The audit examined the effectiveness of DEEWR's: administrative framework for the program; management of the application, assessment and funding processes; and monitoring of and reporting on the program's performance.

In order to form an opinion against the audit objective, the ANAO primarily conducted fieldwork and documentation reviews at DEEWR's central office. A stratified random sample (in order to provide for representation from states, territories and school sectors) of 74 applications from Rounds 1 and 2 was also selected for detailed examination. Through this sample, the ANAO sought to determine whether funding applications had been assessed in accordance with the established assessment criteria and that quality assurance mechanisms for the assessment process were effective.

Summary

Overview of the program

A major policy platform of the incoming Australian Government at the November 2007 federal election was to increase investment in education, skills and training. The Trade Training Centres in Schools Program (the program) is one of a series of recent education initiatives under the Government's education reform agenda, known collectively as the Education Revolution. The program involves a commitment to invest $2.5 billion over 10 years to provide facilities to enhance vocational education opportunities for students in Years 9 to 12 attending eligible Australian secondary schools.[1] The program is an executive scheme[2] and one of the programs that the Labor Government committed to commencing within its first 100–days of office.

Under the program, schools can lodge applications in response to advertised funding rounds, for grants of between $500 000 and $1.5 million to establish or upgrade trade or vocational education and training centres. Schools lodge applications through their state or territory education department or Block Grant Authority[3] (collectively known as ‘education authorities'). Funding can be used to undertake major capital works construction such as trade facility buildings, minor capital works or upgrades of existing facilities, and to purchase or replace a range of trade related equipment.

The Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) is responsible for overall management of the program on behalf of the Australian Government. This involves: designing administrative arrangements; conducting application rounds, assessing applications against criteria (including value for money) and recommending applications for in principle approval; developing overarching funding agreements with education authorities, and negotiating costs and contractual arrangements for individual projects under these agreements; managing program payments; and monitoring and reporting on progress.

Education authorities are also closely involved in implementation of the program by, for example, overseeing the development of applications and management of projects by secondary schools, and providing advice on labour market trends.[4]

The initial phases of the program, including the first three application rounds, have been administered as a grants program supported by bilateral partnership arrangements. Following the commencement of the new federal financial relations framework,[5] DEEWR began negotiating a Trade Training Centres National Partnership (NP). DEEWR anticipates that the delivery of the program under the NP will not result in substantive change to the program's funding agreements, guidelines and administrative instructions. The NP was initially expected to come into effect in July 2010 but was not finalised as at January 2011.

Program objectives and priorities

The objectives of the program are to help: increase the proportion of students achieving Year 12 or an equivalent qualification to 90 per cent by 2015;[6] and address national skills shortages in traditional trades and other eligible occupations by improving the relevance and responsiveness of trade training programs in secondary schools.

An important step to achieving these goals is to ensure students have access to high quality, relevant education and training opportunities that continue to engage them and encourage completion of their studies. Through the program, the Government aims to:

  • improve student access to trade training facilities that meet industry standards;
  • improve the quality of schooling offered to secondary students undertaking trade related pathways; and
  • assist young people to make a successful transition from school to work or further education or training.[7]

In the initial stages, program funding was to be prioritised to secondary schools assessed as having the greatest need and capacity to benefit from a new or upgraded trade training centre (TTC).

Seven areas of priority have been considered in allocating funds,[8] including support for secondary school communities with Indigenous students, and students from regional or other disadvantaged communities; encouragement of enrolment at the Certificate III[9] (or higher level) of traditional trades identified as experiencing skills shortages on the National Skills Needs List;[10] and the inclusion of local industry, taking into account local employment opportunities.

Program application process and funding

Program application rounds are held each financial year. To assist in managing demand, the first step in the process is submission of an expression of interest (EOI) by schools. Subsequently, schools that submitted an EOI may prepare applications and lodge them online. In their application, the schools must demonstrate support for the project from relevant stakeholders[11] and also provide a completed project implementation plan that sets out funding objectives and project implementation strategies; project timelines; and a detailed financial plan.

Following the application period, DEEWR forms State and Territory Assessment Panels (STAPs) to assess applications. Applications are assessed against the following criteria:

  • the quality of the proposal;
  • need and capacity to benefit; and
  • value for money.

A National Assessment Panel (NAP) (comprising senior DEEWR national office personnel) makes recommendations based on the STAP assessments to the Minister for School Education, Early Childhood and Youth for in principle project funding approval. The final funding amount is dependent on the outcomes of detailed contract negotiations between DEEWR and the school. Once negotiations have concluded, grants are authorised. Payments are then made according to schedules established for each project and in accordance with the different funding arrangements established for government and non‑government schools.

Funding rounds

By early November 2010, DEEWR had completed three funding rounds, involving 440 applications of which 73 per cent were approved.[12] The 2008 funding round (Round 1) was conducted in two phases, consistent with the Government's undertaking to move quickly to implement this election commitment. From 2009 (Round 2), a single funding round per year was to be undertaken (until 2018).

At the conclusion of Round 3, applications for $1.41 billion had been processed by DEEWR, with $1.03 billion in project funding approved.

Audit objectives and methodology

The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of DEEWR's administration of the Trade Training Centres in Schools Program.

The audit's major focus was on assessing the program's administrative framework and whether its implementation has been well managed to date. The audit also considered the adequacy of the program performance information framework. The capital program's long planning and construction lead-times meant completed TTCs had not provided a full year of training at the time of the audit.

The audit examined the effectiveness of DEEWR's: administrative framework for the program; management of the application, assessment and funding processes; and monitoring of and reporting on the program's performance.

In order to form an opinion against the audit objective, the ANAO primarily conducted fieldwork and documentation reviews at DEEWR's central office. A stratified random sample (in order to provide for representation from states, territories and school sectors) of 74 applications from Rounds 1 and 2 was also selected for detailed examination. Through this sample, the ANAO sought to determine whether funding applications had been assessed in accordance with the established assessment criteria and that quality assurance mechanisms for the assessment process were effective.

To obtain feedback on DEEWR's administration of the program, the ANAO met with officials from other Australian Government agencies and education authorities, and visited 10 government and non-government secondary schools in New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria with TTCs at varying stages of construction.

Overall conclusion

The Australian Government established the Trade Training Centres in Schools Program (the program) in 2008 as one of several programs developed under the Education Revolution, with a view to increasing investment in education, skills and training. The program is one of several developed by the Australian Government to improve Year 12 retention rates. Its objectives are to help: increase the proportion of students achieving Year 12 or an equivalent qualification to 90 per cent by 2015; and address national skills shortages in traditional trades and other eligible occupations by improving the relevance and responsiveness of trade training programs in secondary schools.

The program requires effective collaboration between the Australian Government, education authorities and schools, given their responsibilities for the financing, administration and provision of education within Australia. In this context, DEEWR was responsible for developing a sound administrative framework and implementing it effectively. This involved establishing administrative arrangements; assessing applications; managing funding agreements; and monitoring and reporting program delivery and outcomes.

By early November 2010, DEEWR had completed three funding rounds, involving 440 applications of which 73 per cent were approved. At the conclusion of Round 3, applications for $1.41 billion had been processed by DEEWR, with $1.03 billion in project funding approved. The audit considered the allocation of funding for Rounds 1 and 2 having regard to seats held by the two main political parties in the then House of Representatives, and found no bias or inconsistency with the application assessment criteria. For these early rounds there were indications that the allocation of funding was consistent with program objectives and priorities: a broad range of trades on the National Skills Needs List and in emerging industries were to be taught; and regional and remote areas received high proportions of funding relative to their population shares. Two hundred and thirty projects had funding approved in principle from Rounds 1 and 2. Of these, at 4 January 2011, 210 had executed agreements in place, involving 48 completed projects and another 162 were in the planning, procurement and construction stages. DEEWR also advised that up to 68 TTCs were expected to be operational from the start of the 2011 school year.

DEEWR's approach to planning, and its administrative framework for the program, were generally sound. The program framework included appropriate program guidelines, application and assessment arrangements; and funding agreements that provided a reasonable basis for program and funding accountability. DEEWR has also given attention to value for money considerations in the assessment of applications and the subsequent negotiation of project level agreements.

Nevertheless, the audit identified issues relating to DEEWR's implementation of the program's administrative framework. In a range of instances, DEEWR was not consistent in the implementation or documentation of application assessment processes; the department's oversight of compliance with funding agreements has been limited; and there is scope to further strengthen the program's performance information framework:
For the initial application rounds, DEEWR did not consistently apply some key application assessment quality controls and procedures, and there were weaknesses in its documentation of application assessments. The automated capture of application assessments from Round 2 has led to improvements.

The program has placed emphasis on the effectiveness of partnership arrangements and the appropriate conduct of associated responsibilities. For the first two program rounds, DEEWR has not systematically monitored education authorities' and schools' compliance with the requirements of funding agreements. DEEWR has recognised a need to tighten its oversight of the program's funding framework, and in May 2010, finalised a strategy aimed at monitoring compliance in relation to the establishment and ongoing operation of projects, for a random sample of projects.[13]

The program's performance information framework has improved over time through the adoption of a broader set of performance measures, such as the trend in students participating in vocational and technical education. However, as the program matures, there remains scope to further strengthen the framework, including by developing clearer milestones of program implementation. There is also an opportunity to heighten transparency by establishing expectations for overall program infrastructure development and subsequently reporting on progress.

As the program is a competitive process and does not have specific targets for the construction of TTCs, it is difficult for stakeholders to assess the extent to which the program is successful in developing the infrastructure that underpins it:

  • At the individual project level, there have been time lags between projects receiving in principle approval and finalisation of contractual agreements (on average 240 days for Rounds 1 and 2), in part due to the need for detailed planning and the close attention given by DEEWR to project costs.
  • There have also been delays in approved projects reaching specific construction milestone dates, with only 31 per cent of Rounds 1 and 2 projects meeting milestone two (commencement of construction) and 27 per cent meeting milestone four (completion of construction) on time. DEEWR advised there have been a variety of reasons for construction delays, such as: availability of subcontractors and building materials; weather conditions and other site issues; state and territory procurement requirements and lead times; and optimistic milestone proposals by schools having regard to planning, procurement and approval requirements.

DEEWR is well positioned to draw on lessons learned from the initial rounds to assist the transition of projects to contractual agreement and to ensure that projects set realistic milestone dates, enabling them to remain on track.

The ANAO has made three recommendations directed at strengthening program management and reporting of program performance to stakeholders. These involve DEEWR:

  • reviewing, for each application round, whether established assessment quality controls and procedures have been applied;
  • prioritising implementation of the program compliance strategy, and using the findings to refine program management approaches; and
  • in association with education authorities, expanding the program's performance measures and public reporting on performance.

Key findings by chapter

Program planning and implementation (Chapter 2)

DEEWR established a generally sound administrative framework for the program, and met the Government's 100–day deadline for the commencement of the program. This included development and authorisation of guidelines that clearly outlined the program objectives, the criteria that would be used to select projects, and the information applicants would need to provide.

DEEWR's initial 2008 risk assessment for the program identified largely generic risks, such as staffing and implementation. The risks that are associated with administering a grant program were identified, to a limited extent, in a second assessment that was approved in October 2009. A more timely risk assessment taking into consideration more specific features of the program would have enabled proactive management of key risks, such as those relating to assessment processes. There was also no evidence of DEEWR monitoring and reviewing program risk management plans to ensure that the treatments and controls remained relevant.

Management of funding applications (Chapter 3)

The assessment process for the program was designed to be rigorous and competitive, with each application assessed by DEEWR on its relative merit, priority given to schools with the greatest need and capacity to benefit, and applications needing to align with the program priorities. Schools were required to demonstrate support for the project from the relevant stakeholders and also provide evidence that they had fully considered the project's funding and implementation.

The guidance and processes developed by DEEWR to facilitate the assessment process were well-defined and systematic. This included outlining the roles and responsibilities of each party taking part in assessment processes, developing assessment criteria that aligned with the program objectives and addressed value for money considerations, a quality control framework and standards for supporting documentation.

DEEWR did not consistently apply aspects of the quality control framework for the assessment process. For example, some staff involved in the assessment of applications did not complete the required confidentiality and conflict of interest declarations, or undertake assessor training. Similarly, for the sample of applications reviewed, in a range of instances key assessment procedures (such as eligibility and compliance checks) were not applied or appropriately documented.

Other documentation issues were also evident in the assessment process. Scorecards supporting assessment decisions for Round 1–Phase 1 could not be located. Errors identified by this audit in the spreadsheets used for ranking applications in Round 1–Phase 2 meant that the overall scores for one group of applicants were reduced by up to 20 points (out of a possible 500),[14] although none of the Round 1–Phase 2 applications in question were disadvantaged as a result.

DEEWR has given attention to value for money considerations during the assessment of applications—including through the independent review of project specifications for major capital works and the reasonableness of associated building material costs. The results of these reviews have subsequently been used by DEEWR in negotiations on project-level contractual arrangements.

After in principle funding decisions were made, the subsequent negotiation of the contractual arrangements took on average 240 days for projects approved in Rounds 1 and 2. These time lags have been caused by, among other reasons, time taken to finalise overarching funding agreements with education authorities; the close attention paid by DEEWR to project costs; and because some aspects of detailed project planning only occurred once applicants were informed they were successful.

Now that the program has been through several rounds, it would be timely for DEEWR to consider how best to reduce lengthy project negotiations, while also retaining focus on value for money. For example, DEEWR could usefully define a threshold for smaller items of fit-out that would lessen the administrative burden placed on schools while also protecting the interests of the Commonwealth. DEEWR advised it is also considering whether the competitive application model best fits with its objective for all eligible schools to be program beneficiaries over the life of the program.

Making payments and tracking progress (Chapter 4)

DEEWR developed funding agreements for the program that provided a reasonable basis for program and funding accountability by, for example, requiring measures that outline project activities, milestones, reporting requirements and the schools' obligations for ongoing use of the TTCs.

The implementation of this framework revealed areas for improvement in DEEWR's management of program payments, and monitoring of compliance with funding agreements and project progress. For example, DEEWR did not receive any of the 2009 annual acquittals from the government education authorities by the dates specified in funding agreements.[15] The delays ranged from two to 10 months for those received. DEEWR also made limited use of documentation checks and site visits to monitor compliance with funding agreements and project status, and inaccuracies in the spreadsheets used by DEEWR to monitor project progress suggested the data had not been validated or subjected to quality checks. DEEWR is now automating milestone tracking through its management information system.

In May 2010, DEEWR finalised a compliance strategy for the program that proposes a check (against funding agreements) for a random sample of 25 per cent of projects from each funding round, using desk audits and some site visits. Implementation of the proposed compliance strategy should be given priority by DEEWR, so that the findings can be used promptly to refine application processes, funding agreements and monitoring activities, as appropriate, in support of program progress and outcomes. Future compliance monitoring could be further enhanced by tailoring the allocation of available compliance resources according to program management approaches adopted by education authorities and schools, and attributes of the different types of projects.[16]

DEEWR has adopted a payment model that involves prepayments to education authorities for all project construction milestones (government sector) or milestones falling due in the relevant financial year (non-government sector). The release of payments by education authorities to schools is linked to provision of advice to DEEWR on achievement of project milestones. This approach facilitates the payment of construction bills when they fall due, but reduces DEEWR's control over the use of Commonwealth funds. In this regard, implementation of the program compliance strategy should help ensure a tighter nexus between project milestone achievement, provision of associated advice, and the release of school project funding by education authorities.

Using project milestones to measure progress

The TTC project schedules developed by each school, in conjunction with the relevant education authority, identify key milestones which DEEWR approves as part of project negotiations. ANAO testing[17] showed that delays had occurred in achieving milestones with, for example, only 31 per cent of projects meeting milestone two (commencement of construction) on time. DEEWR has acknowledged reasons that contribute to delays, including the need to comply with at times complex procurement processes in the states and territories and optimistic milestone proposals given planning, procurement and approval requirements.

Measuring and reporting program performance (Chapter 5)

Since commencement of the program, DEEWR has strengthened the program's Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) performance information framework by including additional key performance indicators to measure program effectiveness. Key performance indicators now include ‘trend in the number of students participating in vocational and technical education in schools and trend in Year 12 or equivalent attainment.'

DEEWR will gather the data to measure program trends from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Ministerial Council for Education, Early Childhood Development and Youth Affairs. While there are inherent complexities in obtaining comparable data across jurisdictions, there would be merit in DEEWR reporting in the program performance information framework the gap that existed in 2008 between the percentage of students already achieving Year 12 (or an equivalent) and the 2015 program objective of 90 per cent.[18] Similarly, there would be benefit in developing target trend data, such that DEEWR could assess progress and take any remedial action necessary.

It is recognised that progress against the key performance measures, particularly Year 12 or equivalent attainment and Year 11 and 12 retention rates, will be affected by a wide range of factors, including the activities of stakeholders and other DEEWR programs. As a result, it may be difficult to establish a definitive link between any improvement and the program.

To undertake a more complete assessment of program outcomes, the department will need to consider other factors which contribute to the program objectives, including the number of TTC graduates proceeding through the program and onto paid employment in their areas of expertise. To this end, DEEWR is now implementing a Reporting and Evaluation Strategy for the program which further explores the impact of the program on retention rates and the numbers of Certificate II and Certificate III qualifications in skill shortage or emerging industry areas, and has identified other ‘preliminary indicators' in this regard. Such indicators that are central to program objectives should be reflected in the PBS as data becomes available. The strategy's proposed evaluation is also an opportunity for DEEWR to consider whether the program has fulfilled the intent of its value for money criterion.

None of the overall program performance measures, and consequential public reporting, address the timeliness of construction or upgrades of TTC facilities. As a result there is a lack of transparency concerning the adequacy of progress in the development of Trade Training Centre infrastructure which underpins the achievement of planned outcomes. DEEWR's experience to date with grant application round outcomes, and project approval and construction timelines, could assist in the development of project demand and completion estimates. This would provide a basis for public reporting on the progress of development of TTC facilities, while also informing expectations regarding movements in key performance trends over time, such as students participating in vocational and technical education.

Achieving program priorities

There were indications, in terms of the kinds of skills to be taught, the focus on need and awarding of funds, that the implementation strategy was contributing to program objectives and priorities. ANAO analysis indicated that for Rounds 1 and 2, regional and remote areas received high proportions of TTC funding compared to their population shares; TTCs located in regional areas received 52 per cent of total funding, which is significantly higher than the proportion of the Australian population (29 per cent) living in regional areas. Similarly, TTCs located in remote areas received seven per cent of total funding, compared to their population share of only two per cent. These funding allocations are consistent with the program's priorities of supporting Indigenous students, students from regional and other disadvantaged communities, and establishing regional skills hubs.

One program priority was to encourage increased enrolments in trades experiencing skills shortages or emerging industries. A broad range of these trades were to be taught for a sample of school projects analysed. Analysis of a sample of 46 projects from Rounds 1 and 2 with approved contracts showed that this group of TTCs will support trades such as the automotive and engineering, construction and food trades, and other emerging industries.

Summary of agency response

DEEWR provided the following summary response to the audit report:

  • The Trade Training Centres in Schools Program (the Program) represents one of the most significant investments in education, skills and training undertaken with a commitment to invest $2.5 billion to provide facilities which will enhance vocational education opportunities for all students from Years 9 to 12 across Australia.
  • With up to 68 Trade Training Centres expected to be operational from the commencement of the 2011 school year, the Program is building the momentum to enhance the vocational educational opportunities for Australian secondary school students.
  • The construction of Trade Training Centres throughout Australia ensures that Australia has the infrastructure in place to support all students seeking a vocational pathway in their secondary schooling.

DEEWR agreed with each of the three recommendations in this report.

Footnotes

[1] Schools are eligible if: they attract Australian Government general recurrent grants funding under the Schools Assistance Act 2004 legislation; are delivering a level of secondary education as determined by the Minister under the Act; and meet financial and educational accountability requirements of Commonwealth and state or territory legislation.

[2] Executive schemes are programs established and implemented by decision of the Australian Government under authority of the executive powers provided by section 61 of the Constitution and for which specific legislative authority is not sought from the Parliament, other than in relation to the appropriation of funding. Australian National Audit Office, Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration, ANAO, Canberra, June 2010, p.iv.

[3] Block Grant Authorities (BGAs) are bodies that represent non-government schools in the states and territories for capital funding purposes. There are 14 BGAs, that is, one for each of the two territories that represents the Catholic and independent sectors, and two in each state (one for the Catholic schools and another for independent schools).

[4] Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), Trade Training Centres in Schools Program, Program Guidelines–2008 (Pending Finalisation of Partnership Arrangements), DEEWR Canberra, March 2008, p. 32. Program Guidelines–2008 (Round One–Phase Two), p. 33. Program Guidelines, February 2009, pp. 17 and 39. Program Guidelines, 2010, pp. 8–12.

[5] The new framework for federal financial relations, which commenced on 1 January 2009, aims to provide clearer specification of the roles and responsibilities of each level of government so that the appropriate government is accountable to the community. It also aims to provide more transparent reporting of outputs and outcomes to drive better service delivery and reform.

[6] This objective of the program was initially to help increase the proportion of students achieving Year 12 or an equivalent qualification to 85 per cent in 2015 and 90 per cent by 2020, but the 2015 target was raised to 90 per cent by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in November 2008. The program is one of several government programs aimed at addressing Year 12 retention rates.

[7] DEEWR, Program Guidelines,2010, op. cit., p. 1.

[8] Over the life of the program, the Australian Government aims to achieve an equitable distribution of funding among states, territories and across education sectors. The final distribution of funds will, however, depend on the quality of applications received from each sector in each state and territory. ibid., p. 2.

[9] Certificate III qualifications focus on relevant theoretical knowledge and the ability to perform a wide range of skills and usually require an on–the-job training element. Government reports forecasting shortages of people in these vocational areas contributed to Certificate III qualifications being given priority for the program.

[10] The National Skills Needs List identifies trades that are deemed to be in national skill shortage based on research conducted by DEEWR. Australian Government, [Internet] available from <http://www.australianapprenticeships.gov.au/whatsnew/NSNL_announced.asp> [accessed 7 September 2010].

[11] Stakeholders include the education authority, Registered Training Organisations, industry groups and associations and other schools involved in any cluster arrangements.

[12] Round 3 of the program closed on 4 June 2010, with remote service delivery applications closing on 2 July 2010. The audit focused on the first two rounds.

[13] In response to the proposed audit report, DEEWR advised that the Compliance Handbook, which puts into operation the compliance strategy, was trialled in some schools in Queensland during November 2010, and will be available for all program staff for full implementation from January 2011.

[14] DEEWR, Schools Education Management Information System (SEMIS), Release 8, TTC Assessment Function Specification, Attachment 1–Questionnaires, DEEWR Information Services Group, 20 May 2009.

[15] In response to preliminary audit findings, DEEWR advised that all the required statements had been received as at 25 June 2010.

[16] The level of devolution of responsibility for financial decisions varies between education authorities and in some cases within them. The independent schools sector is composed largely of self-managing schools, which have complete autonomy in decision-making on financial matters. Decision-making on financial matters in school systems, on the other hand, is generally more centralised with the greatest level of centralisation existing in the government sector.  Australian National Audit Office, Building the Education Revolution-Primary Schools for the 21st Century, Audit Report No 33, 2009-10, p. 131.

[17] Testing was conducted on 125 projects that had executed a contractual agreement at 13 July 2010.

[18] A 2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics report stated that 25 per cent of Australians left school early, a figure that increased to 60 per cent for young Indigenous Australians. ABS, Schools Australia, 2006, cited in K Rudd and S Smith, Labor's Education Revolution: New Directions for Vocational Education and Training: Trades Training Centres in Secondary Schools, ALP, May 2007, p. 4.