevant authorities of DACC 1 support are to be informed and is to be submitted by the approving authority at the first available opportunity.¹¹⁹

3.84 Of the 748 DACC 1–3 tasks recorded in the database as completed since 2013–14, 744 (99.5 per cent) did not have a PAR lodgement date recorded. For the seven DACC tasks reviewed by the ANAO (listed in Table 3.1), Defence provided evidence of PARs for five.¹²⁰

3.85 Defence (DOTAM) advised the ANAO in January 2023 that the completion of PARs is the responsibility of units providing support and, although requested by the JOSS, the PARs are rarely provided. Defence further noted that this ‘highlights that units are not aware of this DACC Manual requirement or see it as an administrative impediment that serves no purpose once the support has been provided.’

3.86 Defence further advised the ANAO in March 2023 that:

The latest version of the DACC Manual recognises an AE830 as a PAR for a DACC 1 task (refer Annex 10A, para 29). DACC 2 and 3 tasks are generally done under the auspices of a domestic ADF operation, which have their own post operation reporting requirements.

3.87 In respect to this advice, the ANAO notes the following.

• While the DACC Manual states that the AE830 webform meets the requirements of a PAR, the webform does not include all the required fields identified in the DACC Manual, including those used to record: the number of observations, insights and lessons (OILs) submitted on the Defence Lessons Repository; or cost recovery details and any cost waivers (the fields are discussed in paragraph 3.82).
• Of the 103 DACC 2 and DACC 3 tasks recorded as complete in the DACC database since 2013–14, 34 did not have an associated ADF Operation recorded. Of these 34 tasks, none had a recorded PAR lodgement date.

3.88 The ANAO observed that Post-Operation Reporting took place as follows: for Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20, in March and April 2020; for Operation Flood Assist 2022– 1, in June 2022; and for Operation Flood Assist 2022–2 and 2023–1, in April 2023. While the Post-Operation Reporting for these operations included identified lessons and detailed analysis of support delivered, they did not include task-level reporting against the required fields identified in the DACC Manual (the fields are discussed in paragraph 3.82).

3.89 By including task-level PAR requirements in the DACC Manual, Defence has identified that it considers PARs to be an important element of accountability and governance in the provision of DACC support. Non-completion of PARs limits Defence’s ability to monitor and report on the outcomes, costs, and costs recovered at the task-level.¹²¹

Annual report to Chief of the Defence Force

3.90 Prior to its review in December 2022, the DACC Manual required MSC to prepare an annual report for CDF and the Defence Secretary outlining the DACC support provided in the previous financial year. The manual also outlined that this involved MSC seeking a DACC database report from DOTAM in June each year for all DACC support provided in the preceding 12 months.

3.91 The annual report was intended to provide a consolidated summary of all DACC support, with an emphasis placed on reporting in respect to support provided as part of any disaster response. In addition, the report was to outline Defence preparedness for the next High Risk Weather Season (HRWS).

3.92 This requirement was originally incorporated into the DACC Manual in June 2014¹²² in response to Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community.¹²³ This reporting requirement was removed in the most recent update to the DACC Manual in December 2022. Defence advised the ANAO in January 2023 that:

The original reference to a report to CDF annually was redundant with each major activity being reported separately for instance, for High Profile Public Event Decision Briefs or DACC 2 summaries. The last time this was reported holistically to CDF was 2015.¹²⁴ … Therefore, directing an undesired and duplicative additional report in [a] new … DACC Manual was deemed unnecessary, and the reference removed. Multiple other forms of reporting to CDF, and the Minister still exist as required for specific delegations, and formal reporting chains. There are 82 repetitions of “report” in the DACC manual referring to these different forms of normalised reporting for DACC.

3.93 The reports provided to CDF and the Defence Secretary in June and December 2015 included aggregated details about: the number of DACC tasks completed by DACC category; compliance with PAR requirements by DACC category and Service Group; measures being taken to improve compliance with PAR requirements; and the cost of DACC support by DACC category. The December 2015 report provided to CDF and the Secretary observed that:

Since the introduction of biannual DACC reporting, the capturing and consolidation of PAR data in the … DACC database has improved. DOTAM … continues working to further improve the completeness, effectiveness and accuracy of the DACC database which will better enable the Services and Groups to ensure through the chain of command that PAR [post-activity reports] are completed.

3.94 Defence provided the ANAO with evidence of other forms of reporting to CDF and the Defence Minister, such as through formal submissions and briefings. These submissions and briefings tended to provide information on the nature, extent and timing of support provided under DACC operations. The information provided was not based on task-level data from PARs and did not provide aggregated analysis of DACC support by category, the cost of the DACC support provided, the extent of costs recovered, or the extent of compliance with PAR requirements. This was the type of aggregated information to be included in the biannual (later annual) management reporting to CDF.

4.1 Effective planning and administrative arrangements for DACC activity will include fit-for-purpose arrangements to identify lessons learned, appropriate consideration of the findings of internal and external reviews, and timely implementation of agreed recommendations from such reviews.

Has Defence established fit-for-purpose arrangements to identify lessons learned?

Gathering and recording lessons

Defence Lessons Program

4.2 In Auditor-General Report No. 1 2011–12 The Australian Defence Force’s Mechanisms for Learning from Operational Activities, the ANAO observed that the effectiveness of deployed Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel depends, in part, upon the ADF’s ability to learn from experience to improve its operational performance.¹²⁵ Defence agreed to the five recommendations made in the report, including that:

to support an ADF‐wide approach to learning from operations and exercises, the ADF establish a clear role and scope for future operational knowledge management repositories, and develop a clear plan for capturing and migrating relevant existing information.

4.3 In December 2014, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Defence Secretary issued Joint Directive 49/2014, Establishment of a Defence Lessons Program. The Joint Directive directed the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) to establish and lead a Defence Lessons Program to ‘encompass governance, administration, doctrine, training, IT systems support and a central lessons repository’.

4.4 The DLP provides policy, guidance and support for lesson management in Defence and includes a Defence Lessons Handbook which: ‘offers some key points and considerations for conducting lesson related activities in alignment with higher direction’ and ‘acknowledges the range of lesson management policies, process and resources that may be required within Defence’.¹²⁶

Defence Lessons Repository

4.5 In February 2021 Defence implemented the Defence Lessons Repository (DLR)¹²⁷ for collating ‘observations, insights and lessons’ (OILs) from Defence activities.¹²⁸

4.6 Defence’s DACC Manual states that:

5.14. Observations, insights and lessons (OILs) on DACC requests are to be collected and maintained across the Groups and Services at all levels in accordance with the Defence Lessons Handbook. When a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters is established or activated, a dedicated lessons management function is to be included and resourced within this headquarters from initiation.

5.15. Formal lesson reviews are to occur when a DACC operation ceases with the outcomes of the lesson review included in the Defence Lessons Repository. Areas for focus in the analysis are based on the Commander’s area of interest but could include the ongoing appropriateness of DACC Policy, procedures and plans (including standing Defence emergency assistance and regional support plans).

4.7 Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with evidence that a dedicated lessons management function had been established for any JTF.

4.8 The DACC Manual also states that, as part of DACC Post Activity Reporting (PAR) requirements, all ‘OILs are to be entered into the DLR in accordance with the Defence Lessons Handbook throughout the DACC activity’.¹²⁹

4.9 In the context of 2828 individual DACC tasks recorded as ‘completed’, ‘approved’ or ‘conducted’ from 27 May 2013 to 30 June 2022, the DLR includes 185 observations, 20 insights and one lesson related to DACC activities recorded since 2013–14.¹³⁰ Defence advised the ANAO in March 2023 that:

Joint Operations Command manages the Joint Lessons management Process, which includes after action reviews from Joint Operational activities, including DACC. Only lessons with a whole-of-Defence implication are recorded in the Defence Lessons Repository. Joint lessons from individual DACC activities within the remit of the Chief of Joint Operations are managed at the Joint Operations Command Level.¹³¹

4.10 This advice is supported by Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) Joint Lessons Directive 48/2022, which states that ‘enterprise level actions are to be managed with the ADF/ADO [Australian Defence Organisation] Defence Lessons Repository’. However, these arrangements are not consistent with the requirements of the DACC Manual discussed at paragraph 4.6 of this audit report.

Lessons boards and reviews

4.12 As discussed at paragraphs 2.46–2.47, the DACC Manual requires that at the end of the High Risk Weather Season (HRWS), there are to be lessons boards conducted reviewing all DACC OILs identified to inform reviews of policy, process, training and preparation for the next HRWS, as well as lesson reviews when a DACC operation ceases.

4.13 The ANAO reviewed the Army Lessons Boards conducted in 2021 and 2022 as well as post-operation documentation for Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 (JTF1110 and JTF1111) and Operation Flood Assist 22–1 (JTG629.3). The ANAO observed that Defence had identified enterprise-wide observations, lessons and recommendations across these operations related to the provision of DACC support.¹³²

4.14 ANAO review of post-activity reporting (PARs) for Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 and Operation Flood Assist 22–1 did not identify any instances where enterprise-wide lessons identified had been recorded on the DLR. Further, none of the lessons identified in the lessons boards had been recorded on the DLR.

4.15 Defence’s limited use of the DLR does not align with the requirements of the DACC Manual or CJOPS Joint Lessons Directive 48/2022. This indicates a need to clarify the policy requirements for recording DACC OILs. It also indicates there is room for improvement regarding the recording of OILs with enterprise-wide implications, identified through DACC lessons boards and PARs. Improved compliance with PAR requirements (discussed at paragraphs 3.81–3.89) would further support the recording of DACC OILs.

Implementing lessons

4.16 In Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community the ANAO observed that Defence did not have an information system to track and monitor the outcomes of lessons boards.¹³³

4.17 The DLR includes fields to record lesson details, as well as recommendations to address the lesson and the estimated difficulty and duration for implementing the recommendation.

4.18 The one DACC lesson recorded in the DLR had an associated recommendation.¹³⁴ However, no implementation update had been provided against the recommendation. Defence advised the ANAO in March 2023 that:

The decision on whether to implement a recommendation and the tracking and monitoring of the implementation of that recommendation is undertaken by the Group or Service that contributed that lesson. This process occurs through Group or Service Lessons Boards and through the Joint Capability Coordination Committee [JCCC] (for military lessons). The classification and nature of the lesson and associated recommendation will determine whether the defence lessons Repository is used for monitoring and tracking implementation.

4.19 Defence subsequently advised the ANAO in July 2023 that:

Lessons and Recommendations related to the provision of DACC Support are primarily addressed through mechanisms such as JOC [Joint Operations Command] Joint Planning Group for High Risk Weather Season (HRWS) … JOC has no record of lessons for DACC being tabled via the JCCC, rather this committee is used to communicate lessons relating to other Operations, Actions and Activities.

4.20 Defence was unable to provide the ANAO with evidence of DACC lessons and recommendations being monitored through the JOC Planning Group.

Has Defence addressed findings and recommendations from internal and external reviews of emergency DACC?

Internal review of Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20

4.24 On 24 January 2020, Defence commenced an internal review of support provided as part of Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20, to ‘develop Defence-level lessons and recommendations to optimise Defence support to future crisis events’. The review made ten recommendations covering: policy and legal frameworks¹³⁵; media and communications procedures; command and coordination arrangements; management and administration of personnel; supporting IT systems; and arrangements for managing relevant supplies and offers of foreign military assistance.

4.25 A subsequent internal review, completed in October 2020, assessed Defence’s implementation of the ten recommendations from the internal review. The review found that five recommendations were either partially implemented or had potential risks to implementation by the agreed completion date, and two recommendations were either not implemented or had significant risks to implementation by the agreed date. The review noted that:

Where the Department has not yet implemented recommendations from the Strategic Review, or is not well progressed to implement recommendations within the agreed timeframes, there is a risk that it may not be effectively prepared to respond to future national crisis events, and the upcoming or future High Risk Weather Seasons. Where required improvements have been identified and not actioned, there is an increased reputational risk to the Department.

4.26 The review also found that there were:

deficiencies in the overarching governance framework and structure supporting management of the recommendations. These deficiencies have impacted the efficacy of actions undertaken in response to recommendations from the Strategic Review and, if not addressed, mean the Department is not well placed to ensure that that [sic] the remaining recommendations are implemented or that lessons from similar future activities are learned (including how the [sic] Defence approaches lessons from the COVID-19 ASSIST Taskforce). This finding is consistent with previous findings made by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and Audit Branch in relation to the implementation of lessons. The fact that these issues have been raised before and have not been addressed is of concern for the Department.

4.27 The review made three recommendations aimed at: improving governance structures for the allocation and implementation of future recommendations; improving the integration of Defence’s Joint Lessons Directorate, which is responsible for the Defence Lessons Program, into the governance and oversight of recommendations which are not confined to a single Group or Service; and improving ongoing assurance of the implementation of recommendations to assist in identifying and escalating implementation risks in a more timely manner.

4.28 In October 2021, the Military Strategic Commitments Division (MSC) provided an update to the Secretary of Defence and CDF on progress in implementing the recommendations from the initial internal review and proposed to close all ten recommendations. The Secretary and CDF approved the closure of the recommendations. At the time of closure, updates against four of the ten recommendations noted that relevant activity to implement the recommendations was still underway.¹³⁶

Implementation of external review recommendations

4.29 The ANAO examined Defence’s implementation of the recommendation made in the last ANAO performance audit of DACC¹³⁷, and recommendations relating to DACC made in the report of the 2020 Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements.¹³⁸

4.30 Table 4.1 below sets out the thresholds applied for the implementation status of each recommendation.

Table 4.1: ANAO categorisation of implementation status

Source: ANAO analysis.

ANAO performance audit – April 2014

4.31 Auditor-General Report No. 24 2013–14 Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community included one recommendation, which was agreed by Defence:

To promote the efficient and effective use of Australian Government resources in the administration of emergency assistance to the civil community, the ANAO recommends that Defence:

• review the minimum information necessary to be reported for each emergency DACC task to discharge accountability obligations, identify costs, undertake cost recovery where appropriate, maintain records for future use and learn from emergency DACC activities; and
• take steps to strengthen the priority afforded by Defence units to meeting these reporting requirements.

4.32 In making the recommendation, the ANAO had observed that:

4.14 Emergency DACC has largely been focused on response, with a lesser priority given to records management and reporting. …

4.15 For many years Defence has had detailed reporting requirements for DACC tasks, and for many years these requirements have not been met on a consistent basis. This raises questions for Defence about the balance between the benefits for DACC planning and public accountability of capturing more comprehensive information, and the risks in not capturing certain task information. Against this background, Defence should review reporting requirements to ensure they represent the minimum information necessary to: identify the nature and cost of emergency DACC tasks, undertake any cost recovery, discharge accountability obligations, maintain reasonable records for future use and learn from emergency DACC activities. Defence should also take steps to strengthen the priority afforded by Defence commanders and personnel to meeting those reporting requirements.

4.16 Defence’s development of a national DACC database is a positive development (see paragraph 4.11). However, if Defence does not also take steps to strengthen the priority afforded by Defence commanders and personnel to meeting the reporting requirements that are determined to be appropriate, there will continue to be shortcomings in Defence records relating to emergency DACC.

4.33 In July 2014, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) submitted an Audit Closure Report to Defence’s Audit and Fraud Control Division seeking approval to close the recommendation, noting that:

Military Strategic Commitments (MSC) has responded to this recommendation working with Navy, Army, Air Force, HQJOC, CFO and DSRG to review the minimum information requirements of the DACC Manual and to develop a compliance regime to ensure that DACC Manual reporting requirements are adhered to by Services and Groups.

The review found that the current information requirements contained in the DACC Manual are the minimum necessary to discharge Defence accountability and transparency obligations to Government. Further, a compliance regime has been developed and incorporated into the DACC Manual whereby MSC will prepare an [sic] biannual report for CDF and SEC [Defence Secretary], in turn available to MINDEF [Defence Minister] as required, in April and October each year for … DACC support provided to the civil community in the preceding six months. In order to prepare this report, it will be critical [that] the Services and Groups meet the reporting requirements contained in the revised DACC Manual.

4.34 A requirement was introduced into the DACC Manual in June 2014 for bi-annual reporting to CDF and the Defence Secretary. Defence’s Audit and Fraud Control Division approved closure of the audit recommendation in August 2014.

4.35 In the August 2020 edition of the DACC Manual, the requirement was changed to annual reporting to CDF and the Defence Secretary. As discussed at paragraphs 3.92–3.93, the last time such reporting was provided to CDF and the Defence Secretary was December 2015. The December 2015 report observed that since the introduction of the biannual reporting requirement, the capturing and consolidation of PAR data in the DACC database had improved.

4.36 The requirement for annual reporting to CDF and the Defence Secretary was removed in the most recent update to the DACC Manual in December 2022. As discussed at paragraph 3.92, Defence advised the ANAO in January 2023 that the reference in the DACC Manual to the annual report was considered ‘redundant’ and ‘duplicative’ and was therefore ‘deemed unnecessary’ for inclusion in the 2022 DACC Manual.

4.37 The ANAO has assessed the recommendation as partly implemented. Defence conducted a review of the DACC Manual in 2014 to consider the minimum reporting requirements necessary to discharge Defence accountability and transparency obligations to government. However, the steps taken to strengthen the priority afforded by Defence units to meeting reporting requirements — through the introduction of biannual and later annual reporting to CDF and the Defence Secretary — were short-lived. The last instance of such reporting was in 2015 and the requirement was removed in 2022. Further, the limited completion of post-activity reporting undermines Defence’s ability to monitor and report, at the task-level, on outcomes, activity costs, and costs recovered.

Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements – October 2020

4.38 The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements was established on 20 February 2020 to examine national natural disaster coordination arrangements in the aftermath of the 2019–20 bushfires (see paragraphs 1.28–1.30). It reported on 20 October 2020 and made 80 recommendations, three of which related to DACC support.

4.39 In November 2020, the Australian Government provided its response to the recommendations, which included support for the three DACC related recommendations.

4.40 In September 2021, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet provided the Australian Government with an update on implementation of the Royal Commission recommendations, advising that Commonwealth actions to address the three recommendations were complete.

4.41 The three recommendations, and the ANAO’s assessment of Defence’s implementation, are outlined in Appendix 4 of this audit. The three recommendations were assessed as implemented.

Appendix 1 Department of Defence’s response

ANAO comments on Defence’s response regarding compliance and ethical issues

1. The evidence relied upon by the ANAO is detailed in paragraphs 3.19 and 3.20 and Case study 1 of this audit report. Where ANAO findings or a conclusion are made as to whether the use or management of public resources by the entity has been ethical, it is a matter for an accountable authority to assess whether the audit findings in the particular case reflect the broader posture of the entity or relate to the conduct of individual personnel.¹³⁹

Appendix 2 Improvements observed by the ANAO

1. The existence of independent external audit, and the accompanying potential for scrutiny improves performance. Improvements in administrative and management practices usually occur: in anticipation of ANAO audit activity; during an audit engagement; as interim findings are made; and/or after the audit has been completed and formal findings are communicated.

2. The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) has encouraged the ANAO to consider ways in which the ANAO could capture and describe some of these impacts. The ANAO’s 2023–24 Corporate Plan states that the ANAO’s annual performance statements will provide a narrative that will consider, amongst other matters, analysis of key improvements made by entities during a performance audit process based on information included in tabled performance audit reports.

3. Performance audits involve close engagement between the ANAO and the audited entity as well as other stakeholders involved in the program or activity being audited. Throughout the audit engagement, the ANAO outlines to the entity the preliminary audit findings, conclusions and potential audit recommendations. This ensures that final recommendations are appropriately targeted and encourages entities to take early remedial action on any identified matters during the course of an audit. Remedial actions entities may take during the audit include:

• strengthening governance arrangements;
• introducing or revising policies, strategies, guidelines or administrative processes; and
• initiating reviews or investigations.

4. In this context, the below actions were observed by the ANAO during the course of the audit.

• As noted at paragraph 2.13, the DACC Manual was reviewed in December 2022 to reflect the establishment of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in September 2022 and changes to Defence’s Accountable Authority Instructions.
• As noted at paragraph 2.18, Concept Plan Coalesce, which details the operational framework and arrangements for the provision of DACC 2 and DACC 3 support, was issued in November 2022, replacing Concept Plan Charlemagne.
• As noted at paragraph 3.76, Defence advised the ANAO that in 2023, it will be in a position to undertake regular checks of the DACC Database to ensure that entries are accurate and correct. It will also issue a national SOP on the management of DACC requests for all JOSS offices to use and follow.

Appendix 3 DACC 3 cost recovery waivers

Appendix 4 Implementation of Royal Commission recommendations

Table A.2: Implementation of Royal Commission recommendations

Note a: In response to concerns raised through the Royal Commission regarding a lack of clarity and internal inconsistency in the thresholds for activating COMDISPLAN, the Royal Commission recommended that ‘The Australian Government should revise the COMDISPLAN thresholds to provide that a request for Australian Government assistance, including Defence assistance, is able to be made by a state or territory government when:

(1) it has exhausted, or is ‘likely to exhaust’, all government, community and commercial resources

(2) it cannot mobilise its own resources (or community and commercial resources) in time, or

(3) the Australian Government has a capability that the state or territory does not have.’

The current COMDISPLAN reflects these revised thresholds.

Note b: Immunities provided to Defence personnel are outlined in section 123AA of the Defence Act 1903. The immunities provided in the amendments to the Defence Act 1903 only apply to DACC assistance if that assistance is provided under a written direction from the Defence Minister. The Defence Minister may issue a direction for Defence assistance if they are satisfied of either or both of the following:

(a) the nature or scale of the natural disaster or other emergency makes it necessary, for the benefit of the nation, for the Commonwealth, through use of the ADF’s or Department’s special capabilities or available resources, to provide the assistance;

(b) the assistance is necessary for the protection of Commonwealth agencies, Commonwealth personnel or Commonwealth property.

Defence advised the Defence Minister in August 2020 that it will continue to rely on other measures to mitigate the risk where immunity under the Defence Act 1903 does not apply, including through the use of Memorandums of Understanding. Defence’s use of Memorandums of Understanding is discussed at paragraphs 3.50–3.59.

Other amendments to the Defence Act 1903 included: removing the requirement that the Governor-General act on the advice of the Executive Council when calling out the ADF Reserve and instead requiring the Governor-General to act on the advice of the Defence Minister, who will be required to consult the Prime Minister before advising the Governor-General; removing the requirement for reservists to render Continuous Full-Time Service, to provide the CDF with flexibility to determine how and when reserve units are required to serve; and amendments to superannuation schemes for ADF members to ensure that reserve members who are subject to a call out order receive the same superannuation benefits as reserve members who provide service voluntarily.

Source: ANAO assessment.