The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s administration of the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy. The ANAO examined whether the department had established effective:
1. Australia’s biosecurity system aims to minimise the risk of entry, establishment or spread of exotic pests, weeds and diseases that have the potential to cause significant harm to Australia’s unique environment and economy. Australia is presently free of many of the biosecurity threats that have had major environmental and economic consequences for other countries.1 Maintaining this favourable biosecurity status is particularly important to Australia’s $32 billion agricultural export industry.
2. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) has primary responsibility for managing Australia’s biosecurity system, which involves a continuum of pre-border, border and post-border activities. These activities form a multi-layered approach that DAFF uses to manage, rather than eliminate, biosecurity risks. According to this approach, detecting an exotic pest, weed or disease within Australia is not a failure of the system if it is detected early and dealt with quickly.
3. Generally, the Australian Government has regulatory responsibility for the pre border and border elements of the biosecurity continuum, while state and territory governments have responsibility for post-border activities, such as surveillance and response activities. The Australian Government does, however, retain responsibility for some post-border activities, such as those delivered under the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy.
4. The Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy (NAQS) was established in 1989 as an early detection and warning system to address the unique biosecurity risks that face Australia’s northern region. Northern Australia is particularly vulnerable to biosecurity threats because of its close proximity to Indonesia, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea, which have different pest and disease statuses to Australia. The objectives of the NAQS program are to: identify and evaluate the unique quarantine risks facing northern Australia; develop and implement measures for the early detection of targeted pests and diseases; contribute to national and international initiatives that target relevant pests and diseases; and manage the quarantine aspects of border movements through the Torres Strait.
5. NAQS operates in coastal regions of northern Australia, covering approximately 10 000 kilometres from Broome, Western Australia to Cairns, Queensland, including the islands of the Torres Strait (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 NAQS Zone
Source: DAFF.
6. NAQS is responsible for helping to address biosecurity risks related to specified pathways in northern Australia, including movements of:
7. Monitoring these pathways is challenging in northern Australia because the coastline is vast, remote and sparsely populated. In addition, the risk of an exotic pest or disease establishing in the north is heightened by large numbers of feral animals and particular plant species, which provide potential hosts for pests and diseases. The Torres Strait islands also form potential ‘stepping stones’ for exotic pests, weeds and diseases from Papua New Guinea to mainland Australia.
8. Consistent with DAFF’s risk-based approach to managing the biosecurity continuum, the NAQS program is implemented through:
9. Under this approach, scientific surveillance and border management activities are supported by public awareness activities.
10. Guided by target lists of high-risk pests, weeds and diseases, NAQS scientific officers undertake a range of animal and plant surveillance activities across northern Australia and the Torres Strait each year. These activities include: monitoring migratory birds, cattle herds and feral and domestic animal populations for the presence of new animal diseases; monitoring fruit fly traps; and conducting regular plant surveys for signs of exotic weeds, insect pests and plant diseases. In 2010–11, the NAQS program made 16 detections, including vegetable leafminer, papaya fruit fly and biting midge in the Torres Strait, and gray leaf spot in mainland Australia. Once NAQS officers detect the presence of an exotic pest, weed or disease, they are required to notify the relevant state or territory government biosecurity agency that is responsible for response activities, in addition to Australian Government authorities.4
11. DAFF manages the quarantine aspects of Torres Strait border movements between: Papua New Guinea and the Torres Strait Protected Zone (TSPZ); the TSPZ and the Special Quarantine Zone; and either zone and mainland Australia.5 The Torres Strait Treaty governs the movement of traditional visitors from Papua New Guinea to islands in the TSPZ, and the Quarantine Act 1908 governs the quarantine aspects of all movements into and between zones in the Torres Strait and into mainland Australia. DAFF restricts the movement of quarantine risk material related to Torres Strait border movements by: informing traditional visitors and vessel and aircraft operators about quarantine and notification requirements; inspecting traditional visitor arrivals and the vessels and aircraft that carry people and cargo southward through the Torres Strait; detecting and seizing quarantine risk material; and managing non compliance with notification requirements
12. To assist in the delivery of the NAQS program across the northern coastline of Australia, DAFF promotes public awareness of biosecurity issues and engages Indigenous ranger groups to undertake scientific surveillance and public awareness support activities. The NAQS program’s public awareness campaign—Quarantine Top Watch! aims to encourage the public to monitor and report exotic pests, weeds and diseases and to comply with border movement requirements. The department uses a range of public awareness activities to communicate the quarantine message, such as direct community engagement activities and the distribution of promotional products.
13. Since its inception in 1989, the NAQS program has been administered by DAFF under various delivery models.6 The NAQS program is currently delivered within DAFF Biosecurity’s7 Northern Region and is administered from the department’s regional office in Cairns.8 The 2011–12 program budget is $12.8 million and is delivered by 68 DAFF officers9, including 22 animal and plant health scientists and 23 border operations staff, of which 20 are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. Indigenous officers help the department to build and maintain relationships with local communities.
14. To support the delivery of the NAQS program, DAFF collaborates with government and non-government bodies, including local councils and Indigenous communities. The department has also established resource-sharing arrangements with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.
15. The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s administration of the Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy. The ANAO examined whether the department had established effective:
16. The audit did not examine DAFF’s arrangements for managing the response to biosecurity emergencies when exotic pests, weeds and diseases are detected post-border
17. Australia is presently free of many pests and diseases that have had major economic and environmental consequences for other countries. This favourable biosecurity status is particularly important to Australia’s $32 billion agricultural export industry. However, Australia’s expansive northern coastline and its proximity to neighbouring countries, such as Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, make it vulnerable to exotic pests, weeds and diseases that can be carried by migrating birds, human activities and wind currents to the mainland.
18. In 1989, the NAQS program was established within DAFF to respond to the unique biosecurity risks that face Australia’s northern region. NAQS aims to facilitate the early detection of pests, weeds and diseases across northern Australia, covering approximately 10 000 kilometres of coastline from Broome, Western Australia to Cairns, Queensland, including the islands of the Torres Strait. The program is implemented through three core elements: scientific surveillance; Torres Strait border operations; and public awareness.
19. In 2011–12, NAQS was delivered by approximately 68 officers, located at 21 locations across the NAQS zone. Since mid-2009, NAQS has reported 33 detections, including 17 targeted exotic pests and diseases, which were reported to state, territory and Australian Government biosecurity stakeholders. NAQS is a mature program that is widely recognised as playing an important role in Australia’s national biosecurity system by assisting to safeguard Australia’s animal and plant health status.
20. In general, DAFF has implemented effective arrangements to administer the NAQS program in line with the department’s risk-based approach to biosecurity. These arrangements support the delivery of the program’s diverse scientific and border operations activities. Systems and processes have been established to identify and review biosecurity risks and to target the delivery of animal and plant health scientific surveys. The department also has arrangements in place to manage the quarantine aspects of Torres Strait border movements, which focus on maintaining an ongoing presence in the Torres Strait, informing stakeholders of their quarantine responsibilities and undertaking inspections to limit the movement of quarantine risk material. In recent years, the department has formalised and more clearly articulated the program’s public awareness strategies to reflect biosecurity risks and strengthened its relationships with key stakeholders, particularly Indigenous communities. Underpinning these arrangements is a sound governance framework.
21. There are, however, aspects of the program that could be improved to better inform management decision-making and to enable the department to demonstrate the achievements of the NAQS program. These include: better managing scientific data; improving the integrity of border operations data; and further strengthening the department’s arrangements for measuring and reporting NAQS performance. Management of scientific data
22. It is critical to the success of NAQS that data collected during scientific surveys is effectively managed and that specimens are identified correctly in a timely manner. This is particularly important for significant findings and detections where notification to biosecurity authorities may be required. DAFF uses a range of in-house and external diagnostic facilities to identify and verify field samples. While DAFF has established processes to manage plant and animal samples, the department is yet to establish an effective mechanism to track the more complex and time-consuming diagnostic activities required to identify insect pests and plant diseases. Enhancing the existing arrangements to track these samples through the identification process would help the department to ensure that all samples are appropriately identified, accurately recorded and, where necessary, reported in a timely manner.
23. Weaknesses were also identified in the department’s management of scientific data. Data entry activities are not adequately monitored and capacity constraints identified in the functionality of the NAQS Database limit the storage and use of survey data and diagnostic results. These issues further impede DAFF’s ability to monitor and manage diagnostic data and adversely impact the effectiveness of the department’s management of surveillance activities. While the proposed migration to a new data-sharing platform is expected to address some of these issues, improvements to the management of scientific data would better place the department to meet the quality and timeliness expectations of the program’s biosecurity stakeholders.
24. NAQS border operations involve inspecting southbound movements of traditional visitors and vessels and aircraft in the Torres Strait and seizing quarantine risk material. DAFF collects data on the number of border inspections conducted and the number of quarantine risk material items seized on a monthly basis. The inspection data for aircraft movements were generally accurate and supported by a quality assurance process. However, the inspection data for traditional visitors and vessel movements were generally inaccurate and, in some cases, incomplete. These data integrity issues were compounded by a lack of quality assurance processes.
25. Given the inaccuracies in the inspection data for traditional visitor and vessel movements, it would be prudent for the department to develop quality assurance processes to help improve the integrity of border operations data. While recognising that there are cultural and environmental challenges in collecting complete and accurate data for traditional visitor movements10, the same cannot be said for vessel movements.
26. Further, although DAFF collects data on notified arrivals, the department does not use this information to calculate inspection and seizure rates. Analysing border operations data to determine inspection and seizure rates would provide the department with more meaningful information to inform management decisions regarding border operations, particularly the priority given to inspection activity across the 15 Torres Strait islands where NAQS officers are located and the allocation of limited resources. It would also enable baselines to be established and trends in the performance of NAQS border operations to be monitored over time
27. While NAQS is a mature program, it has been challenging for DAFF to develop a comprehensive performance measurement and reporting framework, and, in particular, a core set of performance indicators that adequately cover the diverse activities of the program. In recent years, DAFF has made progress in developing performance indicators for NAQS, but there is scope to refine these indicators and strengthen the existing arrangements for monitoring and reporting the program’s performance.
28. While the primary purpose of the NAQS program is generally understood within DAFF and reflected in the program’s reported activities, the department has not articulated a clear objective for the program. The absence of a clear objective has made the development of performance measures more difficult. As part of the department’s ongoing review of the program’s performance measures, there would be merit in DAFF focusing on the establishment of a clear objective and initially developing a small number of key performance measures for each activity area that are aligned to the program’s objective and supported by accurate performance data.
29. Focusing on the key aspects of the program’s performance would better place the department to demonstrate program achievements and report on performance. This approach would also provide the foundation on which the department could systematically build the program’s performance monitoring and reporting capacity over time.
30. The audit has made three recommendations designed to: strengthen arrangements for managing scientific surveillance data; improve the integrity of border operations data; and build a more comprehensive performance measurement and reporting framework.
31. The revised organisational arrangements that have resulted in the delivery of NAQS within a single region—the Northern Region—has helped DAFF implement a more coordinated and streamlined approach to the administration of the program. Established management arrangements support this delivery model and oversight committees provide effective forums for progressing the strategic and operational priorities of the program. In particular, the introduction of the NAQS Steering Committee has helped provide DAFF senior management with greater visibility of the program and strengthened the relationship with business critical stakeholders. Strategic business planning processes, particularly the development of the annual Program Schedule, provide a sound basis for implementing the program. These oversight arrangements help to ensure that emerging risks and changes to the program’s risk profile are identified and addressed in a timely manner.
32. The effective delivery of NAQS is reliant on the engagement of relevant program stakeholders, including state and territory government biosecurity agencies and Australian Government entities that assist the program through resource-sharing arrangements. DAFF maintains formalised arrangements with key stakeholders groups, which are commensurate with each stakeholder’s level of influence over the delivery of the program. In recent years, the department has worked to strengthen relationships with state and territory government biosecurity agencies. These efforts have seen a maturing of these relationships and have placed DAFF in a sound position to manage NAQS within a whole-of-government context.
33. NAQS officers are supported in their roles through: access to a range of training opportunities, which are largely focused on operational activities; and the provision of instructional material, which is periodically reviewed to ensure it is fit-for-purpose. DAFF has also established a verification process to help ensure NAQS officers are performing activities in accordance with the standards established in instructional material. The verification process provides coverage of core NAQS activities and, in 2010–11, did not identify any significant issues with the practices adopted by NAQS officers. Verification processes provide DAFF with an appropriate level of assurance that NAQS officers are performing activities in accordance with agreed standards.
34. The NAQS program uses a range of risk assessment methodologies to identify exotic pests, weeds and diseases in the development of target lists and risk ratings for the 40 risk areas of the NAQS zone. The target lists and risk area ratings are maintained through annual assessments and the conduct of comprehensive reviews, which involve key stakeholders and specialists from state and territory government biosecurity agencies. This risk-based approach provides a practical basis for implementing scientific surveillance work, determining resource allocations and planning survey activity.
35. The conduct of surveillance activities is a well-established aspect of the program and is heavily reliant on the corporate and specialist knowledge held by senior staff. In recent years, the department has used a number of different reporting formats to document survey findings, with variable completion rates. DAFF currently requires officers to complete pre- and post-survey reports. The completion of post-survey reports is particularly important as they assist in the planning of future surveillance activities and the revision of guidance material on survey methodology and succession planning.
36. DAFF uses a range of in-house and external diagnostic facilities to identify and verify field samples and has an established process in place for reporting suspect pests and diseases and confirmed detections that generally meet the expectations of the program’s key biosecurity stakeholders. While there is a mechanism to track the progress of animal and plant samples, the department is yet to establish an effective mechanism to track the progress of diagnostic activities and timeframes for the identification of insect pests and plant diseases. Timely diagnostic processes are particularly important as subsequent notification to biosecurity agencies may be required for significant findings. Capacity and functionality constraints identified in the NAQS Database further limit the department’s ability to monitor and manage diagnostic and data entry activities, which ultimately impacts on the effectiveness of the department’s management of surveillance activities.
37. DAFF is responsible for managing the quarantine aspects of: traditional visitor movements between Papua New Guinea and the TSPZ; and vessel and aircraft movements between the Torres Strait and mainland Australia. This work primarily involves conducting inspections and seizing any quarantine risk material. While DAFF does not mandate a particular number of inspections that NAQS officers are to conduct, which is consistent with the DAFF’s risk-based approach to border operations, the department attempts to inspect as many border movements as possible. The ANAO’s analysis indicated that, in 2010–11, NAQS officers inspected approximately 43 per cent of traditional visitor movements, 68 per cent of Cairns vessel movements and 80 per cent of Cairns aircraft movements.
38. The number of inspections conducted is influenced by the number of NAQS officers available to conduct, at times, large numbers of inspections and the extent to which traditional visitors and vessel and aircraft operators comply with arrival and notification requirements. In those cases where operators fail to comply with notification requirements, DAFF manages and addresses non-compliance incidents through an escalated approach. In 2010–11, three non-compliance incidents were referred to DAFF’s Compliance and Investigations Team, with each incident considered to involve minor non compliance.
39. The collection of border operations data in the Torres Strait is challenging because of limited IT access and rugged working conditions. While the inspection data for aircraft movements were found to be generally accurate and supported by a quality assurance process, the inspection data for traditional visitors and vessel movements were found to be generally inaccurate and, in some cases, incomplete. These issues were compounded by a lack of quality assurance processes. Further, although DAFF collects data on notified arrivals, the department does not use this information to calculate inspection and seizure rates. This further analysis would enable DAFF to monitor trends and performance over time and would better inform management decision-making regarding the deployment of staff and the prioritisation of inspection activity. Improving quality assurance processes would also provide greater assurance regarding the integrity of border operations data.
40. The implementation of NAQS public awareness activities is characterised by a multi-layered and integrated delivery approach that is targeted to specific stakeholders across the NAQS zone. This delivery model helps ensure that public awareness messages reach key stakeholders.
41. While public awareness has been an important component of the NAQS program, until recently, the delivery of public awareness activities was not supported by a documented communication strategy. A review of NAQS public awareness activities in 2010 provided the basis for the development of the program’s Communication Strategy and annual Communication Implementation Plan. DAFF is currently finalising the Strategy, and the Implementation Plan was recently endorsed by the NAQS Management Committee.
42. DAFF has recently taken steps to improve the monitoring of public awareness activities, including: the identification of additional methods to monitor the performance of awareness-raising activities; and the development of performance indicators to assess the effectiveness of public awareness activities. These developments will better place the department to assess the effectiveness of public awareness activities and to help ensure that limited resources are deployed appropriately.
43. Indigenous ranger groups play an important role in supporting the delivery of NAQS through biosecurity support activities and building relationships with local communities. Since 2006, the approach to engaging Indigenous ranger groups has been formalised under annual fee-for-service contracts. While there are a range of challenges in managing agreements with 38 ranger groups across a geographically diverse area, the department has adopted a pragmatic approach that generally supports the achievement of program objectives. A key component of this approach has been mentoring and training Indigenous ranger groups to address varying levels of capacity. There are, however, aspects of the department’s work with ranger groups that require effective oversight, including the extent to which agreed activities are completed and invoiced. Improved monitoring of contracted activities would assist the department to identify constraints to the completion of agreed activities and to effectively target capacity-building activities.
44. An effective measurement and reporting framework requires a clear, well-defined program objective and a set of performance measures that cover key aspects of program delivery, underpinned by accurate cost-effective performance information. While the current NAQS objective identifies key program activities, it does not clearly articulate the primary purpose of the program, which has made developing performance measures for the NAQS program more difficult. As part of its ongoing review of the performance management framework for NAQS, it would be timely for the department to also review the program objective to ensure that it clearly articulates the intended purpose of the program.
45. While there have been challenges in developing performance measures for the diverse range of activities delivered under the program, DAFF has recently revised performance measures for border operations and developed measures for scientific surveillance and public awareness activities. The department has proposed a large number of potential performance measures, which, in some cases, measure activity rather than performance. As the maintenance of a large number of performance measures can be costly and time-consuming, there would be merit in the department initially focusing on a small number of key performance measures that align to the program objective. This would provide a foundation on which the department could build its performance reporting capacity over time. Enhancing the integrity of border operations data and developing quality assurance processes will further strengthen DAFF’s ability to accurately report program performance.
46. DAFF has established mechanisms for reporting program activities to internal and external stakeholders, including monthly performance summaries to the DAFF executive and key stakeholders, half-yearly status reports to the NAQS Steering Committee and a high-level narrative on the program in the departmental annual report. Addressing the identified shortcomings in the current framework for measuring and reporting performance would enable the program to more effectively demonstrate its achievements.
47. The proposed report was provided to DAFF for formal comment. DAFF provided the following summary response, with the full response included at Appendix 1 to the audit report.
The department welcomes the ANAO's acknowledgement that 'DAFF has implemented effective arrangements to administer the NAQS program in line with the department's risk-based approach to biosecurity' noting the unique and challenging operating environment in which program services are delivered. The department further notes the ANAO's statement that 'underpinning these arrangements is a sound governance framework'.
The department accepts the ANAO's findings that there are some aspects of the program that could be improved but notes that there is no evidence that suggest that these aspects have in any way compromised the effectiveness of NAQS' Biosecurity activities. The department agrees that the suggested improvements will better inform management decisions on certain issues and will enable the department to better demonstrate the achievements of the NAQS program.
[1] Examples of exotic pests and diseases that are established to Australia’s north include: screw-worm fly, which is established in Papua New Guinea; citrus canker, which is established in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea; and foot and mouth disease, which is widespread in parts of Asia.
[2] According to the Quarantine Proclamation 1998, the following items are considered quarantine risk material and cannot be moved from the Torres Strait Protected Zone to the Special Quarantine Zone or from either zone to mainland Australia without a permit: live animals; meat products; dairy and egg products; untreated hides and feathers; animal products; soil; fresh fruits and vegetables; and plants.
[3] In addition to these core functions, NAQS maintains strategic collaborations with state and territory biosecurity agencies and provides input into national biosecurity measures of direct relevance to NAQS responsibilities. The program also engages Indigenous ranger groups, which, for the purposes of the report, is discussed alongside public awareness activities.
[4] The Chief Veterinary Officer and the Chief Plant Protection Officer within DAFF are required to be notified of significant findings and detections related to animal and plant health.
[5] The border responsibilities of the NAQS program are specific to traditional visitor movements from Papua New Guinea to the Torres Strait and southbound people and cargo movements on vessels and aircraft from the Torres Strait to mainland Australia. The DAFF Biosecurity Passengers and Seaports programs are responsible for international aircraft and vessel movements, including those that occur in the NAQS zone.
[6] Major changes to the delivery of NAQS include modifications to the model and location of program delivery. Between 1989 and 1995, the program received funding from the Australian Government and was operated by the Queensland, Western Australia and Northern Territory governments. In 1995, a staged transition began, with responsibility moving from the states and territories to the Australian Government. From 2004 to 2009, NAQS was administered centrally from DAFF’s office in Canberra.
[7] During the course of the audit, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service was replaced with DAFF Biosecurity, in line with changed organisational arrangements within the department.
[8] Since July 2009, DAFF Biosecurity has been delivered through five regions across Australia. The five regions comprise: South East; Central East; South West; North East and Northern.
[9] This equates to 64 full-time equivalent positions.
[10] Traditional visitor inspections are generally conducted on island beaches in an uncontrolled and rugged environment, and in some instances, large numbers of traditional visitors arrive at one time for cultural and religious events.